

REPORT

OF

THE GENERAL BOARD

United States Forces, European Theater

Organization of the European Theater of Operations

Property of
Chief of
Military History
Dept. of the Army
Washington, D.C.

Property of U. S. Army

RECLASSIFIED
BY AUTHORITY OF
DATE

Unclassified
Ref TAG OF 5-571

Study 2

Property of
Office of the Chief
Military History
General Reference Branch

THE GENERAL BOARD

United States Forces, European Theater

ORGANIZATION OF THE EUROPEAN
THEATER OF OPERATIONS

MISSION: Prepare a Factual Annotated Report of the Organization and Method of Operation of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces and American Theater Headquarters.

The General Board was established by General Orders 128, Headquarters European Theater of Operations, US Army, dated 17 June 1945, as amended by General Orders 182, dated 7 August 1945 and General Orders 312 dated 20 November 1945, Headquarters United States Forces, European Theater, to prepare a factual analysis of the strategy, tactics, and administration employed by the United States forces in the European Theater.

THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
APO 408

ORGANIZATION OF THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

Prepared by:

Brig Gen Raymond G. Moses - - - - A.G. of S., G-4
Col R. R. Robins - - - - - G-4 Section
Col. C. C. hough - - - - - Theater Service
Forces Section
Lt. Col. W. P. Chesnutt- - - - -G-4 Section
Lt. Col. J. K. Damon - - - - -G-4 Section
Lt. Col. L. M. Gosorn- - - - -G-4 Section

Principal Consultants:

General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, United States Army, Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Forces.

General Walter Bedell Smith, United States Army, Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces.

Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee, United States Army, Commanding General, Communications Zone.

Colonel Charles R. Landon, C-15592, Adjutant General, Headquarters Services of Supply and later Adjutant General, Headquarters 12th Army Group.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| SUBJECT | PAGE |
|---|------|
| Part One: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force | 1 |
| Chapter 1: Organization in Effect Prior to Establishment of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force | 1 |
| Section 1 - Introduction | 1 |
| Section 2 - Establishment of COSSAC | 2 |
| Section 3 - Organization of COSSAC | 3 |
| Bibliography | 8 |
| Chapter 2: Initial Organization of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force | 9 |
| Section 1 - Mission of the Supreme Commander | 9 |
| Section 2 - Organization Plan | 10 |
| Section 3 - Functions of Section | 12 |
| Bibliography | 17 |
| Chapter 3: Control and Organizational Changes of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force | 18 |
| Section 1 - Extent of Control | 18 |
| Section 2 - Progressive Changes in Organization | 21 |
| Bibliography | 24 |
| Chapter 4: Major Commands of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force | 25 |
| Bibliography | 28 |
| Chapter 5: Discussion | 30 |
| Section 1 - Transition from COSSAC to SHAEF | 30 |
| Section 2 - Organization of SHAEF | 31 |
| Section 3 - Selection of Principal Subordinates | 34 |

| | |
|--|----|
| Section 4 - Policies Affecting the Organization and Operation of SHAEF | 35 |
| Bibliography | 36 |
| Chapter 6: Conclusions and Recommendations | 37 |
| Section 1 - Conclusions | 37 |
| Section 2 - Recommendations | 37 |
| Part Two: European Theater of Operations, United States Army | 39 |
| Chapter 7: The Situation as of 31 August 1943 | 39 |
| Section 1 - The Existing Organization | 39 |
| Section 2 - Major Considerations Affecting the Organization | 41 |
| Bibliography | 44 |
| Chapter 8: The Organization between 31 August 1943 and 17 January 1944 | 45 |
| Bibliography | 51 |
| Chapter 9: The Organization between 17 January and 6 June 1944 | 52 |
| Bibliography | 55 |
| Chapter 10: The Organization between 6 June and 15 September 1944 | 56 |
| Bibliography | 60 |
| Chapter 11: The Organization between 15 September 1944 and 8 May 1945 | 61 |
| Bibliography | 62 |
| Chapter 12: Discussion | 63 |
| Section 1 - General Considerations | 63 |
| Section 2 - The Organization Existing in August 1943 | 65 |
| Section 3 - The Period 31 August 1943 to 17 January 1944 | 67 |
| Section 4 - The Period 17 January to 6 June 1944 | 71 |
| Section 5 - The Period 6 June to 15 September 1944 | 74 |
| Section 6 - The Period 15 September 1944 to 8 May 1945 | 76 |

| | |
|---|----|
| Section 7 - Summary of Discussion | 77 |
| Bibliography | 83 |
| Chapter 13: Conclusions and Recommendations . | 84 |
| Section 1 - Conclusions | 84 |
| Section 2 - Recommendations | 85 |

Appendices:

- Number 1 - Amphibious Operations from the United Kingdom. Directive to the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander.
(Designate)
- Number 2 - Chart: Organization of CCS & Staff
- Number 3 - Charts (7): Major Commands Under SHAEF
- Number 4 - Charts (10): Organization of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force.
- Number 5 - Chart Ic. 1: Organization of ETOUSA,
31 August 1943
- Number 6 - Chart Ic. 1a: Organization of SOS,
31 August 1943
- Number 7 - Chart Ic. 2: Organization of MECOM,
16 January 1944
- Number 8 - Chart Ic. 3r: Organization of SOS,
16 January 1944
- Number 9 - Chart Ic. 3: Organization of the MECOM/
as published in GO 5,
17 January 1944
- Number 10 - Chart Ic. 4: Organization of TTOUSA,
5 June 1944
- Number 11 - Chart Ic. 5: Organization of MTOUSA,
2 August 1944
- Number 12 - Chart Ic. 6: Organization of MTOUSA,
15 September 1944
- Number 13 - Chart Ic. 7: MTOUSA, Command and
Liaison Channels,
12 February 1945
- Number 14 - Chart Ic. 7a: Headquarters MTOUSA,
Administration and
Supply Channels, 12
February 1945
- Number 15 - Chart Ic. 7b: Command and Liaison
Channels, Army Groups,
12 February 1945

- Number 16 - Chart No 7c: Headquarters ETCUSA, Command for Administration and Supply, 12 February 1945.
- Number 17 - Chart No 7d: Headquarters, Com Z, ETOUSA, 12 February 1945
- Number 18 - Chart No 7e: Organization of USSTAFF, 12 February 1945.
- Number 19 - Chart No 7f: Organization of Twelfth Army Group, 12 February 1945
- Number 20 - Chart No 7g: Organization of Sixth Army Group, 12 February 1945.
- Number 21 - Chart No 8: Organization of ETOUSA, 8 May 1945
- Number 22 - Letter, War Department, 14 May 1942.
- Number 23 - Factual Data: Status of ETCUSA as of 31 August 1943
- Number 24 - Factual Data: Changes in ETOUSA between 31 August 1943 and 17 January 1944
- Number 25 - Factual Data: Changes in ETOUSA between 17 January 1944 and 6 June 1944
- Number 26 - Factual Data: Changes in ETOUSA between 7 June 1944 and 1 August 1944.
- Number 27 - Factual Data: Changes in ETOUSA between 1 August 1944 and 15 September 1944
- Number 28 - Factual Data: Changes in ETOUSA between 15 September 1944 and 12 February 1945
- Number 29 - Factual Data: Changes in ETOUSA between 12 February 1945 and 8 May 1945
- Number 30 - Letter, Lt Gen John C. H. Lee, dated 17 December 1945, Subject: Theater Organization Study
- Number 31 - Comments on letter of Lt Gen Lee, dated 17 December 1945

THE GENERAL BOARD
UNITED STATES FORCES, EUROPEAN THEATER
APO 408

ORGANIZATION OF THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

PART ONE

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

CHAPTER 1

ORGANIZATION IN EFFECT PRIOR TO ESTABLISHMENT OF

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

1. It seems appropriate to review the organization in effect for the preparation of the assault on the continent prior to the establishment of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force and thereby trace through the various phases the factors affecting its structure.

2. Combined Chiefs of Staff. Upon the entry of the United States in the war against Japan, Germany, and Italy, it became evident that a unified strategy or policy making group was necessary to the most efficient prosecution of the war by the United States and Great Britain. Never before had any military organization been called upon to fight in such huge, widely separated theaters. It was necessary for some agency to determine priority of effort and direct the efforts of the two nations. This global strategy board was called the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and comprised a personal representative of the Chiefs of States of the United States and the United Kingdom and the Chief of Staff for Army, Navy, and Air for each of these nations.

3. Supreme Command. It was patent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, in preparing for the amphibious operation in North Africa in November 1943, that a unified intermediate command was necessary to plan, coordinate and control in the area the efforts of the armed forces of the two nations. Direct supervision of armies in the field by the Combined Chiefs of Staff would have been impossible because of their all-inclusive task of directing global strategy, because of their physical location, and because of their lack of a staff organization necessary to plan in detail and direct military operations in the field. Control would be facilitated and greatly simplified by the designation of a single supreme commander in a theater of operations. It was therefore decided that the armed forces of the United

Nations would operate under a supreme commander in each theater of operations.

SECTION 2

ESTABLISHMENT OF COSSAC

4. At the Casablanca Conference, in January 1943, it was felt that the time had come to evolve schemes for cross-channel operations. It had been calculated that at least four United States divisions would be available for the task by mid-August, seven by mid-September and fifteen by the end of 1943. These figures, however, were found to be greatly exaggerated, and it was recognized that a full scale cross-channel attack could not take place before 1944.1

5. It was agreed at Casablanca, however, that the work of preparing for the grand assault must go forward, and that it must be shared by the two nations which were eventually to cooperate in its execution. For the present it was decided to appoint a Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, under whom would be established a United States-British Staff, with the duty of driving forward the plans for cross-channel operations -- a task which had hitherto been entrusted to a body known as the "Combined Commanders". It was expected at that time that the Supreme Commander ultimately to be appointed would be a British General and that he would have an American Deputy, so the nomination of Chief of Staff and Deputy was decided on parallel lines. To these men accordingly fell the task of building up the organization which was to plan the Allied invasion of Northwest Europe.

6. When the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander addressed his staff at the first meeting, held on 17 April 1943, he stated "**** I want to make it clear, that, although the primary object of this headquarters (COSSAC) is to make plans, I am certain that it is wrong to refer to it in any way as a 'planning staff'. *** What we must contrive to do somehow is to produce not only paper, but action".

"In spite of the fact that it is quite clear that neither I nor you have by definition any executive authority, my idea is that we shall regard ourselves in the first instance as primarily a coordinating body. We differ from the ordinary planning staff in that we are, as you perceive, in effect the embryo of the future Supreme Headquarters Staff."

7. On 26 April 1943 the directive was issued which provided the basis for all of the subsequent activities of COSSAC. Apart from the comparatively long-term planning for the assault on the continent, COSSAC had to make preparations to deal with the situation should the Axis collapse. It was difficult to say when this might occur, but if such a break came, COSSAC must be prepared to take full advantage of it with

whatever forces might be available. There was also the task of planning possible operations for 1943 on as comprehensive a scale as resources would permit.

SECTION 3

ORGANIZATION OF COSSAC

8. Development of COSSAC. The history of COSSAC, from its inception to the time when it was transformed into the Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander, is the story of the development of the three main operational plans which were evolved to meet the requirements of the original directive, and of the internal expansion of organization and powers necessary to produce and eventually to implement these plans. This study is not intended to deal with the development of the plans but rather the expansion and scope of the organization itself. This expansion was to transform COSSAC from a small planning staff into a complex executive headquarters, under a Chief of Staff exercising practically all the authority of the Supreme Commander pending the latter's assumption of duty.

9. Plans developed by COSSAC. In order that the internal affairs of the headquarters may be fully understood it appears desirable to briefly outline the nature and development of the operation plans produced by COSSAC. These consisted of a series of operations or related operations as follows:

DESTROYED PER MEMO AGO, 27 June 1946

b.- "A return to the Continent in the event of German disintegration".

MUNKIN: (in three operations or cases)⁴
CASE A -- Return under conditions of
a weakened German resistance.
CASE B -- A withdrawal from the occupied
countries.
CASE C -- A complete collapse within
Germany itself.

c. "A full scale assault against the continent".

OVERLORD -- The chief scheme, a full scale
assault against the continent
in 1944.⁵

10. As originally organized, the staff of CCSAC was grouped in three main branches: Operations, Administrative, and Intelligence. The Operations Branch consisted of Navy, Army and Air Sections, each of which had American and British components under their Principal Staff Officers. The Administrative Branch also had an American and a British Principal Staff Officer but the Intelligence branch, although containing American representation, was under the control of a single British Principal Staff Officer. In addition, there was established a Central Secretariat, serving the Chief of Staff himself and all branches.

11. Principal Staff Officers. The British and three United States operational Principal Staff Officers were responsible to the Chief of Staff for the production of the main appreciations and outline plans. Collectively and individually, they were to direct their staffs in accordance with the policy of the Chief of Staff and the requirements of their respective services, with due regard to the available intelligence. The Intelligence and Administrative Branches each had their respective naval, army, and air components for both the British and United States Forces. It was their responsibility to supply necessary data to assist the operational staffs in preparing their appreciations and outline plans. The heads of these two branches attended the Principal Staff Officers' meetings to insure that their own planning conformed to operational requirements, and to advise the Operational Principal Staff Officers where necessary.¹

12. Necessity for Operation. On 20 May 1943 the Chief of Staff suggested to his Principal Staff Officers that they should always try to envisage themselves as working, not simply for a chief of staff, but for the Supreme Commander himself. Again on 9 July 1943 at his weekly staff meeting he said " * * * consider the reorganization of this head-quarters, with the object of transforming the present planning staff into an operational staff * * * is a necessary pre-requisite of proceeding to detailed planning." This theme was repeatedly stressed on subsequent occasions, and as the operational plans were developed and the time for their employment drew near, the necessity for the grant to the Chief of Staff of executive powers, pending appointment of the Supreme Commander, became increasingly evident.¹ On 7 Sept 43 a variation to the original directive was issued and paragraph 2 was amended to read:

"Pending the appointment of the Supreme Commander or his deputy, you will be responsible for carrying out the above planning duties of the Supreme Commander and for taking the necessary executive action to implement those plans approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff."²

13. Secretariat. The expansion of the headquarters' functions required the development of the adequate machinery to deal with the work involved. In May 1943, the Central Secretariat was established

to coordinate the work of the headquarters.¹ This was to develop in due course into the office of the Secretary, General Staff, when CCSAC became the headquarters of the Supreme Commander.

14. Civil Affairs. As early as 19 May 1943, the desirability was foreseen of a Civil Affairs reorganization. On 21 June 1943, application was made to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for officers suited to work of this nature to be assigned to CCSAC.

15. Publicity and Psychological Warfare. Another branch of activity that was to figure largely in the subsequent development of CCSAC was that of Publicity and Psychological Warfare. With the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 30 June 1943 a Directorate of Press and Propaganda, under the Intelligence Branch was appointed. In October 1943, the Directorate of Press and Propaganda was transformed into the Publicity and Psychological Warfare Branch which became independent of the Intelligence Branch in November 1943. This expansion was the direct outcome of the lessons learned during operation "STAKKEY" in Sept 1943. On 7 Jan 1944 the Publicity and Psychological Warfare 'charter' was issued explaining the nature and purpose of the new branch.¹

16. Reorganization. By July 1943, it was becoming clear that the prospective executive functions of CCSAC were going to necessitate considerable reorganization of the staff. More cohesion was needed, and closer integration was especially needed on the operational side. The Naval element had been of an executive nature from the start, and the Air element was becoming so. The Intelligence Branch was satisfactory except for a shortage of American officers, while in the Administrative Branch there was already integration in the sense that a British Major General was the Chief Administrative Officer, though it had been found necessary to retain the separation of the American and British sections by reason of the difference between the two administrative systems. The Chief of Staff directed the formation of an integrated United States - British Operational Branch to insure closest cooperation in the operational planning. This resulted in there being only three heads of branches on the military side, in charge respectively of Operations, Intelligence and Administration. Thus, there eventually came about in each branch the integration of the British and American staffs with a single officer - British or American - at its head.¹

17. Under the terms of the original directive to the Chief of Staff the Allied military staffs other than British and American, were not to be brought into the planning at present,² and it was pointed out at the inaugural meeting that the very existence of the staff should be concealed as long as possible. By August 1943, however, despite an original ban on consultation with the other Allied governments, planning for operations 'RAVEN' and 'OVERLORD' had reached the stage where it was necessary to obtain

information on such matters as port facilities, internal conditions and civil affairs of the occupied countries.

18. Military Missions. It was proposed therefore that the heads of the Military Missions of the Dutch, Belgian, Norwegian, Polish and Czechoslovakian governments should be accredited to the Headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander, so that he could consult with them as required, but that they should normally remain with their respective missions at headquarters 21 Army Group (British). In the case of the French, however, it was necessary for a mission to be specially accredited to Supreme Allied Headquarters in view of the active share expected of the patriot forces in the forthcoming operations.¹

19. Civil Affairs Staff. In the accompanying letter sending 'RANKIN' to the British Chiefs of Staff on 15 August 1943, it was pointed out that it was difficult to plan operations in detail before the clear political policy was defined between the two allies on the one hand and the occupied countries on the other. Secondly, the institution of a Civil Affairs Staff was necessary to carry out the orders of the Supreme Allied Commander.⁴ In September 1943 the Civil Affairs Branch of COSSAC was formed, consisting of four units to each of which was allotted the task of planning for a particular country -- France, Holland, Belgium and Norway. With the clarification of operational plans, however, a further reorganization of the Civil Affairs Branch was made. Sections were set up to deal with particular functions; fiscal, supply, economic affairs and information.

20. Necessity for Reconnaissance. In order to make accurate preparations for 'OVERLORD' it was essential to carry out systematic reconnaissance by air, sea and land for months before the actual operation was due to take place. At the outset, however, COSSAC had no direct control over such reconnaissance operations, but in September 1943, the Chief of Staff pointed out to the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the present lack of coordination led to wastage of effort and possibly even more undesirable consequences. He asked them to grant him authority to coordinate the requirements and priorities.¹ On 13 October 1943 this policy was endorsed by the Vice-Chief of Naval Staff. He considered that COSSAC must control all reconnaissance activity directly connected with 'OVERLORD'. The Chief of Combined Operations was likewise in agreement and since the Chief of Staff was unwilling to undertake this without the assistance of the experienced staff at Combined Operations Headquarters, he recommended that the Planning and Intelligence Sections of that Headquarters be put under COSSAC to afford guidance. The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed. A Reconnaissance Committee was accordingly set up, on which were represented the Chief of Staff; the Allied Navy Commander-in-Chief; the Air Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force; the Air Officer Commanding, British Tactical Air Force; the Commanding General Ninth United States Air Force; Commander-in-Chief 21 Army Group; the Com-

manding General, First United States Army Group; the General Officer Commander-in-Chief, Scottish Command; and Combined Operations Headquarters.¹

21. Integration. In early October proposal for the integration of the British and American staffs with a single commander were drafted and forwarded to Washington and the War Office emphasizing the organization for operations rather than for planning. The guiding principle was to be that any division along national lines should be abolished and that the staff should be reorganized functionally.¹ The increase in integration by the autumn of 1943 was the natural outcome of the increasing weight of American representation in the COSSAC staff, in respect to both numbers and ranks. At first, when the forces of the United States in Britain had been comparatively small, the composition of COSSAC had been predominantly British in character, but as the flow of troops across the Atlantic continued, the inter-allied balance on the staff was adjusted. This growth of American representation is reflected in many developments, such for example as the renaming of the former branches as "G Divisions". The Army Operations branch became G-3 Division in October 1943, and subsequently the Intelligence Branch became G-2 and the Administrative branch, G-4.¹

22. Signal Planning. One of the first requisites for the conversion of COSSAC into an operational headquarters was the establishment of an effective signal organization and by the end of October 1943 a Signal Planning Staff had been formed.¹

23. Air and Naval Staffs. Meanwhile, in November 1943, the Allied Naval Commander in Chief Expeditionary Force and the Air Commander in Chief Allied Air Force were appointed and their staffs were established at their respective headquarters. In consequence, whereas the naval and air staffs had hitherto been regarded in some measure as branches of COSSAC, they now became part of the staffs of their commanders.¹

24. Inner Cabinet. These changes, coupled with the steady expansion of COSSAC necessitated the establishment of an "Inner Cabinet", consisting of the Chief of Staff, his Deputy, the Allied Naval Commander in Chief and the Air Commander in Chief. The function of this body was to make command decisions on matters of major importance referred to it requiring inter-service coordination on matters of joint interest.¹

25. Transition. COSSAC had grown from a small planning staff into what was in all but name the headquarters staff of the Supreme Allied Commander; and the plans had been produced for the operations which it was to be the responsibility of the commander to execute. The last weekly staff meeting was held on 14 Jan 1944 when it was announced that Gen. Eisenhower would be arriving by 17 Jan 1944 to take up his duties as Supreme Allied Commander. COSSAC was then concluded as such, and was to continue work as "Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force",¹

B I F L I O G R A P H Y

Chapter 1, Part One

NOTES

1. History of COSSOC, 1943-1944.
2. Amphibious Operations from the United Kingdom. Directive to the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander (Designate). Appendix "A".
3. DESTROYED PER MEMO AGO, 27 June 1945
4. Operation 'DUKE' (Files SGS. 381 DUKE series).
5. Operation 'OVERLORD' (Files SGS. 381 OVERLORD series).
6. Directive to COSSOC (File SGS. 322-011/3).

CHAPTER 2

INITIAL ORGANIZATION OF

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

SECTION 1

MISsION OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER

26. Mission. The Headquarters of COSSAC was originally a planning group that assumed executive authority during September 1943, looking forward to proposed operations. Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF)⁵ was the headquarters to complete the plans developed by COSSAC and to direct the execution of the operations based upon these plans. A statement of the initial mission of the Supreme Commander and his headquarters is contained in a message from the Combined Chiefs of Staff as follows:

"1. You are hereby designated as Supreme Allied Commander of the forces placed under your orders for operation for liberation of Europe from Germans. Your title will be Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Forces.

2. Task. You will enter the continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces. The date for entering the Continent is the month of May 1944. After adequate channel ports have been secured, exploitation will be directed towards securing an area that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy.

3. Notwithstanding the target date above you will be prepared at any time to take immediate advantage of favorable circumstances, such as withdrawal by the enemy on your front, to effect a re-entry into the Continent with such forces as you have available at the time; a general plan for this operation when approved will be furnished for your assistance.

4. Command. You are responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and will exercise command generally in accordance with the diagram at Appendix 1. Direct communication with the United States and British Chiefs of Staff is authorized in the interest of facilitating your operations and for arranging necessary logistic support.

5. Logistics. In the United Kingdom the responsibility for logistics, organization, concentration, movement and supply of forces to meet the requirements of your plan will rest with British Service Ministries so far as British Forces are concerned.

So far as United States Forces are concerned this responsibility will rest with the United States Air and Navy Departments. You will be responsible for the coordination of logistical arrangements on the continent. You will also be responsible for coordinating the requirements of British and United States forces under your command.

6. Coordination of operations of other Forces and Agencies. In preparation for your assault on enemy occupied Europe, Sea and Air forces, agencies of sabotage, subversion and propaganda, acting under a variety of authorities are now in action. You may recommend any variation in these activities which may seem to you desirable.

7. Relationship to United Nations forces in other areas. Responsibility will rest with the Combined Chiefs of Staff for supplying information relating to operations of the forces of the U.S.S.R. for your guidance in timing your operations. It is understood that the Soviet forces will launch an offensive at about the same time as OVERLORD with the object of preventing the German forces from transferring from the Eastern to the Western front. The Allied Commander in Chief, Mediterranean Theater, will conduct operations designed to assist your operation, including the launching of an attack against the south of France at about the same time as OVERLORD. The scope and timing of his operations will be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. You will establish contact with him and submit to the Combined Chiefs of Staff your views and recommendations regarding operations from the Mediterranean in support of your attack from the United Kingdom. A copy of his directive is furnished for your guidance. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will place under your command the forces operating in Southern France as soon as you are in a position to assume such command. You will submit timely recommendations compatible with this regard.

8. Relationship with Allied Governments - the re-establishment of Civil Governments and Liberated allied territories and the administration of enemy territories. Further instructions will be issued to you on these subjects at a later date."

SECTION 2

ORGANIZATION PLAN

27. The outline and development of COSSAC was actually the development of SHAEF to a very large degree. Gen. Eisenhower was informally designated the Supreme Commander and arrived in the United Kingdom the middle of January 1944 to assume command. The Headquarters known as COSSAC was redesignated Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces and formally activated as SHAEF, effective 13 February 1944.

28. Supreme Commander. During the month intervening between Gen. Eisenhower's arrival in the United Kingdom and the formal activation of SHAEF, certain changes in organization were effected and officers selected to occupy key positions. Comments of the Supreme Commander concerning his headquarters during this period are considered of value to this study and quoted here as information:

"While my appointment as Supreme Commander did not become formally official until the issuance of a directive by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on February 12th, and while the status of my headquarters -- to be known as SHAEF -- was not recognized until the following day, the basic work of planning continued during this transitional period. The staff brought into being as COSSAC came under my control and was greatly expanded as the pressure of time and the vast scope of our work dictated."

29. The guiding plan in building up the staff sections was generally that equal British and American representation should be effected both as to position and numbers. This plan of integration was applied not only to Supreme headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force itself but also to the headquarters of the allied Expeditionary Air Forces and headquarters Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force which were closely allied to the combined staff of Supreme headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces. The combined staff of Supreme headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces was primarily concerned with matters pertaining to ground force operations. The coordination of air force and naval operations was accomplished by a joint planning staff which reported to the Chief of Staff and included representation from Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces sections, the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces and the Allied Naval Expeditionary Forces. The combined staff of Supreme headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces was fashioned, in general, along the lines of a high echelon United States Army organization with substantial modifications, however, which were deemed appropriate in view of the prospective responsibilities and functions of Supreme headquarters. It is evident from the attached charts (Appendix 4), that a substantial number of special staff functions were merged with those of the general staff sections appropriate to them.

30. Selection of Principal Staff Officers. The eventual composition of the forces, the locale of the proposed operations and the place whence these operations were to be mounted, materially influenced the selection of the principal staff officers of SHAEF. The Chief of Staff, United States Army had expressed the opinion³ that an American should be selected in charge of operations because the preponderance of forces would eventually be American; that a British officer should be selected as Chief of Intelligence, because of the contiguity of the field of operations to Great Britain and it was presumed that the British intelligence would have greater familiarity with the terrain

and order of battle of the German forces; that a British officer should be in charge of administration, since the United Kingdom was to be the base from which the operations were to be mounted; that the number two man in administration should be a particularly strong American officer who could later take charge of the section, since it was contemplated that the bulk of supplies would eventually flow direct from the United States to the Continent of Europe.

31. In accordance with the plan of integrating the SHAEF staff and the recommendations of the War Department Chief of Staff, a British officer was selected as Deputy Supreme Commander, an American as Chief of Staff and two British officers as Deputy Chiefs of Staff, one for operations and one for administration. The Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-1, G-3, and G-4 were American, with British Deputies, and the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2 and G-5 were British with American Deputies.

SECTION 3

FUNCTIONS OF SECTIONS

32. G-1 Section. It will be noted from a comparison of the charts showing the final organization of COSSAC and the chart depicting the initial organization of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (Appendix 2 and 4), that the COSSAC G-4, or Administrative Section, which was based upon the British system of an "A4" Staff, was reorganized to exclude personnel matters and a G-1 Section was included in Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. The G-1 Section then assumed the functions normally delegated to a G-1 under the American system of staff procedure. The activities of the G-1 Section fell within two distinct categories, namely:

a. Those matters concerning prisoners of war, disarmed enemy forces, reciprocal welfare, etc., as concerned all allied forces irrespective of nationality.

b. Personnel and other G-1 matters concerning the American and British forces.

This was relatively a small section and primarily concerned with policy matters applicable to both United States and British Forces.

33. The G-2 Section was organized and functioned in accordance with normal staff procedures and was concerned with the preparation of estimates, the establishing of policies, the security of plans and operations and the collection and dissemination of intelligence. The section had the added responsibility of presenting intelligence to the British War Office and the United States War Department, direct communication with these agencies being authorized for this purpose. Through the Supreme Commander, the section was also

responsible for intelligence information to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

34. The G-3 Section was integrated throughout and advised the Supreme Commander on operational matters and was responsible for preparation of both operational and post-hostility plans. The special staff sections of SHAEF were limited in number and the G-3 Section included qualified officers capable of advising the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 and the supreme commander on matters concerning the various arms such as artillery, armor, anti-aircraft, etc.

35. The G-4 Section, as indicated in the mission message to the supreme commander from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, was not responsible for the logistical support of the proposed operations. Although headquarters European Theater of Operations, United States Army (representing the United States War Department) and the British War Office were responsible for supporting the operations from an administrative standpoint, a complete G-4 Section was necessary to advise the supreme commander concerning logistical aspects, to establish policies applicable to the allied forces, and the preparation of outline administrative plans for future allied operations. The logistical coordination required in SHAEF was on a high level and generally was not concerned with detail operations which obviated the requirement for special staff sections of the Services being included in SHAEF as such. Ground, air and naval personnel were closely integrated in the headquarters and liaison was maintained with the British War Office and Headquarters European Theater of Operations, United States Army. To assure the effectiveness of this liaison, officers representing British and American services were assigned or placed on special duty with the section. The section was relatively large and the United States members functioned on some theater G-4 matters.

36. The G-5 Section was an integrated staff for the purpose of advising the Supreme Commander on matters pertaining to civilian population and to develop and publish the policy to be followed by the allied forces in the European campaigns. G-5 (Civil Affairs) Division, as organized in September 1943, consisted of four "country" units, entrusted with the task of planning for France, Holland, Belgium and Norway respectively, but by the time COSSAC became Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force it was evident that some reorganization was needed. These sections had worked on the assumption of full military government and direct control, as was the case in Italy; but it was subsequently realized that the countries of Northwest Europe would be 'liberated' territory, not 'occupied' enemy lands and as such would require a different type of treatment. Moreover, the conduct of Italian affairs by Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories had given rise to considerable criticism in the United States, Great Britain and Russia.

37. Reorganization of Civil Affairs Staff. In considering the lines which a reorganization of the Civil Affairs Staff should take, however, two divergent schools of thought arose, centering around the "Standard Policy and Procedure" published in November 1943. On the one hand it was maintained that Civil Affairs should as far as possible be organized on a "country" basis independent of purely military authorities; it was complained that the "Standard Policy" ran counter to this conception, was inconsistent with the principles of international law and the declared objectives of the United Nations, and "made every tactical commander in effect his own military governor". The other school insisted that Civil Affairs should follow broadly the military pattern and that the civil affairs staff should be closely integrated with the other branches of the staff. The Chief of Staff decided in favor of the latter view. It was considered that the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories organization must be avoided and that the Civil Affairs Staff, so far from being unrelated to a military headquarters, must be "more closely integrated with normal staffs throughout the chain of command". To give effect to this policy the Civil Affairs Staff was re-established in two components consisting of a General Staff Division at SHAEF, charged with policy making and coordination, and a Special Staff, located at SHREVEPORT, charged with preparing detailed plans on a "Country" basis. Civil Affairs detachments in the field were to work under the military commanders, receiving their technical instructions direct from G-5 Division at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force.⁴

38. G-6 Section. Under the plans for the 'OVERLORD' operation and for the deceptive measures related to it political and psychological warfare was designed to play a considerable part in the liberation of Europe. On the one hand, the propaganda machine had to be directed upon the German people, the German armies and those willingly or unwillingly working for them, in order to disrupt enemy morale and reduce enemy effective strength in the field. On the other hand, the local populations of the occupied countries had to be encouraged to obstruct the enemy's operations to the maximum extent and to be guided as to their conduct when the Allies came to their territories. The control of publicity was an allied subject of importance. The dangers resulting from the absence of a closely defined plan concerning publicity were brought to the notice of the Supreme Commander by the Prime Minister.⁴ He was disturbed by the growing tendency on the part of the press to indulge in embarrassing speculations about the date, place and scale of forthcoming cross-channel operations. The necessary control was the responsibility of the Supreme Commander and an Assistant chief of Staff, G-6 (Political and Psychological Warfare) was included in SHAEF to advise the Supreme Commander in these matters. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-6 was responsible for the psychological aspects of plans and directives, intelligence propaganda, training of psychological warfare personnel, air leaflet activity, press censorship, control of news correspondents and

field radio propaganda. Since the principal objects of the planned strategy in both the European and Mediterranean Theaters were so closely inter-linked, it was early realized that a unified policy was desirable in respect to publicity, censorship and press guidance. The directives on these matters issued in the two theaters were exchanged for mutual information in January, and a joint scheme evolved. As 'OVERLORD' D-day approached, SHAEF assumed the direction of policy in this respect and advised AFHQ on the course to be followed.

39. The Secretary of the General Staff at SHAEF, in addition to performing the normal duties of the Secretary of a General Staff, functioned in the capacity of an executive to the Chief of Staff. However, he did not exercise command functions and his office should not have been included in command channels as shown in the SHAEF organization charts (Appendix 4). The section was relatively large and maintained records, prepared statistics and daily summaries of the decisions made by the Chief of Staff and his deputies.

40. The special staff of SHAEF varied from time to time and was changed as new problems were met by the headquarters. It was composed initially of the Engineer, Signal, Adjutant General, Surgeon, Civil Affairs and Headquarters Commandant sections and was later increased by the addition of the Psychological Warfare, Public Relations, Air Defense and Combined Visitors Bureau sections. The organization and functions of the several sections were normal and comparable to those in any American headquarters.

41. Joint Planning Staff. The Supreme Commander stressed the need for close contact and the fullest coordination between all the planning elements under his command. A Joint Planning Staff was established in the headquarters which included representatives of the Air and Naval Staffs. This group reported to the Chief of Staff and acted in an advisory and representative capacity. It also was charged with preparing the groundwork for future planning.

42. A civilian group of political advisers was established in the headquarters and reported directly to the Chief of Staff and the Supreme Commander. This group was advisory in nature and had no command functions.

43. Some Theater functions were exercised by the United States staff in SHAEF on matters reserved to himself by the Supreme Commander. The specific functions, so reserved, were not defined or established in any published document.

44. European-Allied contact Section. In the early days of COSSAC, security requirements dictated that the European Allied governments should be kept in ignorance of the plans being developed, and even of the very existence of the staff. By the autumn of 1943, however, it was felt that this position was no longer

tenable. Not only had the staff expanded to proportions that were difficult to conceal, but the planning situation itself required some outside contacts to be made. Information was needed on such matters as port facilities, internal conditions and civil administration of the occupied countries from the allied nations concerned, while the proposals to use French resistance forces in support of the 'OVERLORD' operations should be made to the French Committee of National Liberation. Such disclosure, however, was not to extend beyond a statement of the Allies' intention to launch an assault on Nazi Europe, without giving any details as to the nature of the operation. Moreover, the matter was to be approached purely from a military and non-political angle. In accordance with this policy, an organization was evolved whereby SHAEF was able to maintain contact with the European Allied governments without sacrificing the vital safeguards to security. The Dutch, Belgian, Norwegian, Polish and Czechoslovakian governments each appointed a liaison Mission which normally functioned at Army Group levels, but the heads of which were accredited to SHAEF. By that means the Supreme Commander could consult with them as necessary, but the fact that the missions themselves were with the Headquarters 21 Army Group prevented undue interference with and investigation into matters of higher policy. The functions of the liaison missions were to advise the Army Group commander and to act as the representatives of their respective governments pending the liberation of their countries. They were to be composed of all the essential elements that would enable them to advise on such topics as operations, military security, civil affairs, publicity and psychological warfare in their respective lands. The members were to deal with the appropriate staff branches at Army Group Headquarters, and matters of higher policy were to be handled only by the liaison heads at SHAEF. When their national governments took over the administration of their countries, the missions were to surrender all but their purely military functions. On the other hand, SHAEF missions were to be appointed to represent the Supreme Commander's interests with the Allied governments. These, however, were to function in respect to all such matters as operations, security, publicity and psychological warfare only when the allied governments assumed control in their countries. Pending that date, the missions were to be of combined United States - British composition, each under a head who was to be chief of the Civil Affairs element. A decision as to the nationalities of the heads of the various missions was deferred until a final agreement should be reached between the President and the Prime Minister regarding the spheres of occupation to be allotted to the American and British forces respectively.

45. The coordination of the work of these missions was the responsibility of the European Allied Contact Section of SHAEF. On February 20, 1944, the section was placed under the direction of an officer who had previously been chief liaison officer with the Allied Contingents, working under the British War office; but by now all the allied armies had come under

the command of General Eisenhower, and the new organization represented a recognition of the need for unified control of all factors concerned in the forthcoming military operations.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

Chapter 2, Part One

ANNOTATIONS

1. Ltr Hq ETO, AG 381.099, dtd 19 July 44, subject: "Organization and Command of U. S. Forces".
2. Functional charts of SHAEF (CALA records).
3. Letter Gen Marshall to Gen Devers 24 September 1943.
4. History of SHAEF (Draft), 13 February - 6 June 1944.
5. Ltr SHAEF, File SHAEF/22112/SD, dtd 15 Jan 44, subject: "Designation of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force".
6. General Order No 1, SHAEF 13 February 44.
7. General Order No 2, SHAEF 14 February 44.
8. Message CC/S to SCAEF, file CCS 304/12, 12 February 44. (Ref a. CCS 145 Intg. Item 3)
9. "Supreme Commander's dispatch".

CONTROL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES,

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

SECTION 1

EXTENT OF CONTROL

46. Introduction. The authority of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces stemmed from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to whom he was responsible. At the same time, however, the Supreme Commander was authorized to communicate directly with the United States and British Chiefs of Staff and with the War Department and British War Ministry in the interests of facilitating operations and for arranging necessary logistical support. In the original directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Supreme Commander was given operational control over all ground and naval forces within his sphere. Also, he was made responsible for the Allied Expeditionary Air Force, tactical force to be utilized in direct support of ground operations.¹ Control of the strategical air forces in the United Kingdom was retained by the Combined Chiefs of Staff except during the critical periods preceding and immediately succeeding the assault on the continent. At the request of the Supreme Commander they were placed under his control in April and remained under the control of SHAEF until September 1944.¹⁵

47. Planning for Operations. The Supreme Commander controlled and coordinated the planning and execution of Operation "OVERLORD" as a whole, while delegating to the Naval, Ground, and Air Commanders the responsibility for planning the operation in detail and, under his command, for its execution when so directed.² This relationship was typical of the relationship that existed between the Supreme Commander and major subordinate commanders throughout the campaign. Planning on a strategic level, issuance of operational directives or mission type orders, coordination between units on the same level when such coordination between units themselves was impracticable, as in adjustment of Army Group boundaries, allocation of equipment used by both Americans and British, and the transfer of armies or smaller units between Army Groups were the province of SHAEF.¹¹ Subordinate unit commanders were given the widest possible latitude in the methods employed to carry out assigned missions. The Supreme Commander did not have control of administration and discipline of any forces of the United Nations composing his command.

beyond that which was absolutely necessary.³

48. Control of Logistics. In the United Kingdom, responsibility for logistics was vested in the British Service Ministries so far as British Forces were concerned, and in the United States War and Navy Departments so far as United States Forces were concerned. On the Continent, however, the Supreme Commander was given the responsibility for coordination of logistical arrangements and logistical support to the British and United States forces under his command.⁴

49. Control of other Forces and Agencies.

To facilitate the coordination of forces and agencies not subordinate to him such as portions of the air forces, agencies of sabotage, subversion and propaganda which acted under variety of authorities, the Supreme Commander was specifically asked to make recommendations as to any variation in these activities which he might deem advisable.⁵ Other than to maintain close contact with the Allied Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Theater, in order that operations in the south and northwest of Europe might be effectively coordinated, the Combined Chiefs of Staff retained for themselves the function of relationship with United Nations Forces outside the sphere of the Supreme Commander.⁶ SHAEF had no direct contacts with the Russians until January, 1945 and matters affecting the coordination of military efforts in eastern and north-eastern Europe were dealt with through the Anglo-American Military Mission, representing the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Moscow.¹⁴ In January 1945, the Deputy Supreme Commander, accompanied by the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, journeyed to Moscow for the purpose of conferring with the Russians. This conference proved conspicuously successful. In the course of the discussions, ranging over many aspects of the forthcoming campaigns, Marshal Stalin was acquainted with the plans of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, while he, in turn, responded with a full explanation of the planned Russian offensive.¹⁵

50. Control of Army Groups. During the invasion of the Continent the ground forces were relatively small in comparison to those later to become engaged and the Supreme Commander placed the initial assault forces under a single commander. The Commanding General, 21 Army Group was selected to command this closely integrated assault and retained command during the build up of the forces until SHAEF was established on the Continent on 1 September 1944.¹⁵ At this time, 12 and 21 Army groups began functioning as separate army groups with their commanding generals responsible directly to the Supreme Commander. The Supreme Commander decided against having a single ground force commander, who would have control over all ground force operations, reporting directly to him as was the case with the air and naval forces.⁵ He believed that as Supreme Commander he would be, through necessity, so intimately in touch with the army groups and with the allotment of air support for

operations that he could not relinquish direct and immediate control. He believed that if an over-all ground force commander were designated, he would be constantly directing him in his efforts and that the establishment of an additional headquarters in the chain of command was unnecessary. So it was only for the initial phase of continental operations and until Supreme Headquarters was established on the Continent that the Supreme Commander utilized an over-all ground force commander.⁵ From that time forward he placed himself in direct control.

51. Control of Strategic Air Forces.¹⁵ The Supreme Commander was given control of the strategic air forces, the 8th Air Force and British Bomber Command, in April 1944. It was felt that control of these forces was necessary, particularly during the period immediately prior to and following the assault on the continent. Prior to this time he had command only of the tactical air forces. In September 1944, the strategic air forces were withdrawn from the Supreme Commander's control and again placed under the direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. At the Supreme Commander's request however, the strategic air forces were available for his use. All the air power at SHAEF's disposal was coordinated through a Deputy Commander.

52. Relationship between SHAEF and ETOUSA. The Supreme Commander also commanded ETOUSA and the major commands of ETOUSA were placed under the operational direction of the Supreme Commander.¹⁶ This resulted in the 12th Army Group and the 6th Army Group being dealt with directly by SHAEF on operational matters without the necessity of utilizing ETOUSA command channels. Similarly, when necessary, SHAEF dealt directly with the Communications Zone. All other matters of purely American interest were handled between the War Department and Headquarters, ETOUSA, those with direct operational implications were closely coordinated with the Supreme Headquarters. However, the dividing line as to functions between the two headquarters was not clearly established, and responsibilities were often determined by personal agreements between the two agencies when the necessity arose, or by the direction of the Chief of Staff. This resulted in the sections of the headquarters of SHAEF assuming dual functions and interests within the affairs of ETOUSA when their primary interest and responsibility clearly rested in matters pertaining to Allied Affairs. The degree of interest and control of Theater functions varied in the U. S. staff sections of SHAEF. The L-4 Section assumed the greatest interest in Theater affairs since the other sections were more closely integrated with the British and had comparatively less to do with Theater functions. As indicated in part IIC, the U. S. Staff at SHAEF was affected by political considerations, personalities, available time and suitable personnel, and other factors that are difficult to evaluate but were important.

53. Correspondence. In general, throughout the periods of planning and operations, normal command channels were observed by Supreme Headquarters in conducting correspondence. Originally, no specific provisions were made for conduct through technical channels. It was found, however, that delay incident to the preparation and processing of command communications in matters of a purely technical nature, which did not involve the exercise of command or administrative control, were often of a prohibitive nature, and the need for modification of the existing procedure was clearly evident. Appropriate amendments were made in the existing system, authorizing chiefs of staff divisions to conduct informal correspondence with staff sections and agencies of other commands, exchange of information, forwarding drafts of documents for concurrence in comments, notices of conferences, and, in general, matters covered by previously approved policies, but which involved no command functions.⁶

SECTION 2

PROGRESSIVE CHANGES IN ORGANIZATION

54. Introduction. While there were numerous changes within the general and special divisions of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, which were effected either to increase the efficiency of or to meet new problems facing the headquarters, the initial staff organization, as of 13 February 1944, was not altered to any appreciable extent. There were no real controversial questions on the organization of the headquarters. Staff divisions were added, increased or reduced as the need arose due to a change in functions.⁴ In this connection, the more important changes which were made included the reorganization of the Civil Affairs Division, the splitting of the G-6 Division into two special staff agencies, the Public Relations Division and the Psychological Warfare Division, and the formation of two new special staff agencies, the Air Defense Division and the Combined Visitors Bureau. Perhaps the most important change occurred when Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Air Force was dissolved on 15 October 1944, when an Air Staff was formed as an integral part of the Supreme Headquarters.¹⁵ A common feature in all the changes was a steady demand for increased personnel. As the work of the Supreme Headquarters developed and its commitments were enlarged, it became necessary to expand the staffs to cope with extra work. The acquisition of these reinforcements was not easy, and particular difficulty in supplying men of the necessary qualifications was experienced by the British authorities.¹⁶ The various changes in the organization of the headquarters are shown on copies of SHAEF organizational charts in Appendix 4.

55. Reorganization of Civil Affairs Division. Effective 14 February 1944, the Civil Affairs Division

was reorganized into two components, a General Staff Division, designated as the G-5 Division, and a Special Staff Division, designated as the Civil Affairs Division. The G-5 Division was physically located at Supreme Headquarters, while the Civil Affairs Division was located outside the Supreme Headquarters. The purpose of the G-5 Division was to advise the Supreme Commander on matters of Civil Affairs/Military Government policy, issue Civil Affairs/Military Government policy directives and outline plans, and exercise general supervision over their execution. The Civil Affairs Division was established as a functional agency through which the policy decisions formulated in the G-5 Division were to be put into effect; it was to act in accordance with policies and instructions received from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 and its approach to other staff divisions of the Supreme Headquarters was to be through its corresponding sections of the G-5 Division. The Civil Affairs Division was authorized direct liaison with the staff of Army Group Headquarters. The Civil Affairs Division was made responsible for the preparation of detailed plans and the training of personnel.⁷ Also, it organized "national" sections which were the Civil Affairs nuclei of the Supreme Headquarters missions eventually to be accredited to Allied governments in their territories became liberated. At the same time, a German section was organized which was to provide personnel for ultimate fusion in a Military Control Council and the Military Government of occupied territory.¹²

56. Reorganization of G-6 Division. On 13 April 1944, the G-6 Division (Publicity and Psychological Warfare) was discontinued as a General Staff Division of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.⁷ In lieu thereof two Special Staff Divisions, the Public Relations Division and the Psychological Warfare Division were established. Because of the close and related nature of the two divisions, they were directed to share communications and censorship facilities where necessary.⁷ The splitting of the G-6 Division into two separate special staff division was caused by the fact that whereas Psychological Warfare was an operational weapon, Public Relations was a non-operational means of guiding opinion and obtaining the public support necessary to the forces of a democratic nation; experience had shown the distinct difference and need for the separation of the two functions and their re-establishment in contact with their appropriate operational and command channels.¹²

57. Formation of an Air Defense Division. An Air Defense Division, to function as a Special Staff Division of the headquarters, was established on 31 May 1944.⁸ The functions of the Air Defense Division were to advise the Supreme Commander on Air Defense, including Anti-aircraft Defense, Passive Air Defense, Fire Defense, and to insure that coordination of these matters was effected between all services.⁹ The activation of the Air Defense Division resulted from the desire of the Chief of Staff to place upon one staff officer the responsibility for policy advice on all aspects of air defense, both active and passive.

nd for coordinating the employment of all air defense means. It was felt that the old organization, whereby all artillery was represented as a unit, did not provide the proper basis, inasmuch as its terms of reference pertained only to the anti-aircraft aspects of the air defense and did not include the coordination of measures to mitigate the effects of an air attack. Furthermore, it was considered desirable to have a senior staff officer devoting his full time to air defense problems, thus freeing the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 from the many technical details involved.

58. Dissolution of Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Air Force. Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Air Force was dissolved on 15 October 1944. Following this date, the Supreme Commander exercised command over all air forces placed under his command through a Deputy Supreme Commander who, in addition to his other duties, was directly responsible to the Supreme Commander for the coordination of air operations in support of the Allied Expeditionary Forces. To assist the Deputy Supreme Commander in the discharge of his responsibilities, an integrated air Staff was formed and organized in two echelons, SHAEF Main (Air) and SHAEF Rear (Air). Both echelons reported to the Deputy Chief of Staff (Air). At Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (Rear), an air staff, parallel to the staff already existing, was organized. It was responsible for the planning and necessary action required for the coordination of the tactical air forces, preparing and examining recommendations for the use of strategic bomber effort, and for all air staff matters not specifically assigned to the rear echelon. No A-1 (Personnel) Division was organized, inasmuch as the U. S. Strategic Air Forces Headquarters was responsible for all air corps personnel administration. The A-2 (Intelligence) Division was responsible for all air Intelligence activities at Supreme Headquarters. The A-3 (Operations) Division was responsible for air operations (controlling operations, operational plans, operational records, meteorology, photographic reconnaissance, Combined Air Transport Operations Room, flying control and aircraft safety, and the Communications Squadrone) and air plans (controlling combined future, operational planning and liaison). The A-4 (Air Logistics) Division was responsible for liaison with the Chief Administrative Officer and G-5 of Supreme Headquarters, and for the formulation of administrative policy and plans affecting all tactical air forces and maintenance of air logistical information. No A-5 (Civil Affairs Division) was established. The Signal Division (Air) was responsible for air signal matters. A small air staff at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (Rear) was organized to provide a link with those air forces based in the United Kingdom. It also operated to provide the smooth transfer of Royal Air Force administrative functions from Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Air Force to Headquarters, Second Tactical Air Force.¹⁰ On 25 November 1944, SHAEF Main (Air) and SHAEF Rear (Air) were redesignated Air Staff SHAEF and Air Staff SHAEF (Rear), respectively.¹¹

B I E L I O G R A P H Y

Chapter 3, Part One

1. "Directive to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force", CCS/12, 12 February 1944.
2. Letter, SH^EF, (44)33, subject: "Operation OVERLORD", 10 March 1944.
3. CC/S 75/3, 24 October 1943.
4. Conference, Lt. Gen. Smith - Brig. Gen. Moses, 25 Sep 45.
5. Conference, Gen. Eisenhower - Brig. Gen. Moses, 27 Sep 45.
6. Staff Memo No 1, SH^EF, 15 February 1944 and Staff Memo No 1 (Revised), SH^LF, 7 June 1944.
7. General Order No 8, SH^EF, 13 April 1944.
8. General Order No 14, SH^EF, 30 May 1944.
9. Ltr SH^EF, file /G 373-2 GCP-/GL, 20 Oct 44, subj: "Command Control of Allied Air Forces".
10. 12 Army Group Cable L-16269, file 322.
11. History of SH^EF.
12. Ltr, Hq 'TOUS!', /G 381.099, 6 June 1944, subj: "Organization and Command of U.S. Forces".
Ltr, Hq 'ETOUS', /G 381.099, 19 July 44, subj: "Organization and Command of U.S. Forces".
13. Ltr, SH^EF, to Chiefs of all divisions, SH^EF, 9 Feb 44, /G 322, subj: "Organization of U.S. Forces (Administration)".
14. SOP No 1, Hq ETOUS, "General Plan for Administration Support from UK of U.S. Forces on the Continent", 25 May 44.
15. Supreme Commander's Dispatch.
16. Conference Lt Gen Smith - Brig. Gen. Moses, November 1945.

CHAPTER 4

MAJOR COMMANDS OF SUPREME HEADQUARTERS

ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

59. The major commands of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force varied from the date of activation until VE-Day except for the strategic air forces (paragraphs 46, 51 and 67). Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force maintained operational control of allied forces including, ground, air and naval forces of the United States, Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Norway in the European Theater of Operations.

60. Assault Period. Prior to D-Day the Headquarters, First United States Army Group and the Headquarters, 21 Army Group (British) operated under the direction of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces for planning purposes. While plans called for the eventual organization of American and British ground forces under their own commanders, each directly responsible to the Supreme Commander, the initial assault was foreseen as a single battle, closely integrated in all its parts and requiring the supervision of a single battle-line commander.⁶ The Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group was selected as the ground commander of the assault forces. Within the 21 Army Group for the assault was the First Canadian Army (II Canadian Corps), the Second British Army (I, VIII, XII, and XX British Corps), the I and II British Airborne Divisions and the First United States Army (V, VII, VIII, and XIX United States Corps) with the 82d and 101st United States Airborne Divisions attached.⁶ A United States Administrative Staff composed of personnel from Headquarters First United States Army Group was attached to Headquarters 21 Army Group during this period.

61. Build-up Period. The First United States Army Group became the 12th Army Group on 14 July 1944,¹²

~~DESTROYED FOR RENO ACC. 27 JUNE 1945~~

Headquarters, 12th Army Group moved to France on 22 July 1944 and assumed control of the First and Third United States Armies on 1 August 1944, on which date Third United States Army became operational.⁷ The 12th Army Group was under the command of the Commanding General, 21 Army Group until the establishment of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force on the Continent on 1 September 1944 at which time the 12th and the 21 Army Groups functioned as separate commands, the Commanding General of each being responsible directly to the Supreme Commander.⁸ The 21 Army Group was designated the Northern Group of Armies and was then composed of the First Canadian and Second British Armies. The 12th Army Group was designated the Central Group of Armies, and was then composed of the First, Third, and Ninth United States Armies. The Ninth United States Army was assigned to 12th Army Headquarters, First United Group on 23 August 1944.⁹ Headquarters, First United

States Army Group was disbanded on 18 October 1944.¹³

62. Southern Invasion. The 6th Army Group was activated as a United States headquarters on 1 August 1944 under the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. The Seventh United States Army invaded southern France on 15 August 1944. On 15 September 1944 headquarters, 6th Army Group assumed control of the Seventh United States Army and the First French Army, which was organized from French elements with the Seventh Army.¹⁴ Control of the 6th Army Group on 15 September 1944 passed to the Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force¹⁵ and it was designated the Southern Group of Armies.

63. Winter Campaign. The designation of the 21, 12th, and 6th Army Groups as the Northern, Central, and Southern Groups of Armies respectively was "----" for the purpose of strategical grouping only¹⁶ and had no effect on the operations of their headquarters or their numerical designation. No additional headquarters were established under these titles. The 21 Army Group consisted of the First Canadian and the Second British Armies. The 12th Army Group consisted of the First, Third, Ninth, and Fifteenth United States Armies. Fifteenth Army was assigned to 12th Army Group effective 27 December 1944.¹⁷ The First United States Army was placed under the operational control of the 21 Army Group during the Ardennes counter-offensive and the Ninth United States Army for both the battle of the Ardennes and the crossing of the Rhine. The 6th Army Group consisted of the Seventh United States and First French Armies.

64. The First Allied Airborne Army was formed as a major command operationally subordinate to Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force in August 1944. It was an integrated United States/British headquarters and was responsible for controlling uncommitted airborne units and preparing these units for their next assignment. The United States components of the First Allied Airborne Army were administered by Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, and the British components by the 21 Army Group. The First Allied Airborne Army habitually was relieved of the command of airborne troops upon their being committed, the troops becoming components of the army in whose zone they were dropped. This command was composed of the XVIII United States Airborne Corps with the 82nd, 101st, 17th, and 13th United States Airborne Divisions, the British Airborne Command with the 1 and the 6 British Airborne Divisions, the IX United States Troop Carrier Command, and the 38 and the 4th Royal Air Force Groups.

65. Administrative and Logistical Support. British and Canadian troops were supported by supply and service agencies in the line of communications troops under the 21 Army Group. The 12th Army Group was supported by the Communications Zone of the European Theater of Operations. For the assault the Advance Section was attached to First United States Army,¹⁸ but in July 1944 reverted to the Communications Zone. The 6th Army

Group was supported initially by the North African Theater of Operations. This responsibility with all units and personnel in France was transferred to the European Theater of Operations on 1 November 1944.¹⁸ On 20 November 1944 the Southern line of Communications was established.¹⁹ On 1 February 1945 this was abolished and reorganized as Continental Advance and Field Base Sections of Communications Zone.²⁰

66. Allied Expeditionary Air Force controlled the United States and British Tactical Air Force subordinate to Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. Each of the three groups of armies was supported by a tactical air force. The Northern Group of Armies was supported by the Second British Tactical Air Force and the Central Group of Armies by the Ninth United States Air Force. The Southern Group of Armies had, in the advance from the south, been supported by one fighter group and auxiliary units of the XII Tactical Air Command. When the Southern Group of Armies came under the control of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, the First Tactical Air Force (Provisional) provided air support. On 15 October 1944 Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Air Force was dissolved and an Air Staff was formed as an integral part of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. The United States component forces of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force were administered by the United States Strategic and Tactical Air Force, and the British component forces of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force were administered by the Royal Air Force.

67. Strategic Air Forces were controlled by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and not made subordinate to the Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force.²¹ He requested however that he be given control of these forces during the critical periods preceding and immediately succeeding the assault on the continent. On 14 April 1944 the Combined Chiefs of Staff acceded to this request and the 8th United States Air Force and the Royal Air Force Bomber Command were placed under Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. This control of the strategic air force reverted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in September 1944, with the understanding that the heavy bombers would be made available for ground support when considered necessary by the Supreme Commander. 1-2-6

68. Allied Naval Expeditionary Force. The Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Force was the naval advisor to the Supreme Commander as well as the naval planning authority. It was his responsibility to issue the naval outline plan and later his operational orders to the naval task force commanders. He was responsible for making such adjustments as were necessary between the strength of the various naval assault forces to give effect to the naval plan.²² Due to the fact that the United Kingdom was to be the base for the operations on the continent and the British naval commands would be affected in part, it became necessary to assign definite operational responsibilities to the British Admiralty.²³ In order to coordinate with naval forces

not assigned to his command, the Allied Naval commander, Expeditionary Force was authorized to act, as appropriate, through the agencies of the local British Naval Commander-in-Chief of Home Area and to deal directly with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. United States naval force were administered by the commander of United States Naval Forces in Europe and the British naval forces were administered by the Admiralty.

69. The European Civil Affairs Division was composed of all United States and British Civil Affairs Detachments and was operationally responsible to Supreme headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. British components of the European Civil Affairs Division were administered by the 21 Army Group and United States components of the European Civil Affairs Division were administered by headquarters European Theater of Operations. European Civil Affairs Division was responsible for the provision of Civil Affairs detachments as required by ground forces under Supreme headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. European Civil Affairs Division had very few relations with the other commands of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, since the civil affairs detachments after being provided by the European Civil Affairs Division were components of and responsible to the commander of the force to which they were attached. The allocation of the Detachments was performed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force.

70. Berlin District. The headquarters of the Berlin District was an integrated United States/British headquarters for the purpose of preparing for and the execution of the military occupation of Berlin in accordance with the policies of the Supreme Commander. In May 1945 the headquarters, First Allied Airborne Army was utilized to staff the Berlin District headquarters.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

Chapter 4, Part One

ANNEXATIONS

1. Conference - Gen Eisenhower-Brig Gen Moses, 27 September 1945.
2. Conference - Lt Gen Smith-Brig Gen Moses, 25 September 1945.
3. "Organization and Chain of Command for a cross-Channel Operation". WO 053859/43 Ref Secret.
4. File: Office of C/S: subj: "Combined Chiefs of Staff Directive to the Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force", File No. 322.011.
5. Ltr, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, AG 322-1 (12th Army Group) GUT-AG, 12 July 1944.

6. "Supreme Commander's Dispatch .
7. Ltr, "Command and Organization, US Ground Forces", SHAEF/17100/5 Ops (A) 25 July 1944.
8. SHAEF Cable, Ref No. FD-13188, 24 August 1944.
9. Troop Assignment Order No 5, Hqs ETOUS., 23 August 1944.
10. Cable (FH) to Sixth Army Group, 14 September 1944.
11. Cable SHAEF to 12th Army Group, Ref No FD-13483, 4 September 1944.
12. General Orders No 73, Hq ETOUS., 14 July 1944.
13. General Orders No 104, Hq ETOUS., 18 October 1944.
14. Operational Memorandum No 1 Hq 6th Army Group.
15. Paragraph 60, Troop Assignment No 157, Hq ETOUS., 13 December 1944.
16. Cable Combined Chiefs of Staff to Eisenhower and Wilson FCS-76, 15 September 1944.
17. Paragraph 4, Ltr, Hq ETOUS., file AG 322 OpGC, 17 February 1944.
18. Cable N'TOUS' to AG R, 17 October 1944.
19. General Order No 61, Communications Zone, 3 November 1944.
20. General Order No 10, Communications Zone, 29 January 1945.

DISCUSSION

SECTION 1

THE POSITION FROM COSS'C TO SHAEF

71. Background of SHAEF. Although SHAEF was established by directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and began to function under the Supreme Allied Commander in February 1944, its foundation was established in April 1943 with the activation of the headquarters of the COSS'C. The history of the latter staff is one of expansion from the small planning staff into a complex, integrated, operational headquarters, under a Chief of Staff who exercised practically all the authority of the Supreme Commander pending the latter's assumption of command. The importance of the existence of this staff lies in the magnitude of the work accomplished and in the soundness of its growth, which permitted its transition into SHAEF with minimal changes in organization and continuity in function. Almost from the activation of COSS'C it was apparent that a transition from planning to operational functions was essential, and in September 1943 the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander was direct to take the necessary executive action to implement the plans approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In early October the proposals for the integration of the British and American staffs with a single commander were completed and the fusion and integration of the two nationalities in the many branches of the headquarters became an accomplished fact.

72. Need for Appointment of the Supreme Commander. As early as 9 July 1943, the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander advised his staff in their weekly meeting that they must now, "Consider the reorganization of this headquarters, with the object of transforming the present planning staff into an operational staff. The time is drawing near when it will be necessary to define the relationship between my staff and the outside world. Signs have recently become apparent that, although, by definition, I possess none, I am expected to exert some measure of executive authority". Later, he consulted the Commanding General of ETOUS concerning his position, "the present anomalous arrangement whereby I function without a Commander --- indefinitely".

"While I hate the sight of the whole business", he wrote, "I am completely at a loss to suggest anything better, short of course of appointing the great man himself, which appears to be utterly impossible." The only practical solution appeared to be to rely on the good will of all concerned to make the impossible state of affairs thus created work in practice. Again, in a reply to the Chiefs of Staff Committee he wrote, "Essentially what we are

Here trying to do is to make an impossible situation reasonably possible for practical purposes."¹ Thus, for nearly a year, the preliminary planning and operations required to initiate the greatest military achievement in history were carried out in the absence of a Supreme Commander and without the knowledge of whom he was to be, his policies, operating methods, or guiding hands in the integration of the staffs of two nations into the staff which would continue to work for him henceforward as SHAEF.

73. Almost immediately after the arrival of General Eisenhower he wrote the following to the Chief of Staff, United States Army, It is obvious that strong and positive action is needed here in several directions. The location of the various headquarters, the exact pattern of command, the tactics of the assault, and the strength in units and equipment, are all questions that have not yet been definitely settled. The most important of all these questions is that of increasing the strength of the initial assault wave in OVERLORD. These were pressing questions which demanded positive answers, but they were of the type which required action by the Supreme Commander and their final determination, in many instances, could not have been decided prior to his arrival. The recommended increase in the assault forces was approved and necessitated a major change in much of the work already accomplished by the headquarters and other agencies involved. Although the reasons for not appointing the Supreme Commander at an earlier date were most cogent and continual control was exercised by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the War Department and the War Ministry, it remains obvious that his early appointment would have been desirable and beneficial to all concerned with the initial planning for the invasion.

SECTION 2

ORGANIZATION OF SHAEF

74. The guiding plan of SHAEF has been stated by the Supreme Commander, "I intended my headquarters upon the closely integrated allied establishment which it had been my policy to maintain at Allied Forces Headquarters in the Mediterranean, and in this respect I was fortunate in obtaining for my staff men whose proved ability had already been demonstrated in previous campaigns - - - .² In building up the staff sections he decided that equal British and American representation should be effected both as to positions and numbers. This principle of integration was also applied to subordinate headquarters such as the Allied Expeditionary Air Forces and Headquarters Allied Naval Commander Expeditionary Force, which were closely allied to the combined staff of SHAEF. In the selection of his principal staff officers the Supreme Commander was guided by such factors as proven ability, the eventual composition of his forces, the locale from which the operations were to be mounted, the point of invasion and his previous experience.

The integration of personnel was complete to the maximum practical extent and the staff procedures and organization, although essentially American, were discombined and integrated wherever possible. Because of the difficulties inherent in language, thought, customs, material and operating methods it would probably have been impossible to achieve a similar, operational, integrated staff with any other than an English-speaking nation.

75. Changes in Organization. There were no real controversial questions in the organization of the headquarters. Such changes as were made in the general and special staff divisions of SHAEF were effected either to increase efficiency or to meet new problems facing the headquarters; staff divisions were added, increased or reduced as the need arose, or requirements varied due to a change in function.³ A common feature was the steady demand for increased personnel. As the work of the headquarters developed and its commitments were enlarged, corresponding increase in the size of the staff was effected. From 14 June 1944 to 31 May 1945 the headquarters increased with comparative uniformity to the point where the number of personnel involved at the physical location of the headquarters sometimes difficult. The acquisition of trained personnel in such numbers was not easy and particular difficulty was experienced in supplying key staff officers with the necessary qualifications. This shortage indicates a definite requirement for the continuing training of staff officers for a similar headquarters beyond that which has been accomplished in the past.

76. The major changes in the organization of SHAEF not conceived in prior planning pertained principally to the air forces. In October 1944 the Allied Expeditionary Air Force headquarters was dissolved and its staff functions were taken over by an integrated Air Staff under a Deputy Supreme Commander who was responsible for the coordination of air operations in support of the Allied Expeditionary Forces. Except for 1-1 and 1-5 sections, which were not included, the organization and functions of the Air Staff were typical of American practice. Other changes of lesser importance included the establishment of a Civil Affairs Division, an Air Defense Division, the Combined Visitors Bureau and the splitting of the G-5 Division into two special staff agencies, the Public Relations Division and the Psychological Warfare Division. These changes in organization were made in the interest of increased efficiency or necessitated by the advent of new problems. Although entirely flexible, the organization of SHAEF remained relatively uniform throughout the war and the Supreme Headquarters was never subjected to the disorganization and disruption attendant to a major reorganization of a large headquarters.

77. Effect of Nationalities on the Organization of a Supreme Headquarters. It would have been impossible for SHAEF to have functioned in an integrated, operational headquarters with the same organization

and methods if the other major power had not been an English speaking one. Difficulties in language alone would have rendered it impossible. While long and intimate associations with the British have eliminated confusion and friction in staff procedures, it must be remembered that in the initial stages they existed in pronunciation, custom, terminology, operating methods, organization, staff procedures and basic military policy to an extent now difficult to recall. With the best intent on the part of all concerned, exact understanding and agreements were not always easily achieved in the initial stages. In the event the French had continued resistance in North Africa with a major part of their army in being and available for the invasion from Britain, with the resultant requirement for representation on the staff of Supreme headquarters, a similar organization and methods of operation with equal integration would probably have been impossible. While the organization of a Supreme Headquarters representing three nationalities can only be conjectured, it is probable that the general effect would have been to disassociate SHAEF to a greater extent from operational and logistical details, with emphasis being placed on the determination of overall strategy and matters of general policy. It is also probable that command channels with the French in regard to their ground forces would have been similar to those employed with 21 Army Group. It would also have been essential for the French to have had representation on the Combined Chiefs of Staff, in order that the authority of the Supreme Commander would have been direct and unquestioned. Regardless of the nationality of the supreme Commander in future similar situations, his authority must be unquestioned and granted by the Allies involved through some agency similar to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, if an organization such as SHAEF is to function. After SHAEF had become firmly established on the Continent the organization of the headquarters was so complete and its operating methods were so firmly fixed that it is doubtful if a major reorganization would have been required for any reason. Even in the event that the Supreme Commander and his Chief of Staff had become casualties, it is entirely probable that the major structure and methods of operation of the headquarters would have remained unchanged. Had such an event occurred, and had the Combined Chiefs of Staff determined on a British officer as the Supreme Commander to be assisted by a British Chief of Staff, it is probable that the general organization would not have been materially affected. Such a change, however, would have undoubtedly resulted in the establishment of an American General Headquarters with resultant modification in SHAEF-EICUSA operational methods.

78. The Study of the Organization and operating methods of SHAEF will be of material value in considering a future allied Supreme headquarters. However, such a headquarters cannot be expected to be entirely similar since its operating and administrative methods will probably reflect the nationality of the Supreme Commander and that of his chief of staff,

together with the problems imposed upon it by the situation with which it is confronted at the time. By an interchange of students and instructors between the staff colleges of the allied nations on a much larger scale than heretofore, a more adequate understanding may be obtained during peace of the staff organization and procedures employed by our allies. Such an interchange of officers on a large scale is also desirable to insure greater familiarity with the languages and customs of our allies in the part of staff officers who may be expected to serve in Supreme Headquarters in the future.

SECTION 3

SELECTION OF PRINCIPAL SUBORDINATES

79. In selecting the principal staff officers of SHAEF the Supreme Commander was able to include some officers who had served under him in an integrated staff in previous campaigns. Thus the Deputy Supreme Commander, the Chief of Staff and the Chief Administrative Officer constituted a highly qualified, experienced team who had functioned together in previous campaigns and whose presence insured that SHAEF would be a closely integrated allied headquarters. The continuity of the work performed by COSSOC was continued by retaining Lieutenant General Morgan as Deputy Chief of Staff together with other officers from COSSOC headquarters. The choice of the principal staff officers was influenced by the eventual composition of the forces, the place from which the operations were to be mounted, the locale of the proposed operations and the knowledge, experience and ability of the individual concerned. Since the United Kingdom was the base for naval operations and the operations were to be conducted in waters where they had long experience, a highly qualified British officer was selected as the naval commander. Similarly the air forces were initially under the command of a British officer and eventually controlled and coordinated through a Deputy Chief of Staff (air) and the Deputy Supreme Commander who were also British. Except for the initial phase of continental operations when a British officer commanded the ground forces, no ground force commander was appointed and the Supreme Commander assumed their direct control.

80. Predominance of the forces engaged. Assuming that officers of proven ability are available and that each possesses the confidence and respect of the allied nations involved, the predominance of the forces engaged will probably be the greatest single factor in the selection of the Supreme Commander and his principal subordinates. While such a selection is relatively clear cut when there is a large differential between the size of the forces contributed by the several allies, the selection will be more difficult when the forces are of approximate size. In this case the location of the theater and the relative experience of the officers concerned may well determine their selection, as was exemplified by the choice of the air and naval commanders in SHAEF.

81. The nationality of the Supreme Commander is a major factor in the selection of his subordinates. It is entirely natural that a Supreme Commander should desire his principal staff officers and subordinate commanders to be of his own nationality. The reasons for this are many and obvious, such as similar backgrounds in experience and training, personal knowledge of the individual capabilities, methods and character and freedom from political pressure in the selection of the individual. However, when two or more powers are allied the national prestige of each requires balance in nationalities between that of the Supreme Commander and those of his principal staff officers and major commanders. The trend of this tendency is toward a greater representation in commanders and senior staff officers to counterbalance the national prestige of the Supreme Commander. This was true in SHAEF where the deputy Supreme Commander, the Naval and Air commanders and three Deputy Chiefs of Staff were British. From a national political viewpoint this policy may be essential, but it embodies the possible restriction of the Supreme Commander in his selection of key subordinates on the basis of demonstrated ability.

SECTION 4

POLICIES AFFECTING THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF SHAEF

82. The policy of the Supreme Commander that SHAEF was to be an integrated headquarters and his insistence that the integration be carried to completeness wherever possible was a major factor in determining the character and operating methods of the headquarters. The integration achieved was probably greater than any obtained in previous allied understandings and reflected the integration of the Combined Chiefs of Staff from which SHAEF's authority stemmed. Such integration at the highest level and down through SHAEF materially aided in the elimination of misunderstandings, in the cohesion of effort and in the reduction of internal friction within the headquarters. Had integration not been achieved, it would have been necessary to have organized the staff along parallel lines with "opposite numbers" with a resulting loss in efficiency and an increased probability of errors and misunderstandings throughout the staff. Integration forced the use of common methods and staff procedures which otherwise might have remained at variance throughout the war. After the structure of SHAEF had become firmly established and the integration of the staff completed, the nationality of the Supreme Commander or any of his principal subordinates had little effect on the operation of the staff. Had the Supreme Commander become a casualty, a British officer could have assumed his duties without change in the organization and operating methods of SHAEF.

83. The decision of the Supreme Commander to exercise direct control over all ground forces affected both the operation and organization of SHAEF. The

headquarters was predominately a ground organization. The Supreme Commander believed that since the United States provided the preponderance of forces, he should not establish an American general headquarters under him, but that he should retain all major operating responsibilities of the United States ground forces directly under his control.⁴ Although there is no record of any published document to that effect, the Supreme Commander, acting in his capacity as the Commanding General of ETOUSA, placed the major commands of ETOUSA at the operational disposal of SHAEF.⁵ This action, plus the Supreme Commander's desire to directly command the ground forces, resulted in direct operational control of the 6th and 12th Army Groups without utilizing ETOUSA command channels. Similarly, when necessary, SHAEF dealt directly with the Communications Zone. The direct control of the ground forces necessitated an increase in the size of the G-3 and G-4 Sections, but had little effect on the other staff sections. Had the Commanding General of ETOUSA been an American officer other than the Supreme Commander, it is probable that the ground commands of ETOUSA would not have been placed separately at the operational disposal of SHAEF and that the SHAEF-ETOUSA command functions would have been similar to the relationship between SHAEF and the 21 Army Group. Had the Supreme Commander been British, no doubt the Commanding General of ETOUSA would have directly commanded the United States ground forces under the overall supervision of the Supreme Commander. Had large French forces been in the field, it is probable that their relationship to SHAEF would have been similar to that with the 21 Army Group.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Chapter 5, Part One

COLLECTIONS

1. History of COSSAC.
2. Supreme Commander's Dispatch.
3. Conference, Lt. Gen. Smith-Brig Gen. Iosses, 25 Sept 1945.
4. Conference, Gen Eisenhower-Brig Gen Iosses, 27 Sept 1945.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SECTION 1

CONCLUSIONS

84. It is concluded that:

- a. The organization of SHAEF was logical, efficient, integrated to the maximum practical extent and remained unchanged to a remarkable degree.
- b. The principal factors determining the organization and methods of operation of the headquarters were the decisions of the supreme commander to achieve complete integration and to retain direct control of the United States ground forces.
- c. Such changes as were established were made in the interest of increased efficiency, or to meet new problems.
- d. It would have been impractical to have attempted the same degree of integration had the other ally been a non-English speaking nation.
- e. The appointment of the Supreme Commander at an earlier date would have been beneficial.
- f. Trained and experienced staff officers with knowledge of allied staff procedures are essential.
- g. Had a British officer been the Supreme Commander initially, the organization of SHAEF could have been generally similar, but staff procedures would probably have followed British practice.
- h. Had the French army been in being and ready to participate in the invasion, with the resultant necessity for a large staff representation in the headquarters, it is doubtful if SHAEF could have been as closely integrated.

SECTION 2

RECOMMENDATIONS

85. It is recommended that:

- a. The organization and operating methods of SHAEF be made the subject of study at the Army War College and the Army Navy Staff College.
- b. Instructors be interchanged between the staff colleges or the principal allied nations.

c. The maximum practical number of officers
be detailed for duty with the armies of the principal
allied nations on an exchange basis.

PART TWO

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES ARMY

CHAPTER 7

THE SITUATION AS OF 31 AUGUST 1943

SECTION 1

THE EXISTING ORGANIZATION

86. European Theater of Operations (ETOUSA).

a. Its composition. On the date with which this study begins, 31 August 1943, ETOUSA consisted of a headquarters and under it the Eighth Air Force, the Field Forces, the Services of Supply (SOS), the Iceland Base Command, and the American School Center. Since the two latter exerted no influence on the organization for and took no part in the operation which came later, little further mention of them will be made. The headquarters itself followed the conventional pattern, having a command element, a general staff group and a small special staff group. The notable exception to the pattern was that the general staff group included no G-4, the functions of that section being performed by the Commanding General, SOS. Details of the organization may be seen by reference to Appendix 5.

The basis of the original organization is found in a letter of 14 May 1942¹³ from the War Department. An extract from the letter is quoted.

"The forces under your command will be organized, eventually, into a Ground Force Command, an Air Force Command and a Services of Supply Command***.
Your immediate headquarters will be organized along the general pattern of a command post with a minimum of supply and administrative services****".

The entire letter is reproduced as Appendix 22.

b. Its General Mission. The mission of ETOUSA² was stated by the War Department as follows:

"The mission of the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations will be to prepare for and carry on military operations in the European Theater against the Axis Powers and their allies under strategic directives of the Combined U. S. - British Chiefs of Staff which the U. S. Army Chief of Staff will communicate to the Commanding General.

c. A Short Review of its History. Prior to 7 December 1941, the United States military Forces in the British Isles had consisted of a group of special observers that had been sent over for the purpose of studying technical developments of air operations, and to conduct planning in anticipation of our possible entry into the war.

On 8 January 1942 an organization designated as U.S. Army Forces in the British Isles was established.¹ Following this, on 8 June the War Department created the European Theater of Operations and designated the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Forces in the British Isles (maj. Gen. James E. Chaney) as its commander.² The territorial limits of the theater were established by a cable dated 16 June.³ On 24 June, maj. Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, former Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division of the War Department took command.⁴

General Eisenhower was immediately faced with the problems attendant on operation TORCH which was the projected invasion of North Africa, and of which he was to be the commander in addition to his duties as Commanding General, ETOUSA.⁵ In order to simplify the overseas organization for TORCH, the War Department on 18 August, upon the recommendation of General Eisenhower,⁶ merely extended the boundaries of ETOUSA to include the area of expected operations in North Africa.⁷

General Eisenhower's cable of 16 August⁷ had recommended that once a firm foothold was gained in North Africa, the Theater there should be separated from ETOUSA. Accordingly, in January 1943, Lt. Gen. Frank L. Andrews, Commander of U.S. Forces in the Middle East, was directed to leave Cairo and go to London to assume command of ETOUSA. He received his instructions in London from the War Department on 3 February 1943⁸ and assumed command the next day.⁹ His instructions⁸ included a new definition of the boundaries of ETOUSA which excluded North Africa.

On 3 May General Andrews was killed, and was replaced by Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers¹⁰ who was the commander at the time of the beginning of this study. The theater was, on 31 August 1943, operating according to the principles and with the organization set forth in an order dated 21 March 1943¹¹ as modified by subsequent directives. The only one of these directives having a really important bearing on the organization was the one of 27 May 1943,¹² which directed the Commanding General, Services of Supply to assume the functions of G-4 in the theater.

87. Services of Supply.

a. Its Composition. Appendix 6 shows the composition of the Services of Supply on 23 August. It should be noted that it contains the administrative, technical and supply services of the Theater.¹⁴

b. Its Mission. A statement of its mission is found in various directives.^{11 12 15 16} One is

quoted, as follows:

"The Services of Supply is the Commandant General's agency for the administrative service and supply of the Theater."¹⁵

c. Its development prior to 31 August 1942. It was organized in conformity with the War Department letter of 14 May 1942,¹⁶ which enclosed copies of various directives from the War Department and included the following statement.

"Though the organization prescribed for the War Department need not be slavishly followed at your headquarters, it will in the main be the pattern for similar organizations of the Services of Supply in the British Isles."

The original pattern was adhered to in later directives regarding its form.¹⁷

68. The Field Forces. The field forces consisted of V Corps, the chief mission of which was the training and preparation for combat of the elements of the ground forces. The V Corps was organized in accordance with the applicable tables of organization and included the 2nd, 28th and 39th Infantry Divisions and the 1st Engineer Special Brigade.

69. The Air Forces. The Eighth Air Force was operating from the United Kingdom (UK). Its mission included the same responsibilities with respect to Air Force personnel, that were assigned to V Corps with respect to ground forces personnel, and in addition the conduct of air operations. The Commanding General, Eighth Air Force was the Air Officer of Headquarters, ETOUSA.¹⁸

Article 2

MAJOR ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATED WITH THE COMMANDER

90. Circumstances connected with its growth.

a. Prior to the time at which this study begins, there had been considerable uncertainty as to the final form that the organization of ETOUSA would take and as to the relationship that would exist between Headquarters ETOUSA and the headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander. The growth of ETOUSA had conformed to the pattern established in the basic directives but the effect that impending events would have on this pattern was unknown. It was assumed by many at other headquarters that the U.S. Forces would operate under a field GOC, but until the Chief of Staff of the War Department had announced his decision, and until the Supreme Allied Commander had been appointed, no one could be certain as to the future.

b. There was inevitably a break in continuity in the high command of the European Theater of Operations and a re-adjustment of ideas with each change of commander.

c. However, the Air Force and Services of Supply had definite operating missions and in their contacts with the U.S. War Department and with the British they necessarily were establishing patterns of procedure and organization and performing certain actions to which ETOUSA was committed by August 1942.

d. Headquarters SOSUSA and the headquarters of the subordinate commands had found that their organizations were affected by the loss of personnel to operation TORCH and that a sufficient number of suitable, experienced personnel for key jobs had not been made available to date.

91. The Organization of the Services of Supply was modeled after the organization of the Army Service Forces as adopted by the War Department in March 1941. It had the advantage that direct short lines along technical channels led from field agencies to the offices in the United States charged with the operation of the services and with procurement. With its organization as approved by General Levers in May 1942, placing the theater G-4 functions in the SOS, its commander felt the likelihood of the friction experienced in World War I between the Commanding General, SOS, AEF, and G-4, GHQ, AEF had been removed.¹⁷ Under this organization the theater chiefs of the technical and most of the special services were in the SOS, and were in position to control theater policies, planning, and co-ordination in matters affecting their respective branches, in addition to being in control of most operations of their services.

92. Interior Operation of ETOUSA. The theater headquarters reserved the right of determination of policies, objectives, and priorities, and the issuance of orders affecting two or more major subordinate divisions of the theater, or the theater as a whole; however, all commanders of subordinate units, divisions, or commands were authorized to communicate directly with each other on technical or routine matters. Specific instructions¹⁸ were issued to the Commanding General, Services of Supply regarding this. At the same time, he was cautioned that such communications must not infringe on the inherent command responsibilities of other commanders. Later, under the order of 27 May 1943,¹⁹ in case of matters of a G-4 nature, the Commanding General of the Services of Supply acted for the theater.

Crowded conditions in London forced the establishment of SOS headquarters at Catterick. Initially a liaison service was set up between Headquarters SOS and headquarters ETOUSA, as well as with the Army to insure that all were kept informed.²⁰ Later, in May 1943, the Commanding General SOS, and staff moved back to London in the interests of G-4 planning and coordination.

93. Control by Higher Authority. Since the pattern of the organization had been prescribed by the War Department initially,¹³ the conclusion may be drawn that any material change in the organization would require approval by that authority. Prior to the formation of SHAEF, the Combined Chiefs of Staff through the War Department exercised control over ETOUSA with respect to its operational functions, such as its part in the defenses of the British Isles,¹⁴ the operations of the Air Force, and operation TORCH.¹⁵ This control appears to have had little if any effect on the form of the organization.

94. U.S. Navy. The directive establishing the European Theater of Operations stated that "by agreement between the Navy and War Department planning and operational control*** will be exercised by Commanding General, ETOUSA over all U.S. Navy Forces assigned to that theater of operation". This was recognized by General Eisenhower when he took over the theater in 1942.¹⁶ However, the inclusion of Naval Forces had no apparent effect on the organization of Headquarters ETOUSA, nor were they included as a major command of ETOUSA.

95. Relationship to Allied Organizations. All activities of ETOUSA were performed in such close relationship to British activities that the two had to accommodate themselves to each other without misunderstandings or conflicts. The Services of Supply had constantly before them the mission of preparing in the United Kingdom for the mounting of the operation on the continent. That command had many difficult administrative problems to work out with the British but such activities required no organizational change in the SOS Headquarters.

96. Other Factors. The distance of the British Isles from the Zone of the Interior and the difficulties that arose due to unfamiliarity with British customs, language, and methods apparently had no effect on the form of the organization except as it may have been reflected in the directive establishing it.¹⁷

97. Operation OVERLORD. Until the time of approval of operation OVERLORD in August 1943, the task which was to be the culminating effort of ETOUSA had not been definitely stated. The basic service planning and preparation under the Chiefs of Services in SOS had been continuing for many months. The approval of OVERLORD, the size of the effort and the approximate time of launching the assault on the continent enabled Headquarters ETOUSA, and in particular the SOS, to make definite plans to accomplish their missions and to proceed accordingly.

S I S L I O G R a F H Y

Chapter 7, Part Two

ANNEXATIONS

1. Cable, AGWAR to AFPODS, 8 January 1942.
2. Cable, AGWAR to USFOR, 8 June 1942.
3. Cable, AGWAR to USFOR, 15 June 1942.
4. G.O. 6, ETOUSA, 24 June 1942.
5. Cable, USG, Washington, to USFOR, 11 August 1942.
6. Cable, AGWAR to ETOUSA, 18 August 1942.
7. Cable, ETOUSA to AGWAR, 16 August 1942.
8. Cable, AGWAR to ETOUSA, 3 February 1943.
9. G.O. 8, ETOUSA 1943.
10. Cable, ETOUSA to AGWAR, 10 May 1943.
11. G.O. 16, ETOUSA, 21 March 1943.
12. G.O. 33, ETOUSA, 27 May 1943.
13. Letter, WD C/S to CG, American Forces in British Isles, Subject: "Organization Services or Supply", dated 14 May 1942.
14. Chart from G.O. 82, HQ SOS, 23 August 1943.
15. Letter of Instructions, AG 371, L., HQ ETOUSA, Subject: "Letter of Instructions", dated 21 March 1943.
16. Letter, HQ ETOUSA, AG 371, L. C/S to CG, SOS, ETOUSA, Subject: "Letter of Instructions", dated 28 July 1943.
17. General Lee at SOS Staff Conference, 30 August 1943.
18. Lt Col Franey at Staff Conference, 21 December 1943.
19. Letter, General Eisenhower to C/S Committee, 2 July 1942, AG 323.352.G.
20. G.O. 29, ETOUSA, 21 August 1942.

THE ORGANIZATION ESTABLISHED

31 AUGUST 1943 AND 17 JANUARY 1944

98. General. This period, which is that between the approval of operation OVERLORD and the assumption of command of ETOUSA by General Eisenhower upon his arrival to become supreme commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, was marked by an increase in the rate of accumulation of means to conduct the invasion and by an almost continuous skirmishing within the headquarters itself and in the relationships existing between the headquarters and the major commands. The situation was complicated by the appearance of new and important organizations such as First Army (FUSA), First Army Group (FUSAG), and US Strategic Air Forces (USAAF), requiring adjustment in the organizations and relations of all the major elements of the theater. There was the additional problem concerning the manner in which the headquarters of the United States forces was to be organized for operations on the continent. The following quotation from the history of 12th Army Group furnishes indication of the problem:

"The plan for the invasion of the continent of Europe, ***envisioned large American forces grouped into a number of armies***. After the successful completion of the first phase of the invasion of France through Normandy, in which only one American army was to participate, initially, the newly arriving United States armies were to be grouped under the control of a single American command and headquarters to conduct operations within its own designated geographical square. The organization of such a headquarters***was properly left to the United States War Department".

Appendix 7 shows the theater organization as it appeared on 17 January 1944.

99. Control by higher authority. The Commanding General, ETOUSA believed that there should be but one superior United States headquarters in the theater under one commander, and that eventually he would have a field headquarters to direct the operations of the armies and a rear echelon to handle theater functions in addition to normal rear echelon activities.

In August 1943 the staff of headquarters initially prepared plans for a general headquarters which was to have a modest beginning but which would gradually enlarge its functions to become the superior field Headquarters of all U.S. forces in Europe. It was to be established along the lines of an army group headquarters with all necessary general staff sections. It would be located near but separate from theater headquarters. The Chiefs of General Staff sections of

the Theater would be also the chiefs of the General Staff sections of the HQ headquarters, with deputies actually controlling these sections at the separate headquarters, under the Theater Deputy chief of Staff.

The new headquarters was to follow the standard organizational lines of the U.S. Army with the exception that G-4, in addition to his normal staff functions, would command all supply and administrative services. He would be Commanding General of the Communications Zone (CG, COM Z) and his headquarters would replace that of the existing headquarters, Services of Supply. Recommendations to accomplish the scheme outlined above were made to the War Department on 13 September 1943.²

On 16 September General Marshall replied³ stating that although the organization of an Army Group Headquarters as a field headquarters appeared sound, its designation as General Headquarters of American Forces in the European Theater was not advisable. The organization of an Army Group Headquarters without theater functions would enable the United States to place the field headquarters under the Supreme Allied Commander (SAC) for operations. Headquarters MCUSA would continue to handle other theater functions. After a further exchange of cables,⁴ General Marshall wrote General Levers at some length⁵ setting forth his views on the proposed organization. Extracts from his letter appear below:

"In considering the relationship of ETO Headquarters to the command set-up of SAC the following points appear to be important:

a. That all US Army forces in the theater should be administered by one superior HQ Headquarters under one commander.

b. That Field Force commanders should be relieved of as many administrative responsibilities as possible. I consider the Army Group Commander(s), Commanders of the Air Forces, and the Supreme Allied Commander as Field Force commanders.

I visualize the eventual establishment on the continent of an American headquarters which will exercise command over all American army forces in the European Theater (absorbing the duties and responsibilities of the present ETO headquarters) and operate under the direction of the Supreme Allied Commander (SAC). * * * At that time, the logistical establishment remaining in the UK would become, in effect, a large base section organization under the US commander's SOS. * * * It appears sound that we should adopt a similar organizational structure now. My thought is that ETO Headquarters, under a separate commander reporting directly to the Chief of Staff, US Army, or the Supreme Allied Commander if the latter is an American, should continue to function in its present capacity until it merges

into an American Headquarters on the Continent. * * * If the supreme allied commander is not an American, the Commanding General, ETO, would be directed by the War Department to support, with the means available to him, the operations directed by combined Chiefs of Staff and entrusted to the supreme allied commander, by furnishing forces, materials, and services as required by approved plans and the exigencies of the then current situation.

Under this concept, the initial US Army Group would be organized as separate headquarters, with separate commanders, and subordinate to ACOUSA headquarters. * * * Command channels should be separate and distinct. * * * I desire that the organization of the Army Group headquarters be initially controlled directly by Bradley under your supervision and that it not be merely an offshoot from, or appurtenance to, ETO Headquarters".

It appears from General Marshall's letter that the pattern of the organization, and some of the details, in addition to those included in the extracts quoted, were held closely under his own control.

100: The First Army Group. Following General Marshall's assent to the formation of an army group as a field headquarters, the First United States Army Group was activated on 19 October 1943, and assigned as initial mission the responsibility only for operational planning as directed by headquarters mission. Its responsibilities and its duties were re-stated in detail in a letter of 3 November from headquarters ETOUSA, and included responsibility for all plans, operational and administrative involving operations on the continent of Europe by US Army forces other than air. The plans were to be based on directives issued by the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (SCAMC) or headquarters ETOUSA and were subject to approval by the Commanding General ETOUSA.

At the same time the Commanding General, AFN, was required to undertake such planning as might be required by the Commanding General, FUSAAG. The Commanding General, USSTAF, and the Commanding General, First Army, were directed to effect the necessary co-ordination of their plans. This letter followed closely a letter which had summarized the responsibilities of the Commanding General, FUSAAG, as follows:

a. Planning for crossing of the field areas including assault build up.

b. Execution of such plans.

c. Development of administrative plans for mounting the operation.

d. Co-ordination of field forces administrative plans with operational plans of Navy, Air, and the Services of Supply.

In carrying out its mission FUSAG was authorized direct communication with the other commands of ETOUSA and with COSSAC.

On 29 November COSSAC sent a directive to FUSAG and 21 Army Group (British) in which the responsibility of each was made specific and the accountability of each one for its respective mission clearly stated. Under this directive, the Commander-in-Chief 21 Army Group (British) was made jointly responsible with the Allied Naval Commander in Chief and the Air Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Forces for planning the operation and for its execution until in area of responsibility was allotted to FUSAG by ETOUSA.

FUSAG at once began to draw up plans for executing its portion of the directive. These plans developed a difference of opinion between CG, FUSAG, and the Services of Supply as to the exact responsibilities and sphere of logistical activities that each should control. It was the opinion of FUSAG that it should be responsible for operations in the field and the logistical planning that went with them. This argument was based on its mission and the theory that operational and administrative plans for a military campaign must be the responsibility of one headquarters.

On the other hand the SOS, endeavoring to carry out General Marshall's explicit directions "that Field Force Commanders should be relieved of as many administrative responsibilities as possible", maintained that "it should advise on logistical matters and assist in formulating plans and policies in the Group headquarters. While this would not have relieved the Commanding General, FUSAG of all responsibility for supply matters, it should assure tactical decisions based on logistical considerations".

Consistent with the position taken by the SOS, its Commander recommended the placing of a Deputy Chief of Staff, SOS, and deputy chiefs of service together with a small organization in headquarters FUSAG to handle the service, operational, and technical matters required therein. This recommendation was disapproved.

101. The Growth of the Field Forces, First Army.
The command post of the First US Army was officially opened on 20 October 1943.¹⁰ At the time of its activation it consisted of V and VII Corps. However, VIII and XV Corps were attached until such time as the headquarters of a second field army was activated.

The initial mission of First Army was almost identical with that which had been assigned to V Corps by GO 16, ETUUSA, 21 March 1943. In addition the Commanding General, First Army, was to undertake such planning as might be required of it by the Commanding General, FUSAG. This task proved to be the detailed planning for the assault phase of operation "V-E DAY".

102. The Air Forces. With the arrival of elements of the Ninth Air Force and the activation of that force

it became necessary to establish a headquarters to control and coordinate their activities. Initially this was done by an agency, known as United States Army Air Forces in the United Kingdom (USAFAU).¹² Pursuant to cable from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 5 January 1944, USAFAU was replaced on 1 January 1944 by U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe (USAF), which was authorized to command the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces. However, CG 1, USASF, 6 January 1944, announced that USASF also was taking over administrative responsibility for the Ninth Air Force which was under the tactical control of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force.

103. U.S. Naval Forces. A letter of 8 November 1943 notified SOS concerning that the commanding General, MOUSA, had been relieved of the responsibility for operational control of U.S. naval forces assigned to the European Theater of Operations. It was further stated that the commander of this naval task force would operate under the Supreme Allied Command and would cooperate with appropriate U.S. Army task force commanders.

104. Services of Supply. During this period the relationship of SOS to Headquarters Section was changed on two occasions. Prior to the beginning of the period, the Commanding General SOS, had taken over the functions of G-4 of the theater. On 8 October 1943¹³ the Commanding General SOS, was relieved of that responsibility and the office of G-4, Headquarters MOUSA, was re-established. On 1 December 1943¹⁴ the office of G-4 was again discontinued and the Commanding General SOS, made responsible for the theater functions of G-4 in addition to his other duties.

The Headquarters MOUSA letter of 29 October 1943¹⁵ outlined the responsibilities of SOS with respect to the coming invasion, as follows:

a. Administrative planning and the implementation thereof connected with the mounting of the operation from UK by all U.S. forces.

b. The preparation of harbors, ports, and approaches thereto.

c. The co-ordination of administrative plans and operations for mounting the Army Field Forces with requirements included in approved plans of Air, Navy, or SOS Forces.

After the receipt of this letter the period was given over to the preparation of plans to accomplish the SOS mission, including discussion and plans for suitable subordinate headquarters and liaison or control agencies to insure that the SOS was in the best possible position to discharge its mission throughout the various phases of operation OVERLORD.

Appendix 8 shows the SOS organization as of 10 January 1944.

105. The Assumption of Command by General Eisenhower and the Re-organization. On 16 January 1944

General Eisenhower assumed command of ETOUSA¹⁵ for the second time, and on 17 January a re-organization was announced¹⁶ whereby Headquarters SOS and Headquarters ETOUSA were consolidated. The same order appointed the Commanding General, SOS, Deputy Theater Commander, in addition to his other duties, and assigned him a mission which included the performance of such additional duties as were delegated to him by the Theater Commander and the authority to act for the Theater Commander in appropriate cases. Since the Theater Commander was also the supreme Allied Commander, the new arrangement was intended to reduce the number of headquarters and to conserve manpower.

Appendix 9, Organization of ETO headquarters is copied from the order establishing the new organization.¹⁶

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

Chapter 8, Part Two

ANNOTATIONS

1. Official History 12th Army Group, Part I, Origins
2. Cable, SHQUSA, W-4421, 13 September 1943.
3. Cable, WD R-3267, 18 September 1943.
4. Cable, headquarters, SHQUSA, W-4763, 21 Sept. 1943
5. Letter, C C/S, WD, 24 September 1943, Marshall to Devers (personal).
6. G.O. 74, SHQUSA, 16 October 1943.
7. Letter, SHQUSA to CG, FUSAG, Subject; "Planning for Continental Operations", 3 November 1943.
8. Letter, SHQUSA, to CG, IL SHQ and CG, SCB, SC 370.2, Subject: "Responsibility for mounting Operation _____", dated 29 October 1943.
9. Official History 12th Army Group, Part II, Operation OVERLORD.
10. First U.S. Army Report of Operations: 20 October 1943 - 1 August 1944.
11. Proposed G.O. AG 322/46 drafted by AG-1 in late November 1943, mainly for the purpose of consolidating various G.O.'s.
12. History AG, Chapter II, page 79.
13. G.O. 74, SHQUSA, 16 October 1943.
14. G.O. 90, SHQUSA, 1 December 1943.
15. G.O. 4, SHQUSA, 16 January 1944.
16. G.O. 4, SHQUSA, 17 January 1944.

CHAPTER 9

THE ORGANIZATION FOR D-N 17 JANUARY 1944 AND 6 June 1944

106. ETCUSA Operations in the British Isles. The new headquarters ETCUSA/SEC was faced with the problems connected with mounting the cross channel operations,¹ providing support from the United Kingdom (U.K.) for U.S. Forces on the continent,² and arranging for continued support from the United States, the United Kingdom and other sources. At the same time, it was necessary to plan and make preparations to move headquarters and supply establishments from the United Kingdom to the continent and to transfer the administrative and supply functions similarly without interruption of the support rendered the armies. Some of the solutions adopted are outlined below.

107. The First U.S. Army. The First U.S. Army had been selected to plan for and conduct the assault.³ The Commanding General of the First Army, under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group (British) was to be in command of substantially all of the U.S. Forces on the continent for the period which was to begin on D-day, and continue until such time as the strength of the field forces warranted an army group becoming operational. The Advance Section of the Communications Zone (ADSEC) was attached to the First Army with the initial mission of planning the logistical support of the Army for the period D-Day to D plus 14.⁴ Upon the establishment of an Army rear boundary, which for planning purposes was estimated to be about D plus 25, ADSEC was to take over supply and area responsibility as the initial part of the Communications Zone on the continent.

108. The First U.S. Army Group (FUSAG) Under directives from SHAEF and 21 Army Group (British), FUSAG was charged with the responsibility for coordination of administrative planning and arrangements for all U.S. Forces on the continent, including those required for logistical support, after the First Army relinquished that responsibility.^{5,6} This responsibility coupled with the representation from FUSAG on the staff of 21 Army Group (British) made it feasible to coordinate the planning for all United States ground forces. In addition, the Commanding General, FUSAG was to be prepared to command all troops in the United States sector when the Supreme Commander determined that the number of United States troops in the field warranted such action.⁷ It was contemplated that this would be when the number of troops and their mission made it desirable that a second field army be formed.

109. The Air Forces. The Air Forces were engaged in active operations under the operational control of the commander of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force. Their administrative control was under USSTAF. However, the SOS was charged with the procurement and transportation of all their supplies except for those items peculiar to the Air Forces. Their administrative plans for operation on the continent were subject to

coordination by FUSA G insofar as area responsibility was concerned.

110. Services of Supply - Communications Zone.

The Commanding General SOS was charged with the planning for the development and operation of the Communications Zone. There was designated a Deputy Commander, Communications Zone who, with a staff, comprised the Headquarters of Forward Echelon Communications Zone (FE Com Z), and who was charged with the initial planning, development and operation of the Communications Zone on the continent.⁸ The planning of FE Com Z was under the coordination of FUSA G. It was contemplated that the Commanding General, FE CZ, would also be the commander of the Communications Zone on the continent until the Headquarters MACUSA/Com Z moved there. Since the term Communications Zone (Com Z) began to appear with increasing frequency early in this period, it would be well to see where it fitted into the picture. The original conception, later confirmed in orders⁹ was that when United States forces gained a foothold on the continent in sufficient depth, a theater supply organization would establish itself in rear of the boundary of the areas. This supply organization would be known as the Communications Zone and would have area responsibilities as well as administrative and supply functions. In anticipation of this sequence of events, the theater¹⁰ which had consolidated the Headquarters of MACUSA and SOS, and had designated the Commanding General, SOS as Deputy Theater Commander, had also designated him as Commanding General, Com Z. This arrangement permitted him to control, and coordinate the plans and activities of both organizations so that the transfer of functions would be without complication. It also permitted the movement of the Com Z Headquarters to any place on the continent that, in view of its mission with respect to the theater, might be most suitable, while at the same time Com Z retained control over activities in the British Isles.

111. Coordination with and through 21 Army Group (British). It can be seen readily that the coordination of the details of the several plans with each other and with the tactical operation would require a great deal of skillful manipulation. There was the additional problem of fitting all of these activities to a pattern which would satisfy the requirements of 21 Army Group (British) since its commander-in-chief commanded all ground forces in the early operations. The administrative problem was solved by placing a U.S. Administrative Staff under the Major General G/Administration (G-4), 21 Army Group (British). This staff was composed of the G-4 section of FUSA G with certain operating branches of the G-1 Section and representatives of certain special staff sections including civil affairs which later became G-5. The functions of the section was initially to coordinate the planning, and later, administrative operations affecting U.S. Ground Forces. It also had the mission of coordinating with Air Forces and Navy all matters of common interest.¹¹ Beside the U.S. Administrative Staff the G-2 and G-3 sections of FUSA G and representatives of the various arms worked with and in

21 Army Group (British) Headquarters as long as 12th Army Group remained under 21 Army Group (British). The latter were completely integrated with the British staff.

112. Problems of Organization and coordination.

The existence of several agencies each of which had in mind only the accomplishment of its own primary mission led to problems in coordination that were quite unusual. The problem of how to accomplish the coordination was of itself difficult. If adequate controls were imposed, the system became so cumbersome and inflexible that nothing was accomplished. Without such controls, conflicts were bound to occur. One cause of uncertainty was the complex relationship between the Headquarters SOS, which was later to become SCM Z, and the other agencies engaged in planning the operations. The basic directive from SHAEF dated 10 March had, among other provisions, attached the Communications Zone to 21 Army Group (British) until such time as FUSAAG became operational. It was not intended that Theater Headquarters would be placed under the Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group (British). It was planned that SOS would become the Communications Zone. Since at this time the Headquarters, SOS was also Headquarters ETOUSA, it appears that the order was intended to apply to that echelon of the Communications Zone that was on the continent. In any case, these provisions of the directive caused a great deal of correspondence and some uncertainty, although instructions were issued⁸ which in other respects complied with the literal wording of the order from SHAEF.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

Chapter 9, Part Two

ANOTATIONS

1. Neptune Plan, 1 February 1944, paragraph 87.
2. SOP No. 1, HQ ETOUSA, 25 May 1944.
3. Letter, SHAEF (44) 23, SHAEF to CG, FUSAG, Subject: Operations OVERLOAD, 10 March 1944.
4. Operational history of ADSEC, Chapters II and III.
5. Letter, 370.2/1 (G-4), FUSAG to FUSA, et al, Subject: Directives for Supply Planning, Period D+42 to D+90, 24 April 1944.
6. Letter, AG 370.2/1 (G-1), FUSAG to ETOUSA, Subject: Co-ordination of Planning Operation OVERLOAD, 9 May 1944.
7. Letter, SHAEF to Chiefs of All Divisions, SHAEF, AG 322, Subject: Organization of U.S. Forces (Administration), 9 February 1944.
8. Letter, AG 322 + 381. Op CG Com Z to Deputy CG Com Z, Subject: Organization of U.S. Forces (Administration), Operation OVERLOAD, 14 March 1944.
9. Letters, AG 381.099, ETOUSA to FUSAG, SOS, FUSA, TUSA, USSTAF, Subject: Organization and Command of U.S. Forces, 6 Jun. 1944.
10. G.O. 5, ETOUSA, 17 January 1944.
11. Official history 12th Army Group, Part II, Operation OVERLOAD.

CHAPTER 10

THE ORGANIZATION BETWEEN 6 JUNE AND 15 SEPTEMBER 1944

113. General. The attack on the continent began on 6 June and progressed inland. In accordance with the directive of 6 June¹ the Commanding General, Communications Zone was relieved of his responsibility as Deputy Theater Commander on 1 August. Headquarters ETOUSA was moved from London to Villeneuve France on 1 September,² and on to Paris on 14 September.³

Although it apparently had no effect on the organization, it is noted that a new type of organization appeared on 2 August when a combined Airborne Headquarters was established.⁴

As noted later in this chapter FUSAG on 14 July became 12th Army Group and was later also designated as the Central Group of Armies.

114. Organization and Command of United States Forces. In command matters and the conduct of administrative affairs headquarters ETOUSA and its subordinate commands were being guided by a number of directives⁵, 6 issued previously, to which was added the one dated 6 June.¹ This latter was based on a letter from SHAEF,⁷ issued on 3 June which outlined the manner in which the organization and command of the U.S. Forces would proceed from the time of beginning the assault until the time that SHAEF was established on the continent and took direct control of ground operations. Another directive⁸ issued on 19 July by the Theater Commander, prescribed the organization and functions of headquarters ETOUSA. Since the affairs of ETOUSA had at this time reached a new phase, that of active operations in the field, it will probably be well to review these new directives briefly. Extracts from various ones are quoted:

"a. The determination of broad policies, objectives, and priorities affecting two or more of the above named major commands (FUS.G., Twelfth Army Group, the Communications Zone, the U.S. Army Air Forces in Europe) is the responsibility of the Theater Commander.

"b. In exercising the functions reserved to himself, the Theater Commander will utilize the U.S. elements of Supreme Headquarters and Chiefs of Special and Technical Services.

"c. Advance Headquarters SHAEF will be established on the continent. Theater Commander will delegate all possible authority and responsibility to Commander in Chief, Central Group of Armies, Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Commanding General, USSTAF and the Commanding General, Communications Zone.¹

"d. The Theater Commander holds the commanding Generals named (see "a") responsible for all administrative matters pertaining to their own commands. To promote simplicity, he will from time to time delegate to them responsibility and authority for certain matters normally reserved to the Theater Commander.

"e. The Commanding Generals, USSTAF and Com Z are authorized to communicate directly with British agencies and the U.S. War Department on technical and routine matters. All communications other than on technical or routine matters will be through Theater headquarters, except that all major commanders are authorized direct communication with each other.

"f. Pending the establishment of supreme headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force on the continent, in matters requiring co-ordination among United States Forces in the United States Zone, the decision of the Commanding General, First Army (Twelfth Army Group, when established) (Lt. Gen. Omar N. Bradley) will govern, except that conflicts of troop and supply priorities affecting the United States Air Forces will be referred to the Theater Commander.⁹

"g. The Theater Commander exercises such of his functions as he retains under his direct control through the U.S. elements of SHAEF Staff."¹

The directives quoted above present general policies. The detailed application of the policies also appear in these directives and in others.^{2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}

It may be noted that the directives referred to above are quite broad in some respects, and while each appears to be complete and definite, taken as a whole they are subject to various interpretations, especially if considered also in connection with earlier directives and plans. They indicate that during the period June-July 1944 the problem of overall administrative command was definitely in mind but a satisfactory solution was not clear. Because of the position of the Supreme Commander and his SHAEF Chief of Staff, as Theater commander and Theater Chief of Staff, and his intimate direction of field activities from SHAEF, the exercise of some Theater staff coordinating functions was necessary at SHAEF. It was natural that as matters arose decision would be made as to whether action should be taken at SHAEF or at the Theater/Com Zone Headquarters. No directive or other indication of the definite functions to be performed by the US staff at SHAEF was issued, with the result that Headquarters ETOUSA/Com Z retained the functions it had exercised since January 1944. As the need arose specific Theater matters were handled in the US SHAEF staff instead of at Theater/Com Z headquarters.

Appendices 11 and 12 show the Headquarters ETOUSA organization as of 2 August and 15 September respectively. They are essentially reproductions of Appendix 9¹⁰ corrected to the dates shown on each. These charts

indicate that the headquarters was organized to perform the staff functions pertaining basically to the Communications Zone with the Theater functions embraced therein. There is no indication in these charts and little data are available elsewhere as to who the Assistant Chiefs of Staff of the Theater really were, the ones in SHAEF or those in Headquarters ETOUSA/Com Z. There seems to have been a working agreement between the two staffs with regard to certain functions but they were indefinite as far as written record indicates, and other United States commands under the Theater Commander were uncertain as to the division of responsibilities.

Headquarters ETOUSA/Com Z had a very definite and difficult problem of running the Communications Zone and handling a considerable number of Theater functions of a somewhat static nature. The US staff at SHAEF had a very definite and active mission as a part of the SHAEF staff; it also had to be familiar with the larger problem confronting the US effort and had been busy since January in the preparation and launching of the operations. As a result, neither of the headquarters was prepared to participate fully in the field in the co-ordination between the major Theater commands. After 1 September the field coordinating functions for which the Headquarters 12th Army Group had had some responsibility until that date was accomplished as far as practicable by agreement between the major commands themselves; the most troublesome problems were picked up by the US SHAEF staff as they arose or as experience indicated they might arise.

The situation with respect to the activities of the U.S. Staff at SHAEF can probably be summarized by saying that G-1, G-2 and G-3 were almost completely integrated with the British and were fully occupied with operational matters of the Allied forces,

G-1 had few functions that brought him into contact with the U.S. Forces. G-5 was at this time a military government agency of the Supreme Commander, the activities of which had little relation to the affairs of Headquarters, ETOUSA. The activities of G-4 with respect to the U.S. Forces became relatively greater as the need was indicated for a top U.S. administrative agency, of a G-4 nature, familiar with logistical operations on the continent and able to take prompt and decisive action on matters needing over-all direction.

115. The Communications Zone. On 7 June the Services of Supply was redesignated the Communications Zone.¹¹ This had the effect of changing the terminology of the supply organization of the Theater to agree more closely with that used in our Field manuals and other basic directives. It also made the Services of Supply activities in the United Kingdom part of the Communications Zone to be established on the continent.

ADSEC was detached from the First Army on 14 July⁹ and reverted to control of the Communications Zone.

This change was made prior to the time contemplated in the plan of 6 June¹ which directed it at the time the Commander of the U.S. Army Group moved to the continent and assumed command of U.S. Ground Forces, except Communications Zone forces.

The headquarters of the Communications Zone moved to the continent on 7 August and assumed from ABSD the continental functions of the Communications Zone.¹²

116. The Field Forces. On 14 July FUSAG became 12th Army Group.

DESTROYED PER MEMO AGO, 27 June 1946

Twelfth Army Group did not take over command until 1 August¹³ when it assumed control of U.S. operations on the continent under the Commander in Chief, 21 Army Group (British) and was made responsible for decision in matters requiring co-ordination among United States Forces until SHAEF was established on the continent. Conflicts of troop and supply priorities affecting the Air Forces were excepted. The Third U.S. Army became operational on that same date and was assigned to 12th Army Group.

On 1 September SHAEF was established on the continent¹⁴ at which time 12th Army Group was relieved from the control of 21 Army Group (British).

The final major change in the field forces occurred on 15 September when 6th Army Group, which had been progressing northward from its initial landing in southern France, became a part of ETOUSA.¹⁵

A minor change during this period was the detachment of Iceland Base Command from the European Theater of Operations on 30 July.¹⁶

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

Chapter 10, Part Two

ANNOTATIONS

1. Letters, AG 381.099, ETOUSA to FUSAG, SOS, FUSA, TUSA, USSTAF, Subj: Organization and Command of U.S. Forces, 6 June 1944.
2. G.O. 87, ETOUSA, 1 September 1944.
3. G.O. 91, ETOUSA, 14 September 1944.
4. G.O. 81, HQ ETOUSA, 10 August 1944.
5. Letter, SHAEF(44) 23, SHAEF to CG, FUSAG, Subject: Operation OVERLORD, 10 March 1944.
6. SOP No. 1, HQ ETOUSA, 25 May 1944.
7. Letter, SHAEF/17100/6/Ops(A) to FUSAG, SOS, First Army, USSTAF, Subject: Organization and Command of U.S. Forces, 3 June 1944.
8. Letter, AG 381.099, ETOUSA to FUSAG, 12 AG, Com Z, FUSA, USSTAF, Subject: Organization and Command of U.S. Forces, 19 July 1944.
9. Letter, SHAEF to FUSA, Com Z, and Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz, Subject: Organization of U.S. Forces on the Continent, 14 July 1944.
10. G.O. 5, ETOUSA, 17 January 1944.
11. G.O. 60, ETOUSA, 7 June 1944.
12. Letter, Com Z, ETOUSA, to ADSEC and Base Section Commanders, Subject: Operation of Headquarters Com Z on the Continent, 4 August 1944.
13. A/A Report, 12 AG, 16 October 1944.
14. Cable, FWD-13188 SHAEF to EXFOR, 12 AG, SHAEF, Com Z, 24 August 1944.
15. Cable, FAWS-76, Combined C/S to Eisenhower and Wilson, 12 September 1944.
16. Letter, ETOUSA, 27 July 1944.

CHAPTER 11

THE ORGANIZATION ESTABLISHED 15 SEPTEMBER 1944 AND 8 APRIL 1945

117. General. This period was marked by a great many changes of minor importance in the headquarters itself, and by planning for changes to be made at the end of the war. It was marked also by increasing participation on the part of the United States staff at SHAEF in the direction and coordination of United States activities.

Some of the more important organizational changes follow:

a. DESTROYED PER MEMO AGO, 27 June 1944

(b) ETOUSA and CGH Z took over on 1 November the functions formerly exercised by AFHQ in support of the operations initiated in Southern France,² including the supply lines and establishments on the continent.

(c) On 23 January 1945, Lt Gen Ben Lear was appointed Deputy Theater Commander.³ Among his duties⁴ were those of coordinating and directing the activities of sections having to do with man-power and reinforcements which at that time were pressing problems.

(d) A Redeployment Planning Group⁵ was established. It had the missions of developing a plan for redeployment after the cessation of hostilities and of coordinating theater plans with those of the War Department.

(e) The Office of Deputy Military Governor, Germany, was established⁶ on 18 April 1945.

During the latter portion of this period considerable thought was given to the matter of proper theater organization after the end of the war. An early directive which formed the basis of the final plan came from SHAEF on 10 March 1945.⁷ This was followed by supplementary directives.^{8, 9} The final form that this organization was to take was not published until 25 May 1945.¹⁰

Appendices 13 to 20, inclusive, show ETOUSA, its major commands, and channels of command, liaison, and administration as of 12 February 1945. This date has no significance historically. It happens to be the date on which rather complete charts of the ETOUSA/CGH Z organization were issued by that headquarters. Appendix 21 was compiled from the charts issued on 12 February 1945 as corrected to reflect the changes that occurred in the intervening time.

118. Communications Zone. The taking over of the supply of the units in Southern France² resulted in

additional responsibilities for Com Z which on 3 November announced initially the establishment of a Southern Line of Communications to handle the latter.¹² The arrangement of having a separate supply organization for this purpose was later abolished.¹³

On 16 April 1945 a circular was issued¹³ which summarized in considerable detail the mission and functions of Com Z in the ETOUSA organization and with respect to the other major commands of ETOUSA.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

Chapter II, Part Two

REFERENCES

1. G.O. 104, ETOUSA, 18 October 1944.
2. Cable, MATOUSA to AG-AAR, 17 October 1944.
3. G.O. 5, ETOUSA, 23 January 1945.
4. Letter, ETOUSA to CG, USNAF, et al, AG 322.011, OpGn, Subject: Duties and Responsibilities of Deputy Theater Commander, 23 January 1945.
5. G.O. 118, ETOUSA, 27 November 1944.
6. G.O. 68, ETOUSA, 18 April 1945.
7. Letter, AG 320.2-3 GDS-AGn, AG-MF to CG, ETOUSA, Subject: U.S. Theater Organization, 10 March 1945.
8. Letter, AG 371 OpGS, ETOUSA to CG, AG, et al, Subj: U.S. Theater Organization, 11 March 1945.
9. Letter, AG 320.3-1 (ETOUSA) GDS-AGn to CG, Com Z, 18 March 1945.
10. Letter, GCO/322.01 (Theater) ETOUSA to AG, et al, Subject: U.S. Theater Organization Plan, 26 May 1945.
11. G.O. 61, Com Z, 3 November 1944, effective 20 November 1944.
12. G.O. 10, Com Z, 29 January 1945, effective 1 February 1945.
13. Circular 36, Com Z, 16 April 1945.

CHAPTER 12DISCUSSIONSECTION IGENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

119. Presentation of discussion. In the organization of higher headquarters some factors enter which are known to only a few and some which are not recognizable. Certainly the availability of suitable experienced personnel enters into decisions of the commander and his chief of staff. Not only the organization to be established but in its method of operation the time factor often plays a large part, as do personalities. Often the means available are not all that may be desired. Political considerations at times must be given careful weight. This study can't take advantage of many factors other than those record and the discussion which follows is not intended to be critical of the acts of any individual. It is intended to show what might have been done from the organizational study point of view if some facts affecting the decisions had not been of paramount influence. It is an attempt to show the difficulties and some of the factors affecting administrative organization of a theater from which constructive lessons may be drawn, while at the same time according due consideration to the fact that in time of war the tools available normally must be used, rather than those desired.

120. Theory of Organization. Since a great deal of the time and effort of personnel in the various headquarters appears to have been expended in attempts to establish the type of theater organization which was calculated to obtain the best results, it might be well to examine the theories involved and the merits of each.

Military operations include two main junctures, combat and administration. In a theater of operations the field forces and the air forces are the combat elements, although they have in addition some administrative responsibilities. The bulk of the administrative operations are assigned to the Services of Supply. The strength of the respective establishments which are set up to perform combat and administration should bear such relation to each other that the organization as a whole is balanced. The relationships between the two are intimate and the administrative organization, which has as its only mission service to the combat elements, must seek to render that service in a manner that is effective and yet does not infringe on the responsibilities which of necessity must be carried by the tactical commander. The two parts of the organization work together as a team. They are both working with the single aim of contributing as much as possible to the success of the mission of the theater. Their activities will conflict only to the extent that, when personnel and facilities are limited, each will be bidding against the other for

what it considers necessary to enable it to perform its mission. It is the province of the theater commander or higher authority to render final decision in such matters and to coordinate the activities of his combat and administrative elements in the way that he considers best. Some of the factors involved are present in the succeeding paragraphs.

121. The Traditional Point of View. The organization of our military establishment and our traditions with respect to military affairs are based on the premise that a commander of a force involved in tactical operations must have under such controls as are dictated by the War Department, complete authority over administrative means required for the accomplishment of his mission, and over his staff which acts for him in planning and coordinating the use of those means. This principle is applied to all units, from the smaller ones having primarily tactical functions to establishments of the nature of a theater of operations.

Adherents to this principle interpret it to mean that a commander should have under his immediate control headquarters charged with the functions of planning, directing and coordinating the operations of the subordinate units of the command. No part of a superior headquarters staff should be engaged in the operation of an activity in a subordinate unit nor should any part of an operating agency be charged with decisions as to cooperation between itself and other operating agencies. It is contemplated that among the staff sections of the headquarters there will be certain ones charged mainly with administrative matters, relieving the commanding officer of details.

122. The Army Service Force Theory. In 1942 the War Department organization was changed and most of the operating activities of an administrative nature were placed under the Army Service Forces. It operated on the principle that the combat forces needed to devote their entire energies to fighting and that all service activities could be handled either by the ASF, or in the field by establishments organized along similar lines and having similar functions. An integrated service organization is charged with the control of all administration from the War Department down to include the larger units having tactical functions.

In support of this theory the point is made that there is no sharp distinction as to service functions, such as would be indicated from a study of the scheme of dividing a theater of operations into a communications zone and a combat zone. The creation of special staffs to correspond to precise territorial boundaries therefore leads to a division of responsibilities which is difficult to follow in practice. Obvious examples of this difficulty are found in the continuity required for signals, transportation, road and rail construction and medical evacuation.

In accordance with this theory, it is advantageous as a further step in the integration to combine the

planning and coordinating agency with the operating agency. It is therefore appropriate that the commander of a service organization should be charged also with staff functions having to do with service matters. These are almost entirely G-4 and G-1 functions. For some personal views of the Commanding General Supply AAF, and comments thereon, see appendices 30 and 31.

123. The situation in ETOUSA. The basic directive of 14 May 1942,¹ later supplemented by the letter of 24 September 1943,² indicates that General Marshall desired that Field Force Commanders be relieved of as many administrative responsibilities as possible and the Services of Supply organization follow closely that of the Services of Supply (ASF) in Washington. The pivotal point of differences of opinion concerned the extent that a field commander could be relieved of his administrative responsibilities without infringing on his authority as a commander. Since the field commanders and many of their assistants had been trained in the traditional manner and had gotten their experience under the old system it was difficult for them to become accustomed to the new ASF theory which was somewhat revolutionary.

SECTION 2

THE ORGANIZATION BUILDING IN AUGUST 1943

124. General. In August 1943 the organization was essentially the same one that had been prescribed by the War Department in May 1942.³ However, it was not yet a balanced force. The Services of Supply had continued its rapid growth. The Air Forces had also expanded. The Field Forces were few and the theater headquarters had not fully recovered from the loss of a large proportion of its personnel to operation Torch.

125. Theater coordination. Between the launching of TORCH and August 1943, there was little apparent need for administrative coordination by theater headquarters, due to the fact that activities had mostly to do with the Services of Supply and the Air Forces, each operating along very definite lines; however there was real need for some coordination. Since the need was rather light, it was difficult for the theater staff to confine their activities to administrative direction and coordination, and not infringe on the responsibilities of the major operating organizations. The Services of Supply continued to maintain that the Theater would receive better administrative and logistical support if the responsibility for planning and coordination in such matters were added to its functions as an operating agency. The G-4 section of the Theater was eliminated and the functions of G-4 assigned to the Commanding General SOS.

General Devers states that "the major tasks facing the theater staff of the European Theater of Operations in May 1943 were those of planning for and stocking

supplies for the cross channel operations. With the exception of 8th Air Force there were few combat troops in the Theater. Upon assuming command of the Theater I found on my staff a small G-4 section with small special staff sections none of which were of sufficient size to really accomplish the Theater tasks. Across the block I found a very large and efficient SOS staff which, in fact, were doing the job for Theater headquarters and were handicapped in not being able to deal directly with the Theater Commander and chief of staff. Economy and efficiency clearly indicated the elimination of Theater G-4 and Special Staff sections and the appointment of the CG, SOS as "Theater G-4". Although economical and efficient, this action resulted in the air forces and the field forces feeling that at times the orders and procedures issued by the SOS applicable to the former had not given proper consideration to their views.

Apparently General Levers believed that the new arrangement worked satisfactorily between May and August 1943. In the organization plans drawn by his staff in August 1943 for a general headquarters for continental operations, the G-4 was designed also to command the Communications Zone, with the latter headquarters replacing that of the Services of Supply. This in effect continued the existing arrangements with respect to G-4 functions, although in the new proposed organization the CG, SOS/Com Z would become officially the chief of a general staff section in Theater headquarters. This concept was more in keeping with the thought of the Commanding General, ASF.

126. Position of the Services of Supply. The Services of Supply was organized along the same lines as originally established, similar to the Army Service Forces in Washington. It had practically the same administrative functions with respect to the Theater as a whole, as the Army Service Forces did to the Army in the Zone of the Interior; the Chiefs of Services for the Theater and most of the special staff activities were in the headquarters Services of Supply. In addition, its Commanding General had formed very definite ideas of the manner in which the organization could avoid the conflicts and misunderstandings which were reported to have occurred in 1918 between the administrative heads of General Fershing's headquarters and the Services of Supply.³

The Commanding General ASF believed that in a Theater the Commanding General SOS should have charge of Theater G-4 and G-1 functions of the Theater Headquarters, in addition to commanding all service troops and having responsibility for all special functions not of direct interest to the G-2 or G-3 staff sections. The Commanding General, SOS concurred in the beliefs of the Commanding General ASF.

It is obvious that many of the organizational difficulties resulted from the fact the SOS had administrative operating functions applicable to the entire Theater and of direct constant interest to the Theater

Commander and his staff. Also, the technical (supply) and some other Service Chiefs of the Theater were actually a part of the Headquarters, SOS and commanded by the Commanding General, SOS. As has been indicated, this was due directly to the organization at Washington which placed the overall service operating activities in the ASF and the Chiefs of Services for the Army under the command of the Commanding General, ASF.

From May 1942 until the launching of operation TORCH, the speed of accomplishment of the mission assigned to the SOS in the European Theater was very important. The organization of the headquarters SOS as a practical duplication of the SOS (ASF) in Washington undoubtedly assisted in that speed. As the support of TORCH operations was removed from the responsibility of AFOLSA, the organization for the Theater might well have been reviewed with consideration of the eventual operations on the Continent and the interim preparations for that operation. Many of the Theater Service planning functions could have been removed from the SOS and Theater Chiefs of Service established at the Theater Headquarters. This would have required additional personnel that was probably scarce at the time, and also careful delineation of the work to be done to avoid duplication. Whether the disadvantages and difficulties connected with such reorganization and the results obtained thereby, would have offset the advantages of the direct ASF-SOS relationship cannot be covered in this report because of the lack of available time and officers for consultation.

SECTION 3

THE PERIOD 31 AUGUST 1943 TO 17 JANUARY 1944

127. Result of approval of OVERLORD. The approval of operation OVERLORD resulted immediately in attempts on the part of Theater Headquarters to plan the form of the headquarters which would control and coordinate the activities of United States Forces in the operation. A great many factors were involved and it was difficult correctly to evaluate the effect of each. They were concerned mainly with internal operation of the United States Forces and the manner in which the organization would have to fit into the allied organization. The latter was a difficult problem since the Supreme Commander had not been named, nor had it been decided as to whether he was to be British or American.

128. The plan suggested by Theater Headquarters. The Theater commander believed that a ground force planning agency should be established at the earliest possible moment, directly under the Theater Commander. He foresaw that there would be either a United States field command which might develop into a GHQ, or a field force command which would have charge of the armies and might be designated as an army group headquarters.

Under this plan the USGHq would become the supreme European field headquarters for all United States Forces and headquarters ETOUSA would be its rear echelon, with the mission of handling Theater administrative matters.

This plan, which is outlined in paragraph 99, would have enabled the Theater Commander and his assistant staff to proceed with Theater operating matters and at the same time plan for actual operations on the continent with the new headquarters under his direction.

The policy of having the functions of the Assistant Chief of Staff G-4 in the hands of the Commanding General, SOS was continued in the new plan, except that the plan stated the G-4 would be the Communications Zone Commander. This proposal indicated either (1) a lack of understanding on the part of Theater headquarters of the need for G-4 coordination of the coordinate commands on the continent, or (2) a belief in the ASF/SOS theory of administrative control. From the SOS/Com 2 point of view, the placing of G-4 functions at the theater in the Communications Zone headquarters, in addition to all Theater Service chiefs functions and even most of the G-1 functions, would result in a simplicity of operation and in greater efficiency; it would keep theater headquarters from being interfered with in the performance of its duties and would enable it to relieve other commanders of a considerable amount of administrative activities. From other points of view, such an arrangement would infringe on the responsibilities of the commanders of the other commands and would make those commands dependent to too great an extent upon the actions of the SOS/Com 2. It would take from Theater headquarters the control and coordination of administrative matters that it might consider vital and would give to coordinate commander considerable influence in administrative matters over other commands. Before D-Day problems that might arise as a result of such an organization, even though troublesome, might be worked out eventually. During operations on the continent there was constant need for Theater G-4 coordination of the commands by a staff not engaged in the operations of any one of the commands.

129. The organization adopted, as indicated previously the plan adopted for organization was prescribed by General Marshall.² It consisted essentially of an army group headquarters separate in all respects from Theater headquarters and under the control of an individual other than the Theater Commander, although it was directed that this organization be under the supervision of the Theater Commander. It appeared that this headquarters would be a field command, developing eventually into either a GHQ or a headquarters over a group of armies only. It was organized and designated as the First United States Army Group and assigned the missions indicated in paragraph 100 above.

It would be well to note that although the plan adopted was the one prescribed by General Marshall, some of its features were not adopted to the extent that he visualized in the letter² quoted in paragraph 99. There

w.s no superior US headquarters under a separate Commander reporting to the Supreme Allied Commander.

130. Relations between the Services of Supply and the First US Army Group. The SOS sought every opportunity to relieve the Theater Commander and the Army Group Commander of all possible administrative and logistical problems. This w.s in line with General Marshall's letter of 24 September 1943. A proposal to this end w.s put forth in December 1943.

It w.s proposed by the SOS that the special staff sections of FUSAAG be made up of personnel from the special staff sections of the SOS, while continuing as members of the SOS, with a deputy SOS Chief of Staff coordinating their work. Since the special staff sections of SOS for a long time, had been performing the functions of special staff sections of the theater headquarters, the approval of this proposition would have meant that the special staffs would have been completely integrated, in all headquarters in rear of the armies. As a result of such an integration the SOS and the chiefs of service would have been in excellent position to control the activities for which they were responsible but the arrangement would have infringed on the responsibilities of the Commanding General, FUSAAG.

131. Theater G-4 responsibilities. In October 1943 the G-4 section w.s re-established in the theater headquarters, and its functions withdrawn from the SOS. General Devers states that "by October 1943 combat troops in great numbers were arriving in the theater and were soon competing with SOS troops for supplies and facilities. Since the Commanding General, SOS was also G-4 of the Theater it was necessary for the Theater Chief of Staff to arbitrate many controversies. This became such a burden that the decision was made to reinstate G-4 on the Theater Staff".⁴

The thought on organization for operations on the continent opposed to that of the ASF/SOS was presented to General Devers in September 1943. This thought w.s concerned with the organization of the American army or field command headquarters. It pointed out that the SOS as a command would have a very definite mission to perform on the continent and that it would have communications zone area functions connected therewith; that the areas also would have definite missions and area functions; that the air forces would be in both army and communications zone areas to perform their missions and under the general area administrative control of the commanders of the areas involved. It w.s indicated that there would be many problems of G-4 nature to be solved in planning for and in the future operations on the continent, among them being (a) the organization for and methods of supply during the first stage -- whether supply organizations would be army or communications zone; (b) if certain communications zone units were used at first the control under which they would operate; (c) the time of establishment of a Communications Zone on the continent;

(d) the co-ordination of the tactical air force administrative problems, including the time when that force moved to the continent; (e) the use of available air transport for supply of all forces; (f) the co-ordination and economic use of both Army and Communications Zone service establishments and organizations in the early stages. It was further indicated that such problems and similar ones that would arise in later stages, would involve differences of opinion among the commanders and staff officers concerned, and that some one on the staff of the GHQ Commander would have to make decisions for his commander, or to analyze the problems and make recommendations to his commander for decision. It was stated that no one of the commanders concerned, in particular the Commanding General of the Communications Zone acting as G-4, should make the decision affecting all of them. It was further pointed out that even with the best of intentions on the part of the Commanding General, set to serve the field forces and the air forces, his action as G-4 on matters affecting his own mission and those of co-ordinate commanders would create doubt as to his staff being unduly influenced by their own problems.

The decision of December 1943, to again make the Commanding General SOS responsible for the duties of G-4 of the Theater, was based on the belief by the Theater Commander that the Theater G-4 was duplicating the efforts of the SOS and greatly slowing process.⁴ No indication was given as to consideration of requiring his G-4 to perform his functions without duplicating the proper functions of the Services of Supply.

The elimination of the G-4 staff section from Theater headquarters left it without an independent staff section under the immediate control of the Theater Commander only, absorbing the expected problems of future operations, and preparing to operate on the continent as the Theater Commander's staff. The other staff sections of theater headquarters were unaffected by the elimination of G-4 and could continue with their normal functions. However, since the Army doctrine on headquarters organization contemplates a group of co-ordinate general staff sections, the integration of G-4 functions under the Commanding General, SOS, introduced a strange factor whose magnitude was overpowering when compared with the other staff sections.

152. A Period of Uncertainty. This entire period was one of uncertainty, first as to the eventual form that the organization of the headquarters United States Forces would take, and second as to whether the Supreme Commander would be British or American and the manner in which he would desire the United States Forces to fit into the Allied organization. Headquarters AFHQUSA and each of the commands under it had to take a position in readiness that would enable them to function regardless of the final organization or of the commander selected.

SECTION 4

THE PERIOD 17 JANUARY TO 6 JUNE 1944

133. The Re-organization of January 1944. Uncertainties concerning the form to be taken by the organization of the headquarters of United States forces were dispelled upon the assumption of command by General Eisenhower. In addition to his duties as Supreme Allied Commander, he desired to keep the command of the US Forces under his own control. At the same time he wanted to reduce the total number of Headquarters and personnel working on Theater administrative functions, where there were possibilities of duplication of effort. The result was that Theater Headquarters was combined with Headquarters, SOS, and the Commanding General, SOS, was made Deputy Theater Commander, in addition to his other duties. This resulted in the Commanding General SOS having the responsibility for all forces in the Theater so far as administration and supply were concerned.

134. Comments on the New Organization. From the viewpoint of the Theater Commander, with his desire to retain control while at the same time maintaining simplicity of organization at the top, such a structure was undoubtedly satisfactory. However, from the viewpoint of the commands co-ordinate with SOS, the new organization had the same defects as the old one plus some additional ones. The consideration expressed in paragraph 131 with respect to the Theater G-4, now applied with equal force to all sections, in that they were in a headquarters of a command co-ordinate with other major commands of the Theater.

The Services of Supply had a definite mission in the preparation for combat operations and, as the Communications Zone, the mission of immediate support of the field forces and the air forces. As the largest service operating agency it had a number of functions which were also of prime interest to the Theater Commander; it contained personnel such as Theater Service Chiefs and their assistants whose big operating jobs were in the Communications Zone but whose interest lay also in the Services of the other commands.

If a separate Theater Headquarters echelon had been retained, with the G-4 Section re-established, the Theater Service Chiefs might have been placed in the Theater Headquarters. However, considering the lack of personnel and the time element, it would have been appropriate to continue having the Theater Service Chiefs remain in the Headquarters, Communications Zone, performing their overall functions for the Theater Headquarters. Certain functions exercised in the Theater/Com Z headquarters were not of prime interest to the Communications Zone and therefore could have been removed therefrom and placed in a separate Theater Administrative Headquarters; such functions are those which were applicable to all commands both in interest and in amount of activity.

135. Effect of Reorganization. Since until D-Day most of the Theater administrative matters pertained largely to SOS functions the operations of the two headquarters as one, had little immediate adverse effect. The Theater/SOS headquarters continued to execute the mission of the SOS and the Theater functions pertaining to the administrative activities of the Theater as a whole. However, there remained no separate staff in that Headquarters to prepare as a Theater staff for the execution of Theater administrative field coordinating functions in the continent, and apparently it was not intended that headquarters would execute such coordination. The US persons in the SHAEF staff, many carried over from the COSSAC staff, were busy with their SHAEF functions in the short time remaining before continental operations began and it was difficult for them to organize and prepare for the purely US field organization that eventually would be required. The scarcity of suitable experienced personnel and many constant pressing problems arising in a short space of time mitigated against these staffs performing their operating functions and at the same time preparing thoroughly for operations of a different nature and with additional responsibility as months later. The question of transferring a number of theater functions to a separate Theater Headquarters echelon, operating through the US staff at SHAEF, was considered and decision made against taking such action.

136. The Administrative Command Problem. The administrative command problem for early operations in the continent was solved at first by continuing FUSAG as the Theater agent for planning for continental ground operations, including administrative functions, and for operations until SHAEF and Theater headquarters were established on the continent. At first, the placing of FUSAG personnel in Headquarters 21 Army Group (British) as the US ground representatives for operations while under the command of General Montgomery assured preparation for control in the field during that period. It was understood that all ground forces in the field including the Communications Zone would be under the command of General Montgomery; the administrative coordination between the field forces, Communications Zone, and the air forces would be the responsibility of the US personnel in General Montgomery's staff. Later directives clarified the issue and left in doubt the administrative command relationship of the US forces in the continent. It was apparent that, during the period of ground force command by General Montgomery FUSAG would become a separate unit and, lacking any directions to the contrary, that its commander would be the US ground commander in the field and would be charged by General Montgomery with the coordination of the US effort.

137. Early Administrative Command Decisions. The COSSAC directive for operation OVERLORD, dated 7 January 1944 had directed that the Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group (British) in collaboration with the Commander-in-Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force, would be responsible for preparation of plans and general super-

vision of the development and operation of the lines of communication on the continent. A later SHAEF directive of 9 February stated that at the time FUSAG was assigned an appropriate tactical command, the Communications Zone would be attached to FUSAG headquarters.⁶ An indorsement from General Smith to a memorandum from General Bradley dated 18 February affirmed this and the consideration implied in the other directives, to the effect that this attachment of Col. Z to FUSAG would be terminated at the time when the Supreme Allied Commander took over all US Ground Forces on the continent; at that time, the Col. Z line would come directly under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander (Theater Commander). The same instructions were repeated in the SHAEF directive of 10 March.

138. The Services of Supply. At the same time that it was occupied in planning for the support of operations under the direction of FUSAG and Headquarters 21 Army Group (British), the SOS was engaged in the enormous job of mounting the operation from the UK and preparing for support of the operation. The General Staff of the SOS, and to a lesser degree the Services, had little time to devote to thinking of the problems which would arise on the continent and to preparing to meet them. The Forward Echelon, Communications Zone was organized to plan for the Communications Zone's operations and to conduct these operations in the early stages, but before D-Day its responsibility was reduced. Apparently a change in Communications Zone plans were made so that the Headquarters Communications Zone, engaged principally in mounting operation OVERLORD, would move to the continent and absorb the Forward Echelon Staff, at a time that would obviate the need for a Communications Zone command representation beyond that exercised by the Advance Section.

139. The Situation at the end of the Period. In spite of directives and agreements, there still was considerable question as to just what the US administrative set-up actually would be on the continent after the early days of the invasion, and when FUSAG (later re-designated 12th Army Group) became operational on the continent. The Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, (British) was still the commander of all Ground Forces on the continent as the representative of the Supreme Commander for early operations; directives had indicated and plans made accordingly that the Communications Zone on the continent would be attached to FUSAG, all under the command of the Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group (British). However, the SHAEF directive of 3 June and the Theater directive of 6 June stated that when FUSAG assumed command of US Ground Forces on the continent the Communications Zone forces would be exempt from such command. No mention was made as to what higher authority would command the Communications Zone at that time, although the same directives reiterated that the Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group (British) continued to command all Ground Forces. Inquiry indicates that it was not desired to have the US Communications Zone under British command and apparently the action taken by the directives of 3 June

and 6 June was intended to show that the Theater Commander would retain control of the US administrative effort, with particular thought to Communications Zone activities. Since the Theater Commander was also the Supreme Commander, he could exercise such control in any manner he wished and apparently he felt that he would exercise control through his US staff at SHAEF. On the other hand, the directives referred to above left the various staffs concerned in doubt because of the conflicting inferences in them regarding command. It is possible that the action with respect to the Communications Zone was influenced also by its headquarters being the Theater Headquarters in addition.

SOLUTION 5

THE PERIOD 6 JUNE TO 15 SEPTEMBER 1944

140. Further Administrative Command Difficulties. Reference has been made in paragraph 139 to administrative command provisions of the MOUSA directive of 6 June 1944. The letter of 14 July 1944 from SHAEF to the major US commanders⁷ amplified somewhat the directive of 6 June by stating that General Bradley, as commander of First Army and later of 12th Army Group, would be responsible for decisions in matters requiring coordination among US forces on the continent, except for conflicts with the air forces. This letter did not give General Bradley actual command responsibility but in effect it gave him power to guide the entire ground effort in the US zone until 1 September when SHAEF and theater headquarters took over direct responsibility for operations on the continent. The Communications Zone on the continent came into being on 14 July when the Advance Section was relieved from attachment to the First Army and an operating boundary between the two was designated. The plans of 21 Army Group (British) contemplated that, when such a Communications Zone was established, the coordination of the efforts of the field forces and the Communications Zone would be accomplished for General Montgomery by the United States Administrative Staff at his headquarters -- the same personnel which would have charge of the coordination under General Bradley. General Montgomery had been charged with the command of all ground forces on the continent and with the development of the lines of communication. If the directives of 6 June and later had not been issued, it appears that the larger portion of the United States Administrative Staff at 21 Army Group (British) Headquarters would have been established on the continent before 14 July and available to General Bradley as a separate staff for the coordination of the United States forces. Again, personalities and political considerations seem to have exerted considerable influence on the action taken.

141. Beginning of the final stage. The directive of 6 June contemplated that at the beginning of the final stage, which was planned for and turned out to be

1 September, General Montgomery would cease to command all ground forces and the United States Forces would then be commanded directly by the theater commander, who was also the supreme commander. It was also contemplated that the theater commander would exercise such of his theater coordinating responsibilities as he desired to keep under his personal control through the United States staff at SHAEF.

It appears that the US SHAEF staff gave serious consideration about 1 June to the removal of theater functions from headquarters AFHQ/SOC and to their exercise by the US staff at SHAEF. It appears also that if this had materialized, a physically separate theater echelon would have been established to work under the direction of the US staff SHAEF. Although desirable, there were a number of difficulties in making such a change at the time and the shortage of suitable experienced personnel alone was a great deterrent. In any case, decision was made against such a removal.

142. Responsibilities of the Theater Commander. Between D-Day and 1 September 1944, when the Supreme Commander took command of all ground forces, the theater commander had no direct responsibility for the coordination of effort in the field between the field forces and the Communications Zone. The commander of 21 Army Group (British) commanded ground forces during this period, and as such, was responsible for the entire ground effort. The theater commander theoretically, and actually in the person of General Eisenhower as SHAEF, was responsible for the proper functioning of the Army Group and the Communications Zone as organizations and for the air forces in the combat and Communications Zone, and of course, retained overall administrative responsibility with which the Theater Commander was at all times charged. This latter overall administrative responsibility was principally exercised in the Theater/Communications Zone headquarters.

It was evident after 1 September that there was doubt as to what functions would be carried on at the SHAEF level and what at the AFHQ/SOC level. The organization charts issued by AFHQ/SOC at the time indicated that the organization at that headquarters was really the old SOC organization changed into a COZ form, but with added theater functions, or rather with the retention of the theater functions which the AFHQ/SOC headquarters had in the U.K. The functions retained by the Theater Commander himself at the SHAEF level were of a nature which General Eisenhower desired to keep under his personal control and were not published.

143. Need for a G-4 section in Theater headquarters. The logistical operations on the continent from 1 September to at least 1 December indicated very clearly the need for a top United States administrative agency, principally of a G-4 nature, which would be familiar with the whole and which would take prompt action on matters needing overall direction. It was impossible for the Army Group headquarters to do much

more than coordinate the forward end of the operations of the Communications Zone, which were the operations of the Advance Section (ALSEC), with the armies, and to attempt to become familiar with the ability of the Communications Zone to perform its mission of supporting the field forces and the air forces in the forward areas. The Communications Zone was handicapped in performing its own mission by not having a Theater G-4 in a separate headquarters constantly adjudicating between it and the field and air forces on supply priorities, transportation, and facilities.

SECTION 6

THE PERIOD 15 SEPTEMBER 1944 TO 2 MAY 1945

144. Coordination in the final period. After 1 September 1944, SHAEF issued instructions for the prosecution of the operation which were applicable not only to the Army groups but also to the Communications Zone, insofar as its functions were affected. The justification of such action was that the Theater Commander had placed all U.S. means at the disposal of SHAEF. As a result Communications Zone and the Army Groups as well as the Air forces were all under the operational control of SHAEF. However, most of the administrative coordination of the U.S. effort, as between major commands, and in general the overall administrative Theater functions, continued to be the responsibility of Theater/Com Z Headquarters.

The following illustrates some of the problems of field coordination that needed constant attention by the Theater Headquarters after 1 September 1944. The air forces, the field forces, and the Communications Zone required continual increase in strength of their forces, additional equipment, supplies, and replacements. Due to the rapid operations transportation was scarce and there was need for allocation of truck, rail and air transportation to meet the requirements of the major commands, in accordance with the importance of their missions from time to time. This allocation and decisions on priorities for personnel, supplies, and facilities required an overall Theater organization cognizant with the whole. Each command, particularly the air forces and the field forces, attempted in various ways to obtain or assist in obtaining what it required, at times detrimental to the operations of the Communications Zone and the Theater as a whole unless stopped by higher authority. Such a situation is a perfectly natural one and these items are pointed out as indicating the need for all possible thorough preparation for the problems that will arise. Both the US staff at SHAEF and the Theater/Com Z Headquarters took such action as was possible for them, but in such momentous times their many other interests were apt to affect their ability to do all they desired. As has been pointed out, there were many factors which affected the organization of the headquarters for the European

Theater, but it is believed that had it been possible to establish a separate Theater Headquarters section, under the US staff at SHAEF, in time for its staff to prepare for the field problems that did arise, the operation of the major commands together as a unified force would have been smoother.

145. Action in Theater matters by U.S. staff at SHAEF. The G-4 Section of the U.S. staff SHAEF gradually took over coordinating functions as needed. The other general staff sections at SHAEF were integrated with the British and had comparatively little to do with Theater functions. However, the efficiency of the U.S. Forces during the critical logistical period September to 1 December 1944 was dependent to a large measure on the close co-operation between the two different headquarters having Theater functions.

SECTION 7

SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

146. Scope of this Study. It may be well at this point to discuss certain references. In the agenda for this study it was directed that there would be included (1) a description and discussion of the relationship of SHAEF and Headquarters ETOUSA with their subordinate commands; (2) The advantages and disadvantages of the organization and method of the operation adopted and a discussion of other logical organizations; and (3) A recommendation based on experience in this theater as to the organization and method of operation that should be accepted under similar conditions.

147. Definitions. Paragraph 11, FM 100-15, 29 June 1942, defines theater of operations as "a term used to designate that portion of the land, sea, and air areas of the theater of war necessary for military operations *** pursuant to an assigned mission and for the administration incident to such military operations". The same reference continues, "The theater is organized for tactical control and administrative control to the extent dictated by War Department instructions."

Paragraph 16 of the same manual states "The theater commander, pursuant to policies announced by the War Department, is directly responsible for the administrative and combat operations within the theater". Further reference in the same paragraph is made to FM 100-10, paragraph 14 of which defines administration to include "all phases of military operations not involved in the terms 'tactics' and 'strategy' and mentions specifically, 'supply, evacuation, sanitation, construction, maintenance, replacements, transportation, traffic control, salvage, graves registration, burials, computations pertaining to movements, personnel management, quartering, military government, martial law, and other allied subjects'.

148. The War Department Directive. A consideration of General Marshall's letters of 14 May 1942¹ and 24 September 1943² indicates that he visualized the sort of theater of operations prescribed in the references cited in the preceding paragraph and contemplated that it would consist of a Ground Force Command, an Air Force Command and a Service of Supply Command, all under the control of a superior American Theater Headquarters, commanded by a separate commander. There appears to be no indication that any necessity for variation from this basic pattern was foreseen.

149. Variation from the War Department Pattern. In two important respects there was a deviation from the pattern established by the War Department. The first was the retention by the Supreme Allied Commander of his command of ETOUSA; the second was the assignment of the functions of the Theater Headquarters to the Headquarters, Services of Supply. The decisions concerning each of these matters were made after what appears to be due consideration of the factors involved, but a view of the organization in retrospect indicates that each of these decisions led to uncertainties with respect to functions and responsibilities.

150. Division of responsibilities of Theater Headquarters. The decision of General Eisenhower to retain command of the ETOUSA after his appointment as Supreme Allied Commander was later followed by a division of the functions of the Theater Headquarters between the United States Staff at SHAEF and the Theater/Com Z Headquarters. The dividing line between the two was not clearly established by order, but was subject almost entirely to personal agreements between the two agencies, and to specific direction of the SHAEF Chief of Staff. Thus the US staff at SHAEF and the Theater/Com Z staff each had functions to do with the responsibility of two commands. Such a condition is not the most desirable but the many factors affecting the problem for a number of months as already shown, in addition to some which are not clearly in the record such as the matter of personalities, availability of officers for key positions and the methods of operating of those in key positions, influenced the decisions made. It necessitated the enlargement of the US staff at SHAEF. It seems probable that if it had been practicable at that time to establish a separate Theater Headquarters echelon, the US staff physically located in the SHAEF Headquarters would have been somewhat smaller but with its Chiefs of Sections having supervision over the staff located in the separate echelon. Under such conditions also the Communications Zone staff could have given its undivided attention to its own command. It seems that such an organization is preferable to the one that existed, especially in consideration of the constant administrative coordination required for the major commands in the field.

151. The effect of combining Headquarters ETOUSA and Headquarters SOS. The decision that Headquarters SOS should, in addition to its other functions, exercise

the functions of Theater Headquarters, and the effect of eliminating the overall superior headquarters that was needed to assist the Theater Commander in the exercise of his functions of command in the field after D-Day. One of these functions is the coordination of the parts of his command to best accomplish his mission. His responsibilities include guidance and direction of the Services of Supply as well as the other commands. On the continent, Theater administrative functions were in fact delegated to the Communications Zone. This condition gave rise to opinion in the various headquarters in ETOUSA and particularly in the headquarters coordinate with Com Zone, that the Commanding General of the latter was in complete control of policy making, planning and decisions affecting the conduct of administrative affairs within the theater, and that the full interests of all the commands were not known and consequently, were not thoroughly considered. The Commanding General Com Z has stated that there was no conflict of interests between the Theater administrative organization and the combat elements. In view of the fact that there were shortages of personnel, material, and transportation to fulfill the total requirements of the Field Forces, the Air Forces and the Communications Zone, it is obvious that decisions had to be made as to their proper distribution. Such decisions and others could be made with better results through the Theater Staff charged solely with the affairs of the Theater as a whole, but considering all the factors that influenced the organization the preferable solution, if it had been practicable, would have been to make the US staff at SHAEF responsible for all Theater functions that pertained approximately equally to the major commands, with a separate Theater echelon under it to handle administrative details, in order to avoid increasing the physical size of the SHAEF headquarters.

152. Organization under British Commander. This report indicates a number of the complications in Theater organization due to the appointment of a US officer as Supreme Commander. If the Supreme Allied Commander had been British it appears quite definite that there would have been a separate American Theater Headquarters with at least a field GHQ and with probably a separate rear echelon not combined with the Communications Zone. Nothing has appeared in the records, or in discussions in the preparation of this report, to indicate that any other solution would have been adopted. It is a matter of conjecture as to whether the Service Chiefs would have been in the Theater Headquarters or, if not, the amount of Theater coordination of their activities which would have been exercised in the Theater Headquarters. Again considering the late date of the appointment of the Supreme Commander, and the other factors indicated in this report which affected the organization in the United Kingdom up to January 1944, the actual organization which would have been adopted probably would not have been quite the same as that contemplated in our Field manuals and Command and Staff doctrine.

153. General observations. Having observed that the organization of Headquarters ETOUSA was faulty in respect to the factors noted above, consideration will be given in the succeeding paragraphs to the organization as it existed, in an attempt to indicate what the effect would have been if the various factors had permitted modifications.

154. A solution for Theater headquarters. Since General Eisenhower desired to retain direct control of the U.S. Forces and wished to retain control of the theater staff actions through his one chief of staff, who was with him at SHAEF, a separate theater headquarters echelon headed by a deputy chief of staff might have been maintained. This arrangement would have permitted the desired control to be exercised without involving any portion of the U.S. Staff at SHAEF in the internal affairs of US Forces.

155. An alternate solution. Another possible solution would have permitted General Eisenhower to retain control of the U.S. Forces through a chief of staff at a separate Theater Headquarters. A variation of this solution would have been to have the separate headquarters headed by a Deputy U.S. Theater Commander who had no other responsibilities. Both of these solutions would have required his SHAEF Chief of Staff to devote himself solely to SHAEF matters. The use of a Deputy Theater Commander would have required an exceptional officer for the position and one in whom General Eisenhower had the utmost confidence.

156. Need for a coordination agency at theater level. The real need of a separate Theater headquarters was shown clearly in the operations on the continent. Some coordinating functions were not exercised or were exercised in a coordinate command, because of the relationship of the Chief of Staff at SHAEF to the Supreme Commander/Theater Commander, major U.S. staff matters had to be handled through the SHAEF/Theater Chief of Staff, and some staff action on such matters was required from the U.S. staff personnel physically located at SHAEF and acting also as SHAEF staff. Many field coordinating matters, particularly of a G-4 nature carried out in accordance with major policies, were dependent on close cooperation of the major commands or of the staffs at SHAEF and Theater/COM 2 headquarters.

157. Desirability of retention of Theater headquarters. With the above in view, it appears that if other considerations had permitted such action, it would have been beneficial to operations if a theater headquarters had been retained in January 1944, developing into an echelon of the headquarters under the U.S. staff at SHAEF. The headquarters, in addition to performing the daily necessary administrative functions of Theater headquarters while in the U.K., could have furnished the U.S. administrative personnel required at 21 Army Group Headquarters for planning the U.S. portion of continental operations, with the First U.S. Army Group and Communications Zone personnel under their direction. The Army Group headquarters then

could have confined its efforts to the administrative functions pertaining to the exercise of command of the armies by Group Commander, and there would have been no question of placing even temporarily the command of the Communications Zone under a coordinate commander. This Theater personnel then could have been well organized for and familiar with the probable operation problems on the continent. There should have been no confusion in the administrative direction in the field of the U.S. effort as a whole and the Communications Zone Headquarters would not have attempted to perform the functions of the Communications Zone at the Theater Headquarters with the same personnel. Neither would there have been the uncertainties and the numerous changes in U.S. administrative organization that actually existed between February and September 1944.

158. Retention of a G-4 Section. The fact that there was no G-4 Staff Section operating in Theater Headquarters in January 1944 would have required, for a separate Theater Headquarters discussed above, a prompt organization of a Theater G-4 Section with competent personnel. This would not have been easy in the time available but it could have been done. While such a staff section was being formed, the personnel of first U.S. Army Group could have been utilized for the planning of the ground operations for the early stages under the Commander in chief, 1st Army Group (British). It is possible that had the Theater G-4 Section been in existence in January 1944, the decision to combine the Theater and the SOE Headquarters would not have been made. The retention of Theater Headquarters, and the re-establishment of a G-4 Section therein, would have resulted in a simpler command structure and should have enabled the Theater Commander to perform more easily and fully his functions of directing and coordinating his commands.

159. The efficiency of the consolidated headquarters. The insistent claim of the SOE/Com 1 Headquarters that the exercise of the Theater administrative functions by the SOE/Com 1 Headquarters would result in greater efficiency of operation is true as far as the mechanics of operation of that headquarters are concerned. But the resultant efficiency to the Theater as a whole, in actual operations especially, would not have been as great as in an organization with a separate Theater Headquarters. It was stated that with the Theater functions in the SOE/Com 1 Headquarters there would be no cause for conflict between the two headquarters. This claim, however, brings up a staff functioning point that is worthy of mention. Our experience in peace time in the exercise of staff functions in higher headquarters is very limited. When a headquarters such as a Theater has principal commands under it to carry out all operating functions, that headquarters should see to it that only the necessary command direction and coordination is exercised by it and that its staff, in an attempt to be efficient, does not go into details of operation which belong in one of its commands. With proper functioning of the Theater staff, there should

have been no wrongful interference in the exercise of its functions by the SOS/Com. I or by any other of the major commands under the Theater Headquarters. The cure for the defect does not appear to be the elimination of the separate Theater Headquarters.

160. Theater Service Chiefs. It is believed that had the time, the situation, and personnel available been such as to permit it, the Theater organization should have had the technical and some of the other Service Chiefs in the Theater headquarters liaison, if there had been one, charged with the Theater planning, technical inspection and coordination of the Service activities in the various commands. Experience in operations on the Continent indicates they were handicapped in the performance of their Theater functions by being also the chiefs of services in the Communications Zone. The Services of Supply and its personnel would then have been charged with the planning for and carrying out of the missions assigned to it. If suitable personnel had been available and the objectives carefully considered in advance, an organization could have been developed beginning early in 1942 which would have been in keeping with our accepted doctrine and staff training before the war. There would have been some disadvantages in that the close relationship between the ASF and the SOS, particularly with respect to Theater planning and operation on matters of interest to the ASF, would have been lessened or lost. It appears doubtful that such action could have been taken before the fall of 1943, chiefly because of the war Department reorganization of March 1942, the status and functions of the ASF, and the shortage of suitable experienced officers.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

Chapter 12, Part Two

Annotations

1. Letter, WD C/S to CC, American Forces in British Isles, Subject: "Organization Services of Supply", dated 14 May 1942.
2. Letter, C C/S, WD 24 September 1943, Marshall to Devers (personal).
3. General Lee at SOS Staff Conference, 30 August 1943.
4. 1st Ind, 320.2(ETO) (15 Nov 1945) GNDUG, Eq., AGF, to President, The General Board, USFET, 15 November 1945.
5. Memorandum to Chief of Staff, ETOUSA, dated 8 and 19 September 1943, from Brig Gen R. G. Moses.
6. Letter, SHAEF to Chiefs of All Divisions, SHAEF, AG 322, Subject: Organization of U.S. Forces (Administration), 9 February 1944.
7. Letter, SHAEF to FUSA, Com Z and Lt Gen Carl Spaatz, Subject: Organization of U.S. Forces on the Continent, 14 July 1944.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SECTION I

CONCLUSIONS

161. The war Department organization and the functions of the ASF, after March 1942, had a predominant effect on the European Theater organization. Other major influential factors were the time element; the enormous SOS mission of preparing in the United Kingdom for the mounting, first of operation TORCH and then of operations on the continent; the shortage of experienced administrative staff officers; the lack of any large field forces in the theater before the fall of 1943, except those used in operation TORCH; theater organization difficulties in the North African or Mediterranean theater; General Eisenhower's personal desires with respect to command; General Eisenhower's position as supreme commander and political considerations connected therewith; the late date of appointment of the supreme commander; the ASF theory of service organization; the difference between theater operation in the United Kingdom and on the continent.

162. It was desirable from the US organization viewpoint that the European Theater of Operations have a commander with no other position or responsibilities that would divert his time and efforts and those of his staff from his primary task.

163. The serious shortage of experienced administrative personnel had an adverse effect on operations, both before and after L-Day, and on the organization for such operations.

164. The headquarters ETOUSA should have had a complete General staff at all times. It should also have contained at least those chiefs of services whose activities pertain to the theater as a whole and not primarily to the SOS.

165. The ASF/SOS theory of organization violated our pre-war concept of staff organization and command responsibility that no General staff functions of a commander are performed by any subordinate commander. The record fails to indicate that such a violation is justified.

166. Under the existing conditions and had it been practicable, the command of ETOUSA exercised through the US SHAEF staff with a separate Theater headquarters echelon should have resulted in a simpler organization to carry out the Theater Commander's functions, with probable better results in the co-ordination of the commands in their field operations. Considering the Supreme Commander's desire to retain command of ETOUSA and to have General W. B. Smith to

act as his chief of staff for both SHAEF and ETOUSA, the separate theater headquarters echelon should have been headed by a deputy chief of staff.

167. The placing of overall theater functions of equal interest to all commands in the headquarters of one coordinate command, gave rise to organizational difficulties in the theater. It was difficult for that one headquarters General staff to exercise the functions of both Theater and SOS/Com 2 and impossible to keep the execution of the two responsibilities separate.

168. Experience in ETO has indicated that it is practicable to have the chiefs of technical services of the SOS perform theater functions in addition, even though they and their staffs are located at SOS or Com 2 headquarters. In operations as large as those that took place in the European theater, the major part of the technical service operating responsibility rests in the SOS or Com 2. However, from the theater viewpoint it was preferable to have most of the chiefs of services plan for and coordinate their service activities in the operations on the continent, in a separate theater headquarters. Considering the war department reorganization of March 1942, the TORCH operations, and the initial need for speed in SOS preparation in the United Kingdom for the mounting of TORCH, such action with respect to the Service Chiefs was impracticable before 1943 and probably before the fall of 1943. The late date of appointment of the Supreme Commander, and the Theater Commander, mitigated against such action at any time.

169. Functions of a general nature and those of equal interest to all major commands, could have been performed at a separate headquarters echelon with little increase in personnel or space over that necessary in the theater/SOS headquarters. Those of interest principally to the SOS/Com 2, even though other commands were affected, could have been left at that headquarters for efficiency of operation. Even if the conditions found in January 1944 required the retention of the technical chiefs of services in the SOS, the Theater Adjutant General and such chiefs of services as the Inspector General, Judge Advocate General, and the highest serial, and the chiefs of such sections as armored, artillery, and anti-aircraft, could have been placed in a separate Theater headquarters echelon.

170. Theater administrative organization for the preparatory period for operations may not be the same as that required for the actual operations. All units should be organized well in advance to perform their functions in the field.

SECTION 2

RECOMMENDATIONS

171. It is recommended that:

a. An analysis of the organization of the European Theater be considered in connection with those of other Theaters, and action be taken by the War Department for the Army to benefit therefrom.

b. Specifically more attention be given to the education and training of suitable officers for administrative staff duty with higher headquarters.

c. The organization of the War Department and our peacetime army commands be such as to avoid conflicts in administrative command organization, determined to be most suitable for Theater organization in the future.

c. Theater organization problems and their solution be stressed in the education and training of senior officers, particularly for duty as general staff officers.

c. In the doctrine for Theater organization for the future, consideration be given to the overall single command of the Army, the Air Forces, and the Navy.

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM

Directive to the Chief of Staff to the
Supreme Commander (Designate)

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have decided to appoint, in due course, a Supreme Commander over all United Nations forces for the invasion of the Continent of EUROPE from the UNITED KINGDOM.

The Supreme Commander will be responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for planning and executing such operations, and for the coordination of the training policy of forces to be employed in amphibious operations against the Continent in accordance with this Directive.

2. Pending the appointment of the Supreme Commander or his deputy, you will be responsible for carrying out the above planning duties of the Supreme Commander. You will report direct to the BRITISH Chiefs of Staff with whom will be associated the UNITED STATES Commander of the European Theatre of Operations acting as the direct representative of the UNITED STATES Chiefs of Staff in the UNITED KINGDOM.

OBJECT

3. Our object is to defeat the GERMAN fighting forces in North-West EUROPE.

4. To this end the Combined Chiefs of Staff will endeavour to assemble the strongest possible forces (subject to prior commitments in other theatres) in constant readiness to re-enter the Continent if GERMAN resistance is weakened to the required extent in 1943. In the meantime the Combined Chiefs of Staff must be prepared to order such limited operations as may be practicable with the forces and material available.

PREPARATION OF PLANS

5. You will accordingly prepare plans for:-

a. DESTROYED PERMEMO AGO, 27 June 1946

(b) A return to the Continent in the event of German disintegration at any time from now onwards with whatever forces may be available at the time.

(c) A full scale assault against the continent in 1944 as early as possible.

STAFF AND METHOD OF PLANNING

6. You will be provided with a small permanent Combined Staff drawn from the BRITISH and UNITED STATES Navies, Armies and Air Forces. For administrative planning you will make appropriate use of the planning agencies of the U.S. and BRITISH Services.

FURTHER GUIDANCE

7. You should maintain close contact with the BRITISH Chiefs of Staff and their organization, through whom you will be given such further guidance as you may require. You should also maintain close contact with Headquarters European Theatre of Operations of the UNITED STATES Army.


8. The Allied military staffs (other than BRITISH and AMERICAN) will not be brought into the planning at present. The BRITISH Chiefs of Staff will inform you at what stage these other Allied Staff should be consulted.

CANCELLATION OF PREVIOUS DIRECTIVES

9. This directive cancels all previous directives issued to the Combined Commanders for amphibious operations launched from the UNITED KINGDOM against the Continent.

ORGANIZATION OF C.O.S.S.A.C. STAFF


1 January 1944



MAJOR COMMANDS UNDER SHAEF

FOR PLANNING CONTINENTAL OPERATIONS

13 February 1944




No administrative functions shown.

MAJOR OPERATING COMMANDS UNDER

SHAEF ON THE CONTINENT


1 August 1944



MAJOR COMMANDS UNDER SHAEF


FOR PLANNING CONTINENTAL OPERATIONS

14 April 1944



MAJOR OPERATING COMMANDS UNDER
SHAEF ON THE CONTINENT


1 September 1944



MAJOR OPERATING COMMANDS UNDER

SHAEF ON THE CONTINENT


15 September 1944



MAJOR OPERATING COMMANDS UNDER

SHAEF ON THE CONTINENT


15 October 1944



STRUCTURE OF OPERATING COMMANDS UNDER


SHAEF ON THE CONTINENT

VE-DAY




SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

14 February 1944




SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

13 April 1944



SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

30 April 1944




Command

- - - - Coordination


SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

31 May 1944




SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

1 September 1944




SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

15 Sept 1944




SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

16 October 1944




SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

21 November 1944




SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

13 February 1945




SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE


15 April 1945




EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS
Compiled from Collateral Information
31 Aug 1943




ORGANIZATION CHART OF SOS, ETOUSA IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 82, HEADQUARTERS, SOS ETOUSA 23 AUGUST 1943



ORGANIZATION OF ETOUSA
Compiled from Collateral Information
16 Jan 1944.




ORGANIZATION OF SERVICE OF SUPPLY
16 Jan 1944
COMPILED FROM COLLATERAL INFORMATION



GO 5, ETCUSA, 17 JAN 44

ORGANIZATION ETO HQ



ORGANIZATION OF HQ ETOUSA
6 JUNE 1944
Compiled from Collateral Information

Command for Administration and Supply Only.
Operational Command from SHAEF to Major Subordinate Commands Direct.





Chart No 4
APPENDIX 10

HEADQUARTERS ETOUSA

2 August 1944

Compiled From Collateral Information

Command for Administration and Supply Only.
 Operational Command from SHAEF to Major Subordinate Commands Direct.





HEADQUARTERS ETOUSA

15 September 1944

Compiled from Collateral Information

Command for Administration and Supply Only.
 Operational Control from SHAEF to Major
 Subordinate Commands Direct.





— COMMAND FOR OPERATIONS

===== COMMAND FOR ADMINISTRATION


- - - - - LIAISON

LIAISON WITH

BELGIUM
DENMARK MISSION
FRENCH MISSION
NETHERLANDS MISSION


12 Feb 45

HQ ETOUSA



COLLABORATION AND LIAISON CHANNELS AMONG GROUPS


12 Feb 45



Command for administration and supply only.
 Operational command from SHAEF to major subordinate commands direct.
 Note: The General Staff functions of theater are performed jointly by the US element of SHAEF and the General Staff Com Z.


HQ ETOUSA

12 Feb 1945



HEADQUARTERS COM' ZONE ETOUSA


DATE 28 FEB 1945
REVISED 15 MAR 1945



The channel of command between CG Com Zone and subordinate commanders (ie Base Sections, etc, as shown in bottom tier of this chart) remains as prescribed in paragraph 18 FM 101-5. Therefore, orders to such subordinate commanders will be issued only by or in the name of the Commanding General Com Zone. Informal inter-staff communication as described in paragraph 10 FM 101-5 is authorized as a desirable adjunct to orders promulgated through command channels

US STRATEGIC AIR FORCE IN EUROPE


12 Feb 45



NOTE:

1. Personnel strength includes rear and main headquarters.
2. Duty commanding general operations includes advisory specialist group.
3. Director of personnel includes provost marshal, chaplain and "AC director."
4. CATOR Air Staff, SHAEF, has limited operational control over IX Troop Carrier Command for purpose of utilizing troop carrier air planes for supply of the ground forces when such airplanes are not being used for actual operations.
5. US component-AFAF Air Staff, SHAEF, has operational control over IX Air Force and 1st Tactical Air Force (Provisional)
6. 1st Airborne (American Increment) has operational control over IX Troop Carrier Command.

12TH ARMY GROUP HQ ORGANIZATION
12 February 1945




6th ARMY GROUP HQ ORGANIZATION

12 Feb 45

RECAPITULATION

| | |
|------------------|-----|
| Officers | 209 |
| Warrant Officers | 3 |
| Enlisted | 400 |




HEADQUARTERS ETOUSA

8 May 1945

Compiled from Collateral Information

Command for Administration and Supply Only.
Operational Control from SHAEF to Major Subordinate
Commands Direct.



U.S. DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
Washington

May 14, 1942.

Subject: Organization Services of Supply.

To : Commanding General, American Forces in British Isles.

1. Through my visit and previous communications, you have been furnished with the general plans and intentions covering operations in Salerno.

2. The forces under your command will be organized eventually into a Ground Force Command, an Air Force Command and a Services of Supply Command. This letter is to furnish you with instructions regarding the organization of the Services of Supply, which is to be undertaken at once. Your immediate headquarters will be organized along the general pattern of a command post with a minimum of supply and administrative services. All of these services will be grouped under an organization known as the Services of Supply and will be placed under the command of a general officer reporting directly to you. Major General John C.H. Lee and a skeleton staff are being directed to proceed to England. Upon arrival, General Lee will be assigned to command of the Services of Supply and be permitted to appoint the staff officers selected by him before leaving the United States. It is further desired that such administrative and supply officers as are now serving at your headquarters be made available for assignment to your Services of Supply in conformity with the organization adopted. Copies of Circular No. 59 (The Orders creating the Services of Supply); General Orders No. 8, Services of Supply; Circular No. 11, Services of Supply; and letter, headquarters, Services of Supply, March 9, 1942, are inclosed for you as a guide in the formation of your orders creating your Services of Supply. Though the organization prescribed for the War Department need not be slavishly followed at your headquarters, it will, in the main, be the pattern for similar organizations of the Services of Supply in the British Isles.

3. Under your supervision, General Lee is invested with all authority necessary to accomplish his mission including, but not limited to, authority to approve or delegate authority to:

a. Approve all plans and contracts of all kinds necessary to carry out the objectives of this directive.

b. Employ, fix the compensation of, and discharge civilian personnel without regard to civil service rules.

c. Purchase any necessary supplies, equipment, and property, including rights in real estate practicable of acquisition.

d. Adjudicate and settle all claims.

e. Take all measures regarded as necessary and appropriate to expedite and prosecute the procurement, reception, processing, forwarding, and delivery of personnel, equipment, and supplies for the conduct of military operations.

* * * * *

E. Direction of The Commander-in-Chief:

Three Inclosures

Gen. Orders No 8

Circular No 11

Initial Directive for the Organization
of the Services of Supply

Chief of Staff.

Factual Data Showing the Status of
ETOUSA as of 31 August 1943

I. The organization of ETOUSA as of 31 August 1943 is shown on Chart No 1, which is taken basically from GO 33, ETOUSA, 27 May 1943. The original chart has been modified to show the changes between 27 May and 31 Aug, as follows:

1. 16 July 1943, GO 43, ETOUSA, Office of the Theater Judge Advocate General transferred from SOS to ETOUSA.

2. 29 Aug 1943, GO 57, ETCUSA.. Office of the Secretary General Staff re-constituted.

II. Major Commands under European Theater of Operations (ETOUSA) - Functions of each.

1. Ground Forces.

The following quotation is from GO 16, ETOUSA, dated 21 March 1943.

"VI - V Corps

8. a. Mission. Pending the activation of a higher headquarters, the Commanding General, V Corps, is charged with the following:

- (1) Reception in corps and divisional areas of such ground force units as may be assigned or attached to it, including the reception of filler replacements for those units.
- (2) Training of the ground forces and replacements for them.
- (3) Preparation of the above ground forces for combat.
- (4) Recommendations for the flow of replacements and material and equipment for assigned or attached ground forces.
- (5) Reports to the Commanding General, ETCUSA., at intervals of the state of training of troops under his command.
- (6) Planning, training, and execution of any missions assigned to his command for the defense of territory of the United Kingdom.
- (7) Conduct of such special training schools as may be directed."

2. Eighth Air Force.

The following quotation is from GO 16, ETCUSA., dated 21 March 1943:

"9. a. Mission: The Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, is charged with responsibilities for air force troops similar to those described in paragraph 8 above for ground troops and with the procurement, quartering, distribution, and training of replacements for the air forces (including arms and services therewith). He is responsible for the conduct of air operations in accordance with directives and policies prescribed by the Theater Commander."

3. Iceland Base Command.

The following quotation is from GO 16, ETOUSA, dated 21 March 1943:

"10. e. Mission: The Commanding General, Iceland Base Command, is charged with the defense of the territory under his control, the training of units under his command in accordance with such directives as may be issued by the Commanding General, ETOUSA, and the execution of such specific instructions as may be issued from time to time. The Commanding General, Iceland Base Command, is authorized to communicate directly with the War Department on all supply and routine administrative matters."

4. Services of Supply.

The following quotation is from GO 16, ETOUSA, dated 21 March 1943:

"7. e. (1) The Services of Supply is the Commanding General's agency for administrative service and supply of the theater. It is not a separate military unit.
(2) The Commanding General, SOS, ETOUSA, is charged in general with the functions, responsibilities, and authorities of command authorized by law, Army regulations, and custom over individuals and units assigned to his command.
(3) The mission of the Services of Supply, ETOUSA, is to provide services and supplies to meet military requirements in the ETOUSA, except those peculiar to the Army Air Forces.
(4) Authority and detailed instructions will be provided the CG, SOS in a separate letter of instructions."

NOTE: The separate letter of instructions referred to in Par 7e of GO 16, appears to be letter AG 371 wX, Hq ETOUSA, Subject: Letter of Instructions, dated 21 March 1943, which is quoted as follows:

Letter of Instructions, SOS

AG 322, SC6, 1943.

"1. Pursuant to instructions contained in War Department cable R5585 dtd 3 Feb 1943, War Department letter, Office of the Chief of Staff, dated 14 May 1942, subject: "Orgn, Services of Supply," is rescinded. The following specific instructions re-issued for your guidance under the general mission furnished your headquarters in Par 7e, General Orders 16, Hq ETOUSA, dated 21 Mar 1943. "2. The Services of Supply is the Commanding General's agency for the administrative service and supply of the theater. The Commanding General, SOS, ETOUSA, is charged with the following responsibilities:

a. Receipt and delivery to depots of all supplies from the zone of the interior or from local or foreign sources.

b. Procurement, storage, maintenance, salvage and basic issues of all equipment and supplies, except Air Corps technical supplies.

- c. Preparation of purchasing and contractual policies and procedures for the approval of the Theater Commander, and action thereunder, when approved.
 - d. Control of all transportation pertaining to the theater except that specifically assigned to the control of other commands.
 - e. Constructors.
 - f. Quartering, to include acquiring, by such means as may be necessary, accommodations and facilities for all forces and activities.
 - g. Technical supervision of all elements of the Army Postal Service and operation of those elements not assigned to the control of other commands.
 - h. Establishment and maintenance of the Central Records Office for all Army elements of the theater, except operation of the Prisoner War Information Bureau.
 - i. Acquisition, procurement and distribution of publications, training films, film strips and blank forms.
 - k. Requisitioning, quartering, training, and distribution, under directives and policies prescribed by the Theater Commander, of all replacements for all units in the UK (except the Air Force replacements including arms and services therewith).
 - l. Establishment and control of all disciplinary barracks, and military police control forces under his command.
 - m. Establishment and operation of such training centers and officer candidate schools as may be directed by the Theater Commander.
 - n. Establishment and operation of centers for reclassification of officers to include administration of reclassification boards appointed by the Theater Commander.
 - o. Evacuation from the commands of prisoners of war, and administration and control of all prisoner of war establishments, except those pertaining to other ETO Commands.
 - p. Evacuation and hospitalization of sick and wounded from other commands.
 - q. Preparation of estimates of funds (except Air Force) required for operation of the theater.
 - r. Organization and operation of recreational facilities.
 - s. Organization and operation of the Army Exchange Service.
 - t. Procurement and sale of war bonds and stamps.
 - u. Operation of all supply and administrative services which serve the theaters, while and which are not a part of other subordinate forces of the theater.
- "3. Authority.
- a. The commanding General, SOS, ETOUSA, is charged with the functions, responsibilities, and authority of command authorized by law, Army Regulations, and custom of the commander of a service command, over all units, individuals, and installations assigned to the SOS, ETOUSA.
 - b. The CG, SOS, ETOUSA, is vested by the Theater Commander with all authority necessary to accomplish his mission, including authority to:
 - (1) approve plans and contracts of all kinds required to carry out his duties and responsibilities.

(2) Employ, fix the compensation of, and discharge civilian personnel without regard to Civil Service rules.

(3) Acquire any supplies, equipment or property including rights in real estate, practicable if requirement, required to carry out his duties and responsibilities.

c. The Commanding General, SOS, ETOUSA, is authorized to communicate directly with the War Department, or British agencies, or other separate commanders on technical and routine administrative matters arising directly from his duties and responsibilities proscribed in paragraph 2 above. Such communications will have as their purpose the facilitating of administrative service and supply procedure, but they will not infringe upon the inherent command responsibilities of other commanders.

d. Within the authority delegated to the CG, SOS, ETOUSA, orders may be issued by order of the Theater Commander."

The above letter was modified by the following:

Ltr., HQ., ETOUSA, 28 July 1943, AG 371 Mc/S, to CG, SOS, ETOUSA, "Letter of Instructions."

"Paragraphs 3c and 3d letter, this headquarters, dated 21 March 1943, file and subject is ab ve, are rescinded and the following substituted therefor:

3c. The Commanding General, SOS, ETOUSA, is authorized to communicate directly with British agencies, the War Department, and the major separate commands of this theater on technical and routine administrative matters arising directly from his responsibilities as outlined in the letter referred to ab ve. Such communications will not infringe upon the command responsibilities of their major commands.

3d. When deemed advisable that instructions issued to the major separate commands in matters which affect the command and responsibilities of commanders, the proposed instructions will be submitted for approval and issuance by this headquarters."

Major commands in European Theater of Operations.

Relationship to ETOUSA and to each other under ETOUSA.

The portion of GO 16, ETOUSA, 21 March 1943, which was quoted in answer to b, (3) (b) above covers to great extent the answer to this question. Further information may be obtained from Par 5 and 6 of GO 16 which appear below:

"III. 5. . Organization of theater based on following general principles; . CG, ETOUSA, will from time to time delegate certain functions and responsibilities to subordinate commanders. To be used by specific directives to commanders concerned, who are then authorized to issue such orders and instructions within their commands as may be necessary to

accomplish their respective missions, without reference to higher headquarters.

b. ETO Hq to be informed of all principal orders and instructions issued within subordinate units. Close cooperation with British forces and between coordinate Hqs. of ETCUSA to be maintained by commanders concerned.

c. Subordinate units, services, or commands, authorized to communicate directly with British agencies, U.S. War Department, or appropriate agencies thereof or with each other, only on routine and technical matters. Communications on other than these to be sent to this Hq for action and transmission.

d. All requests for movement of individuals or units into or out of ETCUSA will be submitted to ETO Hq.

e. Operations reports involving any contact with the enemy will be submitted to the War Department by ETO Hq.

f. Determination of policies, objectives, and priorities and the issuance of orders affecting two or more major subordinate divisions of the theater, or theater as a whole, reserved to CG, ETCUSA.

IV. Hq. ETCUSA.

6. a. Mission as prescribed in CG's directive.

b. Organization: (1) Hq., ETCUSA, to consist of the following: Theater Commander, personal staff, Dep Theater Commander, General Staff, Adj. Gen. Sec., Air Technical Sec., M.I. Section, Censorship Section, Civil Affairs Section, Claims Commission Section, Combined Operations Liaison Section, Inspector General Section, J.G Section, PHG Section, Public Relations Section. (2) Chiefs of Services or representatives will be available at all times to advise and assist Hq in matters affecting their respective services.

I. TOUEA -- Progressive changes, after 31 Aug 43 to 17 January 44:

i. 22 Aug 43, GO 55, ETOUSA, Paragraph 1 changes the designation "Finance Section" to "Fiscal Director".

2. 8 Oct 43. GO 71, ETOUSA, Paragraph 1 re-establishes the G-4 Section in ETOUSA staff and rescinds that portion of GO 33 which directed CG, SOS to assume the duties and functions of G-4 ETOUSA. Paragraph 3 discontinued the G-5 Section as a separate staff section of ETOUSA and transferred the G-5 plans section to the Office of CG of S G-3.

3. 16 Oct 43. GO 74, ETOUSA. Paragraph 1. Effective 19 October 43. HQ FUSAG and HQ/HQ CO Special Troops FUSAG are activated at APO 887 pursuant to authorization. Paragraph 2. Mission: "Initially HQ FUSAG will be responsible only for operational planning as directed by this headquarters. It will be prepared to assume responsibility for the direction of field operations at the appropriate time."

Paragraph 3. HQ FUSAG authorized direct communication with other commands of ETOUSA and with COSS CO.

4. 26 Nov 43. GO 88, ETOUSA. The Civil Affairs Section was discontinued.

5. 1 Dec 43. GO 90, ETOUSA. The duties and functions of AC of S G-4 ETOUSA are assigned to CG, SOS in addition to his other duties. The following sections of HQ ETOUSA and HQ SOS are consolidated as staff sections of theater headquarters and placed under control of CG, SOS:

| | |
|-----------------------|--------------------|
| Air Petroleum Service | Ordnance |
| Army Exchange | Provost Marshal |
| Chef de la Guerre | Purchasing Service |
| Chemical Warfare | Quartermaster |
| Claims Commission | Signal |
| Engineer | Special Services |
| Fiscal Director | Transportation |
| Medical | |

II. Major Commands Under ETOUSA

1. Changes between 31 Aug 1943 and 16 Jan 1944:
USSTAF:

Narrative: In September 1943 officers and men of the Ninth Air Force arrived from the Far East and were assigned to ETOUSA (Reference: History ASL, Chap II, Page 78)

Prior to 1 Jan 1944 the activities of 8th and 9th Air Forces were co-ordinated with each other and with the British at higher levels by an agency known as USAAF (United States Army Air Forces in the United Kingdom) (Reference: History ASL, Chap II, Page 79)

Upon recommendation of Gen Eaker, dated 31 Dec 1943 USAAF was superseded by USSTAF, the authority

for which was contained in a message from the Combined Chief of Staff, dated 5 Jan 1944.

The message is quoted herewith:

"Effective 1 Jan 1944, there will be established an air command designated as the US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, consisting initially of the Eighth and Fifteenth US Army Air Forces. Headquarters for this air command will be established in the U.K."

It will be noted that this message did not mention the 9th AF which was under the tactical control of AAF (Reference :SC, Chap II, Pages 80-81).

However under GO-1 USSTF, 6 Jan 1944, USSTF took over administrative responsibility for 9th AF:

GO-1, USSTF, 6 Jan 1944. (Summary only)

"a. Establishment of the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe (USSTF) to consist initially of the Eighth Air Force in the UK and the Fifteenth in the Mediterranean, and to have administrative responsibilities for the Ninth (Tactical) Air Force also in the UK.

"b. The Headquarters of USSTF to be operated under two Deputy Commanding Generals, one for Operations to control the work formerly done by A-2 and A-3, and the other for administration to control the work formerly done by A-4 and A-1 including the special staff work and certain personnel and administrative activities formerly carried on by A-3 and A-2.

"c. The Deputy Commanding General for Administration to continue in his role as CG, Air Service Command USSTF which was responsible for air base services, including 4th echelon supply and maintenance in the UK.

"d. The 4 major divisions of the Service Command to be retained as the Directorates of the USSTF."

2. Ground Forces.

Narrative - On 16 January 1944 Ground Forces was headed by First US Army which at that time had under its control V, VII, VIII and XIV Corps, the two latter being attached pending the establishment of a second field army headquarters.

Advance elements of the First US Army staff arrived in England late in September 1943. They were headed by Lt Gen Omar Bradley who had commanded II Corps in Sicily. Later (8 Oct) this group was joined by other members of the staff of II Corps and by personnel from Hq 1st Army which had come from the United States. (19 Oct) - The command of FUSA was officially opened on 20 Oct 1943.

3. First US Army Group (FUS.G) was activated on 19 Oct 1943 pursuant to GO-74 ETOUS, 16 Oct 1943. It was also under command of Gen Bradley. Initially it was to be responsible only for operational planning. It did not form part of the ground forces.

4. Services of Supply.

There was little difference between the organization of SOS on 16 Jan 1944 and its organization on 31 Aug 1943. However, the changes are important since they are reflected in the organization which on 17 Jan 1944 combined Hq SOS with Hq STGUS. They are as follows:

2 Oct 1943 - GO-101, SOS. . North Ireland Base Section was established, effective 5 Oct 1943.

2 Nov 1943 - GO-112, SOS, as modified by GO-119, 21 Nov 1943. In Histricital Division was established.

24 Nov 1943 - GO-122, SOS. . Field Force Replacement System was established.

5. Iceland Base Command.

No changes during the period since 31 Aug 1943 as noted.

6. American School Center.

No changes during the period since 31 Aug 1943 as noted.

III. Major Commands Under ETOUS:

Functions of each.

A proposed GO drafted by AG-I. in late November 1943 (AG 322/46, ETOUS/ 1943) mainly consolidated previous GO's regarding the organization of ETOUS. SOS functions remain basically the same.

"Sec V. First US Army Group.

"6. Mission: .s outlined in General Order 74, Hq ETOUS, 16 Oct 43".

VI. First Army

Pending assignment to First US Army Group, the Commanding General First U.S. Army, is charged with the following:

- (1) Reception of such field force units as may be assigned or attached to it, including the reception of filler replacements for these units.
- (2) Training of the field forces and replacements for them.
- (3) Preparation of field forces for combat.
- (4) Recommendations for the flow of replacements and material and equipment for assigned or attached field forces.

- (5) Reports to the Commanding General, ETOUSA, at intervals of the state of training of troops under his command.
- (6) Planning, training, and execution of any missions assigned to his command for the defense of territory of the United Kingdom.
- (7) Conduct of such special training schools as may be directed.
- b. Organization; The headquarters First US Army, and the various units assigned and attached to it, will be organized in accordance with standard, approved tables of organization, unless a special organization has been authorized by this headquarters.
- VII. US Army Air Forces United Kingdom.
- (8) Air Mission. The Commanding General, US Army Air Forces United Kingdom is charged with responsibilities for air force troops similar to those described in paragraph 7 above for field forces and with the procurement, quartering, distribution, and training of replacements for the air forces (including arms and services therewith). He is responsible for the conduct of air operations in accordance with directives and policies prescribed by the Theater Commander."

IV. ETOUSA Organization as of 17 Jan 1944.

Narrative: On 16 Jan 1944 General Eisenhower assumed command of ETOUSA, (GO 4, ETOUSA, 16 Jan 1944). On 17 Jan, the following major changes were published in GO 5, ETOUSA:

1. Hq SOS and Hq ETO consolidated. Note: This did not have the effect of dissolving SOS.
2. General Lee appointed Deputy Theater CG in addition to his duties as CG, SOS. His duties also included command of Com Z.
3. General Smith appointed C/S ETO in addition to his duties as C/S SHAEF.
4. Colonel Lord appointed D C/S ETOUSA in addition to his duties as C/S SOS.
5. Chart No. 3, reproduces an organization chart from GO 5, 1943.
6. The duties and responsibilities of the Deputy Theater Commander, as set forth in GO 5, follow:

The command of the Communications Zone;

The continued operation of administration and supply for the American Forces in the United Kingdom and for continental operations, in accordance with existing procedures;

Necessary duties in connection with static defense;

Perform such duties as additionally delegated to him by the Theater Commander. To fulfill his duties and responsibilities, the Deputy Theater Commander will act, in all appropriate cases, for the Theater Commander.

I. ETOUSA - Organization and Functions, 17 Jun
6 June 1944.

1. The functions of ETOUSA have for the most part been focused directly toward the mounting and execution of the operation OVERLORD. The two documents quoted below appear to summarize the situation:

a. Par 87, Neptune Plan, 1 Feb 1944. The mounting of the operation to meet the requirements of the Joint Commanders in Chief is the responsibility of the Service Ministries and ETOUSA.

b. General Plan for the Administrative Support from the UK of US Forces on the Continent. SOP No. 1, HQ ETOUSA, 25 May 1944.

"5. ETOUSA is responsible for:

e. The operation and control of U.S. establishments in the UK for the administrative support of US forces on the Continent, as outlined in paragraph 9 below.

b. All movements of US personnel, and accompanying supplies and equipment to the point of embarkation and dispatch overseas.

c. Calling forward through the War Office (Q(Ops)) common user stores for US forces when furnishing of these stores is the responsibility of the War Office.

d. Calling forward through the War Office Civil Affairs supplies for the US Zone when such supplies are held in British Civil Administrations or by War Office depots.

e. Furnishing supplies to U.S. Naval Forces engaged in the operation, in accordance with "Supply Plan to Govern U.S. Army responsibility to U.S. Naval Forces in Europe." (to be published).

f. Coordination with the War Office of all movement of U.S. personnel, supplies and equipment in and from the United Kingdom.

Sec. III. 9. Services of Supply in the U. K.

a. The functions of the Services of Supply in the UK include:

- (1) The receipt of statements of requirements and requisitions for all supplies and equipment for the US Forces on the Continent.
- (2) The preparation, issue from stocks in the UK, movement to ports and embarkation of all supplies and

equipment not shipped directly from the United States to the Continent.

- (3) The arrangement for direct shipments from the UK to the continent, and eventually, for the transition from supply from the UK to direct supply from the US.
- (4) The maintenance by requisitions on the US, and demands on British sources or overall theater levels of supply for all US forces.
- (5) The procurement of any special supplies or equipment required for operations.
- (6) The reception and treatment of casualties evacuated from the continent, and where required their further evacuation to the United States.
- (7) The requesting of replacement from the United States, their reception and training and dispatch to US Army Forces on the continent in accordance with requirements until such time as replacement depots are established there.
- (8) The receipt, care and evacuation of prisoners of war owned by the US passing through the UK.
- (9) The receipt, care and disposal of other persons evacuated from the continent for whom the US assumes responsibility.
- (10) The arrangements for the ultimate displacement to the continent of full theater reserves for all US Forces located there.
- (11) The repair and maintenance of equipment evacuated from the continent to the UK.

II. The following changes in HQ USA took place between 17 Jan 1944 and D-Day 6 June 1944.

1. 1 Feb 1944. GO 12 ETOUSA 1944. The existing Area Petroleum Service was transferred from Hq SOS to Hq ETO and absorbed by the Chief Petroleum Officer, the functions of the Chief Petroleum Officer were prescribed.

2. 7 Feb 1944. GO 13 ETOUSA 1944.

a. A European Civil Affairs Division (US Contingent) SHAEF was established.

b. Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Advance Section, Communications Zone (Provisional) was organized.

3. 11 Feb 1944. GO 15 ETOUSA. American component of SHAEF activated.

4. 21 Feb 1944. GO 19 ETOUSA 1944. The Air Technical Section was discontinued. Its functions and responsibilities were to be assumed by USSTAF.

5. 8 March 1944. Letter HQ ATCUSA, AG 323. 36 OPGB, to Base Section Commanders and HQ Comdr Transfer of Intelligence Functions.

a. "All intelligence and counter-intelligence functions heretofore performed by AC/S G-2 HQ SOS, ETOUSA will be the responsibility of AC/S G-2 ETOUSA.

b. All such matters within your command requiring reference to a higher headquarters will be channeled to AC/S G-2, ETOUSA.

6. 4 April 1944. GO 30 ATCUSA 1944. Armor Fighting Vehicles and Weapons Section was established as a special staff section of ATCUSA. The duties of the Chief of the section were prescribed.

7. 24 April 1944. GO 35 ETOUSA 1944. The designation "Provisional" was eliminated from GO 13, which established the Headquarters, AGHQ.

8. 28 April 1944. GO 37 ATCUSA 1944. Headquarters Base Section to 1 Com Z was established effective 1 May.

9. 5 May 1944. GO 43 ATCUSA 1944. A G-5 Section, Civil Affairs was established as a general staff section of ETOUSA.

10. 6 May 1944. GO 44 ATCUSA 1944. A Artillery Section was established as a special staff section of ETOUSA.

III. Major commands under ETOUSA -- Relations w/ to ETOUSA and to each other under ETOUSA.

The period 17 Jan - 6 June 1944 was occupied in planning for operation OVERLORD and in the shifts within the headquarters that were indicated as being desirable. A number of documents that illustrate the complexity of the situation and the solutions arrived at are presented below:

1. Per 5. Ieptune Plan, 1 Feb 1944.

First United States Army with appropriate Army Group and Zone of Communications troops have been placed under command of 21 Army Group for the initial part of the operation.

2. Ltr, SHAEF to Allied Naval Comm, Engd. Force, C in C, 21 AG; Dir C in C, SHAEF, 27 Jan 1944 "Administration, Operation OVERLORD", SHAEF/533/1/0/ is quoted in part below:

1. Reference is made to directive on Operations Overlord COMINT (44) dated 7 Jan 44. The instructions which follow cover the policies which govern Administration G-1, G-4 matters in Operation OVERLORD.

2. These instructions cover the period during which the Commander in Chief, 21 Army Group, commands all land forces engaged in the operation. They indicate in general administrative procedure until the Supreme Commander allocates an area of responsibility to the Commanding General, First (US) Army Group.

* * * * *

Maintenance

"4. You are jointly responsible for determining the requirements in material and personnel for the maintenance of all forces under your commands and for making the necessary arrangements for obtaining and distributing resources thus made available.

"5. For this purpose you will deal directly with HQ ETOUSA, COMINCH, and the Service Ministries on related matters which are within the announced policies of this headquarters. Demands for movement/shipment allocations and other facilities of common use and recommendations on matters not within the announced policies will be submitted to this headquarters.

"6. You will be jointly responsible for ensuring sound maintenance and for directing administrative development within the zone of operations in accordance with directives from this headquarters. Administrative procedures of US Forces will function as far as practicable through normal US channels.

"7. Attention is invited to paragraph 8 of the reference letter. Operations will be conducted as far as practicable in areas clearly defined US or British. Administrative policies require this. The policy will be initiated at the inception of operations.

8. Conflicting demands, or matters requiring coordination between the commanders concerned, will be brought to the attention of this headquarters.

Base and Lines of Communications.

"9. Initially the main base will be the United Kingdom.

10. Subject to such general direction as may be exercised by the Supreme Commander, the Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, in collaboration with Air Commander in Chief, Allied Expeditionary Air Force, is responsible for the preparation of plans and for the general supervision of the development and operation of the lines of communication on the continent; for determination of requirements for movement to the Continent; and for supervision for movement overseas. The general layout of the US lines of communication will be coordinated with HQs ETOUSA as regards their suitability for later development. If no change in the system of command is made prior to the time when one Base Section is insufficient or unsuitable to supply US forces, this Headquarters may modify these arrangements in consultation with Headquarters ATCUSA.

3. Ltr 18 Jan 1944 HQA 21 AG to AC/S COSSAC
Proposal for administrative staff organization British-US, for operation under plan "OVERLORD", is quoted herewith:

"1. In order to clarify the administrative set-up of this Army Group vis à vis FUSAG and First US Army. An agreed statement of policy has been formulated by I.G.C., 21 Army Gp, and Brigadier General R.G. Jones on behalf of FUSAG.

"2. This statement of policy has been personally agreed by Lt. General Bradley, and in absence of the C-in-C, by the C of S, 21 Army Group.

"3. It is requested that the terms of this statement of policy may be agreed and confirmed by you. Signed ... P. Graham, Brig. for I.G.C., 21 Army Group.

Enclosure: "Proposal for Administrative Staff Organization British-US, for operation under plan 'OVERLORD'".

1. In accordance with directive of C.A.C.

- (a) C-in-C, 21 Army Gp is to command all ground forces in Phases 1 and 2, until
- (b) CG, FUSAG, is designated to command troops in the US sector when C.A.C. determines that number of US troops in the field warrants such action.

2. It is agreed that

- (a) The administrative command of elements in the field must be under the Ground Forces Commander.
- (b) The Ground Forces commander must control the L of C/Com Z and, within the directives of S.C. determine provisions for the flow of personnel, equipment, and supplies across the channel, the levels of supplies in the various areas, and the priorities for allotment to and movement within and between armies, Ls of C, and Com Z.

3. The administrative staff of the C-in-C, 21 Army Group under the N.G.A., will consist of a British section and a US section, working closely with each other, but designed primarily each to concern itself with the administrative matters pertaining to the British and US sectors respectively. In preparation to and during operations, they will be located together, either as a whole, or divided into forward and rear echelons.

4. The US section, under the supervision of G-4, FUSAG, will consist of the G-4 staff section, certain operating branches of the G-1 section, and necessary special staff (services) sections of FUSAG. It is planned to have with this US section such representatives as may be desirable (a) in the UK from the SOS, and (b) on the Continent from the Communications Zone. Signed by H.G. Moses, Brig Gen. G-4 FUSAG and Deputy to N.G.A., and L.W.P.T. Graham, Brig., N.G.A., 21 Army Group.

4. Par 102. Neptune Plan, 1 Feb 1944.

Planning for the planning the assault FUSA will be associated with Western Naval Task Force and Ninth USAF.

5. Par 17. Neptune Plan, 1 Feb 1944.

The Western Naval Task Force will be associated in the assault phase with FUSA.

6. Letter (1 GOVILLOR GLP) Mj Con Loo, to CG, FUSAG Administration, Operation OVERLORD, 2 Feb 1944.

1. The system of command control for initial stages of operation OVERLORD, as laid down in latest directives from Supreme Headquarters, AAF, provides that administrative as well as operational control is to be exercised through C-in-C, 21 Army Group. Letter dated 23 January from General Brownjohn to I.G. 21 Army Group provides that the administrative staff of 21 Army Group will consist of a British section and a US section, each primarily to concern itself with

administrative matters of its own nationality. This letter further contemplates that inclusion of representatives from the SOS (later Communications Zone).

7. 1st Ind to General Lee's letter of 2 February by Maj Gen L.C. Allen, C/S FUSAG, 7 Feb 1944.

"2. The staff representatives from this headquarters are to act as overall planners and principally for the coordination of planning for the US part of the operations for which the C-in-C, 21 Army Group is charged. They are not to attempt to do work which pertains to the Army Commanders, the Communications Zone Commanders, or Commander of the Air Forces which will be in the US sector. These commanders or their representatives should be advised promptly of any problems that arise or are apt to arise affecting their commands in order that they may have representatives at 21 Army Group to handle such problems. Such problems, if confined to one command only, will be handled with the 21 Army Group entirely by the representatives of those commands the representatives from this headquarters keeping informed insofar as may be practicable. Problems which affect more than one of the commands indicated should be worked out by the representatives of those commands, coordinated by representatives from this headquarters, and the final result or decisions for the use of the C-in-C, 21 Army Group, will be approved by the representatives of this headquarters headed by the Deputy HCA. Every effort will be made to see that representatives of the commands concerned have free access to the British planners at 21 Army Group concerning their respective problems and if it appears desirable those commands should make arrangements at Headquarters, 21 Army Group, for certain of their personnel to work more or less constantly at their headquarters."

8. Memorandum, HQ. FUSAG, signed briefly for Lt. Gen. J. P. Smith, C/S SHAEF, AG 322.01 Vol I, 1944. F.D. Cr. 9-21 Feb 1944.

"1. Reference is made to my telephone call to you this morning. It was my understanding that the Supreme Allied Commander desired that the senior US Commander in the field would have control of the Ground forces in the field after the C-in-C, 21 Army Group, was relieved as Allied Commander of the Ground Forces; that initially this senior US commander would be the commander of FUSAG and, in keeping with the decision, the Communications Zone would be attached to FUSAG; that when the Supreme Allied Commander moved to the Continent and took over the control of all Ground Forces in the US sector he would relieve FUSAG of its overall sector functions. FUSAG would then be interested only in the trains; the Communications Zone would come under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander direct, with the administrative coordination of the sector as a whole being exercised for him by his Deputy Theater Commander."

By 1st Ind, to CG, FUSAG, Gen Smith wrote:

"1. The understanding in paragraph 1
supr is correct.

9. Memorandum 21 AG, 14 Feb 1944 'Operating
Procedure, US Army Staff 21 AG'. AG 200, Vol I, 1944.

"1. Reference letter, subject: "Organization of US Forces (Administration), SHAEF File 32A, 9 Feb 44, the following procedure of the staff section for administration of US Ground Forces is outlined for the information and guidance of all concerned:

a. The function of the staff Section attached to FUS/G is, initially, coordination for the HQ., 21 Army Group, of all US administrative planning and later, of administrative operations which affect US Ground Forces. Each element of the Ground Forces, (Armies and Communications Zone), which are now under, or may come under, command of the C-in-C, 21 Army Group, will make its own plans for operations on the Continent under directives of C-in-C, 21 Army Group. However the plans of any element of the Ground Forces affect the plans or operations of another element of the Ground forces, they will be presented to the US Staff Section for coordination.

b. The Services of Ground Forces commands will exercise such control over their own operations as may be authorized by their commanders; they are expected to recommend, through their commanders, policies desired for application to the entire US sector. Any such recommendations should be presented to the US Staff Section for coordination and the decision of the C-in-C, 21 Army Group. Service doctrine established by the Commanding General, ETO, will apply to all components of Ground Forces.

"2. The Army and Communications Zone planning staffs each should coordinate with the Air forces and Navy all matters of common interest. The US Staff Section will keep informed and, whenever applicable, see that agreements with the Air forces are uniform for the entire US sector."

(Signed) R. G. MOSELEY
Brig General
US Deputy
I.G.A., 21 AG

10. Letter, FUS/G to CG, 9th AF, Attn A-1, AG 370 (G-1), "Ninth AF Administrative Plan, 29 April 1944. AG 381/2, Vol I, 44:

'1.This letter (from Hq FECZ on same subject) should have been forwarded through this Hq as CG, FUS/G, has been charged with:

'2. General direction of planning by the Deputy Commander, Communication Zone (Note: This should probably read Deputy Commander ETOUSA.) and

b. The coordination of build-up and administrative arrangements for all US Forces on the continent, including Western Naval Task Force and Ninth US Air Force, from the time that the First Army relinquishes this responsibility...."

11. Letter, CG, FUS.G to CG, ETOUSA, 10370.2/1 (G-1), "Co-ordination of Planning, Operation Overlord" 9 May 1944, AG 324.01/12 Overlord, Vol I, 1944.

1. Under directives from SHAEF and C-in-C, 21 Army Group, the Commanding General, FUS.G, has been charged with the responsibility for coordination of administrative planning and arrangements for all US Forces on the Continent after the First Army relinquishes this responsibility. In addition, this Headquarters is furnishing a US Administrative staff to C-in-C, 21 Army Group, for the administration of US Ground Forces engaged in the operation initially.

2. In view of this responsibility, it is requested that such administrative plans and instructions which you purpose to issue and which are applicable to all forces on the continent, including those pertaining to personnel replacements, be referred to this Headquarters for comment prior to publication."

G-1 ETOUSA, commented as follows:

a. 1. No reply is considered necessary by G-1.

a. a. G-1 has no objection to the request contained in par 2 of basic communication, as in the past and in the present, such coordination has been effected with FUS.G as standing procedure, on such papers as Claims and Labor SOP's.

c. However, comments of FUS.G are not considered binding for HQ level publications.

c. On the other hand, G-1 will give every possible consideration to the suggestions and comments of FUS.G.

"3. Unless directives to the contrary are received from the DC/S, G-1 will continue to proceed on the lines outlined.

12. Letter Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, to DC/S CG, ETOUSA, "Relationship between CG, FUS.G and Deputy Theater Commander," 26 May 1944. AG 324.01, Vol I, 1944:

"1. It is desired that a directive substantially is follows be issued:

c. The Commanding General, First Army Group will be responsible for making recommendations concerning (1) the priority of shipment, the assignment and the utilization of Field Force units, and (2) the allocation of supplies and equipment to

units of the Field Forces.

b. The Deputy Theater Commander and the Commanding General, First Army Group will deal directly with each other on all such matters.

c. In the event of a disagreement on matters of conflicting interest the subject will be referred to the Theater Commander for a decision.

This was written in Eisenhower's capacity as Theater Commander / heading of stationery is WFO. Letter issued 1 June 1944, over Gen Lord's signature, is Ltr., Hq., WFO, 7/3 211.311 OPGC, to CG, FUSAG.

13. Letter, SHAEF/17100/1300RS to CG, 21 AG & ALF, Subject: Control of AF during Initial Phase of Neptune, 19 May 1944.

21 AG will deal with one Air Commander who is Commander, Advanced AF.

14. Par 96 b, Neptune Plan, 1 Feb 1944, Concentration. If Ninth AF is unable to provide suitable concentration areas from their own resources, they will submit demands on the Army through HQ., ALF to EHOUL.

15. Par 121. Neptune Plan, 1 Feb 1944. Fighter aircraft will be coordinated and controlled by Air Force Commander through the Defense Commander in accordance with SHAEF Operational Memo Ic. 7.

16. Letter SHAEF/17100/9/ Ops, to CG, 21 AG, CG, FUSAG, CG, ALF, Subject: Chain of Command Allied Naval Forces - Operation OVERLORD, 6 April 1944.

1. From 1 April all US Naval forces allotted to OVERLORD to be under Allied Naval Commander, Expeditionary Forces.

17. Letter, FUSAG to FUSA at 81, AG 370.2/1 (G-4) directive for Supply Planning Period D plus 42 to D plus 90, 24 Apr 44. AG 381/12 OVERLORD Vol 1, 44.

"1. The Forward Echelon, Com Z, is designed as the agency responsible for the summation of supply requirements for the US Forces for the period D plus 42 to D plus 90, both inclusive. In addition, the Forward Echelon, Com Z, will allocate for shipment to the continent the tonnages available during this period, subject to review by this headquarters if requirements of all commands and prescribed reserves cannot be met.

"2. Except for supplies peculiar to the Air Force and the requirement of the Navy for all items of supply for which Navy must provide lift, the Forward Echelon, Communications Zone, will calculate tonnages for maintenance and reserve requirements of all commands, including requirements of non-military technicians within the areas of those commands.

"3. The Ninth Air Force will compute and furnish to the Forward Echelon, Com Z, the requirements, within the levels prescribed by the RAF, of supplies peculiar to the Air Force. Likewise, the Navy will compute and furnish to the Forward Echelon, Com Z, the requirements of all items for which the Army must allocate lift.

"4. Based on tonnages finally determined in accordance herewith, Forward Echelon, Com Z, will prepare requisitions for all items of Army supply, except those for items peculiar to the Air Force, and forward same to Headquarters, SOS --- APO 871.

"5. It is desired that commanders furnish such information pertaining to supply requirements as may be requested by the Commanding General, Forward Echelon, Com Z, in order that he may be able to make required calculations and complete plans at an early date for supply to the continent. In complying with the provisions of this communication, all computations of requirements will be in accordance with administrative instructions of this headquarters.

"6. For the purpose of carrying out the above mission, direct communication between the Forward Echelon, Com Z, and the other commands is authorized.

13. Letter, ABSEC to CG, FECZ, 25 Feb 1944. "Attachment to First US Army." AG 322, ABSEC Vol I (c)

"1. Pursuant to par 4, letter dated 17 Feb 44, HQ ETOUSA, file AG 322 OpCG, the HQ & HQ Det, AB SEC, Com Zone (Prov) is assigned to ETOU, and is attached to the First US Army effective 7 Feb 44."

19. Letter FECZ to Chiefs of Gen and Special Staff Sections FECZ (G 370.2, 26 Feb 1944) AG, "Planning Directive".

"3b. Outline Com Z Plan

(1) At the present time no outlined Com Z plan for the entire operation Overlord exists. Planning for the operation has been conducted by HQ ETOU and HQ SOS, in accordance with an outline for planning developed principally by G-4. The services and other agencies co-ordinated by the lines to be repaired and maintained, petrol storage and distribution, etc., in addition, many valuable separate studies have been made.

(2) The Advance Section, Com Z, has proceeded with a detailed plan for support of the First Army for the advance to the

Loire and the capture of Arret. This planning has been initiated under the direction of C-4, ETO and the Chiefs of Services and is in full progress. It is not possible to hold it up in order that this Headquarters may draw an outline plan on this project, nor is this believed to be necessary. Instead, the plan will be reviewed when drawn to see that it meets the needs of 21 Army Group and fits into later Com Z activities.

- ... (5) In addition to the planning outlined above, this HQS will assist US Com Staff in detailed planning now being carried on for D to D plus 41 and in arranging for troop and supply requirements. If assistance is needed, it should be obtained from the parent staff Section, AFOSB.

20. Letter LTCUSA to each Chief of Section, et al, AFOSB G 32 361 O.G., 27 May 1944, AFOSB G 322.011, Vol I (4), 1944:

"1. Forward Echelon Communications Zone will exercise staff supervision over Continental Base Sections in the UK and on the Continent. It is not a separate Command Headquarters. When Headquarters, Communications Zone is established on the Continent, the Forward Echelon Staff will be absorbed.

"2. Brig Gen Harry L. Vaughan is assigned as the Forward Deputy Commander, Com Z, and will be in charge of the forward Echelon staff.

"3. The personnel requirements for the forward Echelon staff sections and services will be determined by the respective Chiefs of the Staff Sections and services, AFOSB, after consultation with the Forward Deputy Commander, Com Z. Personnel to be placed on detached service with forward Echelon will be recommended by Chiefs of Staff Sections and services, AFOSB, and approved by the Deputy Theater Commander.

"4. Reference is made to SHAEF Directive 4433, dated 10 Mar 44, and to directive, this HQS, subject as above, AFOSB G 322/381, OPGC, dated 14 Mar 44. The staff duties and responsibilities of Forward Echelon, Com Z, while attached to the 21 Army Gp remain unchanged.

5. All administrative planning for the period subsequent to D plus 90 will be performed by Headquarters Com Z (HQ AFOSB). The Forward Echelon will complete all Com Z planning for the period D plus 90 in accordance with previous directives.

I. The Following changes in ETOUSA took place between 7 June 1944 and 1 Aug 1944 (after 12 AG became operational)

1. 7 June 1944. GO 60 ETOUSA.

a. SOS was redesignated the Communications Zone, ETOUSA.

b. Lt Gen J.C.H. Lee noted as being CG, Com Z in addition to his duties as Deputy Theater Commander, ETOUSA, reference GO 5, 1944. Note: GO 5 stated that Gen Lee was Deputy Theater CG in addition to his duties as CG, SOS.

c. Gen Lord in addition to duties as DC/S ETOUSA is Deputy Commander and C/S Com Z.

d. The Chiefs of Staff Sections and Services, ETO will perform the necessary similar duties for Com Z, ETOUSA.

2. 10 June 1944. GO 62 ETOUSA. A replacement system is established consisting of GRIBS and MURS.

3. 11 June 1944. GO 63 ETOUSA. HQ and HQ Det EC B, (U) Contingent SELFR Provisional organized by GO 13 ETOUSA, 7 Feb 1944 is disbanded.

4. 24 June 1944. GO 67 ETOUSA. The Artillery Section established by GO 44 ETOUSA 1944 is disbanded. Its duties are transferred to Artillery Officer FUS.G.

II. Major Commands under ETOUSA -- Changes between 7 June and 1 August 1944.

1. 14 July 1944. GO 73 ETOUSA.

a. Pursuant to order -6163C, 7 July, HQ & HQ Command Twelfth Army Group is activated.

b. CG, 12th AG authorized direct communications with other commands under ETOUSA via SELFR.

c. All units and individuals of FUS.G except those specifically exempted by FUS.G will be transferred to 12 AG.

d. Pursuant to instructions S.A.C (G322-1 (12 Army Gp) GOT-G), 12 July 1944, the Twelfth Army Group will have the mission: The CG, 12th AG will be responsible for the preparation of operational plans, and for the conduct of operations in accordance with directives from Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. (See also letter SELFR to FUSA et al, 14 July 1944)

e. Instructions concerning the future mission of FUS.G will be issued subsequently. Note: It should be noted that the order activating Twelfth Army Group did not have the effect of releasing the

US ground forces from control of 21 Army Group. This latter action was taken, effective 1 Sept 1944, by Cable from SHAEF No. FD-13188, 24 Aug 1944.

2. 27 July 1944, letter ETOUSA citing as authority cable 1 ARN 66933 18 July eliminated Iceland Base Command from ETOUSA effective 30 July 1944.

3. 1 August 1944. 12 Army Group became operational. This Army became operational, under 21 AG. Reference i/A Report 12 AG, 16 Oct 1944.

III. Major Commands under ETOUSA - Relationship to ETOUSA and to each other under ETOUSA.

The general outline of these relationships appears to be set forth in letter, AG 381.099, ETOUSA to FUSAG, et al, subject: "Organization and Command of US Forces," dated 6 June 1944, and letter ETOUSA, same file and subject, dated 19 July 1944, both of which are quoted below:

RECORDED UNCLASSIFIED
ORDER SEC ARMY BY
TAC OF 511

Headquarters
European Theater of Operations
United States Army

~~SECRET~~

AG 381.099

Initials: CG, ETOUSA
Initials: /s/
Date: 7 Jun 44

SUBJECT: Organization and Command of US Forces.

TO : Commanding General, First UK Army Group
Commanding General, Services of Supply
Commanding General, First Army
Commanding General, Third Army
Commanding General, US Strategic Air Forces

The organization and command of US Forces will proceed as follows:

a. Initial Stage.

1. Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, commands the Allied Ground Forces on the Continent. An echelon of First US Army Group is attached to the staff of 21 Army Group for the administration of US forces. A Communications Zone Staff continues attached to 21 Army Group.

2. The bulk of US Ground Forces, including Advance Section Communications Zone on the continent, are attached to First US Army and are under the Commanding General, First Army. The Ninth US Air Force is under operational control of ALAF and under administrative control of the Commanding General, USSTAF.

3. The Theater Commander will delegate to the Commanding General, First Army, such authority and responsibility as may be practicable and desirable.

4. The Services of Supply will be redesignated as the Communications Zone with duties and responsibilities as defined in FM 100-10, date 15 Nov 1943. The Chiefs of Services are charged with responsibilities and duties as defined in paragraphs 15-19, FM 100-10 and are located at Headquarters Communications Zone. Otherwise, the existing organization in the UNITED KINGDOM continues unchanged.

b. Transition Stage.

1. Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group commands the Allied Ground Forces on the continent. An echelon of First US Army Group still remains attached to 21 Army Group for such administration of US forces as remains necessary at 21 Army Group Headquarters. During this period, the key officers and the bulk of First Army Group staff now attached to 21 Army Group revert to First US Army Group control. Communications Zone staff is detached from 21 Army Group.

2. The Third US Army is established on the continent. First US Army Group moves to the continent and assumes command of US Ground Forces except Communications Zone Forces.

3. The Communications Zone is extended to the continent. The Advance Section, Communications Zone, detached from First Army, passes to the control of the Communications Zone. The Commanding General, Communications Zone, is relieved of his responsibilities as Deputy Theater Commander.

4. The Ninth Air Force is under operational control of A/F and under administrative control of Commanding General, USSTAF.

5. The Commanding General, First US Army Group, relieves the Commanding General, First Army, of the US authority and responsibility delegated by the Theater Commander.

6. The existing organization in the UNITED KINGDOM continues at reduced strength.

c. The final stage.

1. The Advance headquarters, SHAEF, is established on the continent.

2. The Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, becomes the Commander-in-Chief, Northern Group of Armies, and the Commanding General, First US Army Group, becomes the Commander-in-Chief, Central Group of Armies.

3. The Communications Zone is under the Theater Commander.

4. The Theater Commander will delegate all possible authority and responsibility to the Commander-in-Chief, Central Group of Armies, Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, Commanding General, USSTAF, and the Commanding General, Communications Zone.

5. The Base Section, UNITED KINGDOM, is established under the Commanding General, Communications Zone, with functions and responsibilities pertaining to Communications Zone activities in ENGLAND.

6. A rear echelon of SHAEF will remain in the UNITED KINGDOM.

7. The Theater Commander exercises such of his functions as he retains under his direct control through the US elements of SHAEF staff.

8. The Communications Zone will be the channel of communication to the Air Department except for those matters reserved by the Theater Commander to himself.

By Command of GENERAL EISENHOWER:

/s/ R. B. Lord
/t/ R. E. LORD
Brigadier General, GSC
Deputy Chief of Staff

Copies to:

Chiefs of General & Special Staff
Commanding General, Advance Section Com Z
Forward Deputy Commander, Communications Zone, LONDON
Base Section Commanders

• • • • •

Headquarters
European Theater of Operations
U.S. ARMY

AG 381.099

19 July 1944

SUBJECT: Organization and Command of U.S. Forces

TO : Commanding General, First Army Group
Commanding General, Twelfth Army Group
Commanding General, Communications Zone
Commanding General, First Army
Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces.

1. Except as modified below, letter this headquarters, file and subject as above, dated 6 June 1944, and General Order Number 60, this headquarters, as, establishing the LOC upon the European Continent, remains in force.

a. Organization. The European Theater of Operations consists of Theater Headquarters, the First Army Group, the Twelfth Army Group, the Communications Zone, the US Army Air Forces in Europe and any other major commands which may be established.

b. (1) The Theater Commander holds the Commanding Generals of the organizations named in subparagraph a., above, responsible for all administrative

matter pertaining to their own commands, and such units as may from time to time be attached. To promote simplicity he will, from time to time, when appropriate and desirable, delegate to them responsibility and authority for certain matters normally reserved to the Theater Commander.

(2) The determination of broad policies, objectives and priorities affecting two or more of the above named major commands is the responsibility of the Theater Commander.

(3) The Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Forces in Europe and Communications Zone are authorized to communicate directly with British agencies and the U.S. War Department, or appropriate agencies thereof, on technical and routine matters. All communications on other than technical or routine matters will be through Theater Headquarters, except that all major commanders are authorized direct communication with each other.

c. (1) The Theater Chiefs of Administration and Supply and Special Services will be located as directed by the Commanding General, Communications Zone. In addition to their functions as Technical Advisors of the Theater Commander, they will report to the Commanding General, Communications Zone, as chiefs of corresponding services in the Communications Zone and will be responsible to or through him for the execution of Communications Zone and Theater duties.

(2) In exercising the functions reserved to himself, the Theater Commander will utilize U.S. elements of supreme headquarters, AFHQ, and Chiefs of Special and Technical Services.

By command of General EISENHOWER:

/t/ .. B. SMITH
Lieutenant General, US Army
Chief of Staff

• • • • •

Additional information on this subject is contained in a tentative memorandum of FUSAAG, subject: "Relationship Between Com Z Commander and the Senior US Field Force Commander on the Continent", 9 July 1944, which is quoted below:

"1. Advance Section Communications Zone will be the direct representative of the Communications Zone Commander in all contacts with the First US Army in matters pertaining to supply, equipment and personnel replacements.

"2. Priority for the shipment of all troop units to the continent will remain vested in BUOC under the Senior Field Force Commander on the Continent.

"3. Communications Zone Commander will be responsible for making available on request to the Senior US Field Force Commander on the Continent, full and detailed information as to the status of supply and equipment.

"4. Communication Zone Commander will be responsible for promptly advising the Senior US Field Force Commander of any existing shortages in supply or equipment or any foreseeable shortages of supply or equipment.

"5. In case the requirements for any particular item of supply or equipment exceed the available stocks on hand in the Communications Zone, whether in depots or in the hands of troops, the allocation of such items will be made by the Senior US Field Force Commander.

"6. Until sufficient room is available in the forward areas to establish separate Army supply depots, the command of all supply depots distributing points or other installations in the UTAH or OMAHA Beach Areas will remain with First US Army."

Note by Col Albrecht: "This is understood to be a tentative paper, yet to be confirmed in all respects by higher authority." Set up for sig. by Bradley.

.....

Another document bearing on the existing relationships is a memorandum of a statement made by Gen LME at a Staff Conference on 23 July 1944 which follows:

"...There has been published within the week an order on organization emanating from Supreme Headquarters. It has to do, however, only with the conduct of American Theater Affairs. Lest you become confused with it, I inform you that there is no change in the way we conduct theater business. The responsibility of the Theater's Chiefs of Services whether administrative or supply, does not change. The channels of responsibility do not change. The Commanding General of the Communications Zone will not be known as Deputy Theater Commander, but he is responsible for all administration of a theater nature. The channels of responsibility and administration continue unchanged..."

A further detail regarding the relationship between Com Z and the US Forces on the Continent is furnished by a letter, SHAEF to FUSA, Com Z and Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz, Subject: "Organization of US Forces on the Continent", 14 July 1944, which appears below:

"1. Effective this date, the Advance Section, Communications Zone, is detached from First Army, and reverts to control of the Commanding General, Communications Zone, who is responsible for all normal Communications Zone activities on the Continent.

"2. Pending the establishment of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force on the continent, in matters requiring coordination among United States Forces in the US Zone, the decision of the Commanding General, First Army (Twelfth Army Group, when established) (Lt Gen Omar N. Bradley) will govern, except that conflicts of troop and supply priorities affecting the United States Forces will be referred to the Theater Commander."

I. The following changes took place between 1 August 1944, (date that 12th AG became operational) and 15 Sept (date that 6th AG became operational under ETOUSA)

1. 9 August 1944. GO 80 ETOUSA. A Group Control Council (Germany) was established for planning. It was to operate under CG ETOUSA in close liaison with British and Soviets, subject to directive issued as a result of recommendations made by European Advisory Commission.

2. 10 August 1944. GO 81 ETOUSA. Headquarters & HQ Co XVIII Corps is reorganized as HQ & HQ Co XVIII Corps (Airborne) Combined Airborne HQ & HQ Co (US) established effective 2 August.

3. 31 August 1944. GO 87 ETOUSA. HQ ETOUSA moved from London to V LOGNE, France at 0200 1 Sept 1944.

4. 13 September 1944. GO 91 ETOUSA. HQ ETOUSA moved from V LOGNE to PARIS effective at 0001 14 September 1944.

5. 24 August 1944. Cable F.D-13188 SHAEF to EXFOR, 12 AG, AAF, Com Z.

a. SHAEF to become operational on continent 0200 hours 1 Sept 44.

b. 21 AG designated as Northern Group of Armies.

c. 12 AG removed from control of 21 AG and designated as Central Group of Armies.

II. Major Commands under ETOUSA - Between 1 August and 15 September 1944.

The only change in major commands during this period was the addition of Sixth Army Group which, pursuant to cable F/CB-76, 12 Sept 44, combined Chiefs of Staff to Eisenhower and Wilson, was placed under the control of ETO effective 0001 15 September 1944. The change was made as a result of a recommendation embodied in cable F/D-14276 SHAEF to IG/R 9 Sept 1944 which is summarized below:

"Recommendations relative to assumption of command of Dragoon forces. On 15 Sept operation control should pass to me and I will transmit operational directive direct to General DWYERS with copy to Z/CHOL and CG 7th Army.

Coincidentally, CG 9/F will assume operational control 12 T/C and others actually with 7th Army. 12 AF, Italy, will continue to support Dragoon until 9th AF can take over.

Date of taking over administrative control uncertain. Logistic support and maintenance for Dragoon would continue from MacArthur as long as

US supplies are in excess of reserves needed for other US units in that theater. Termination date of this responsibility to be arranged by a mutual agreement between Wilson and Devers."

I. The following changes took place between 15 September 1944 and 12 February 1945.

1. 2 October 1944. GO 99, ETOUSA. A Liaison section was established as a Special Staff Section of ETOUSA. Note: No duties or functions were prescribed.

2. 18 October 1944. GO 104. FUSAG was disbanded and remaining personnel transferred to 1st FG.

3. 29 October 1944. GO 109. Modifies GO 81 and GO 101 to redesignate Combined Airborne Hq & Hq Co's Hq & Hq Co (US) First Allied Airborne Army.

4. 27 November 1944. GO 118. Replacement Planning Group established as a special staff section under DC/S. Duties of Chief of the Group are specified.

5. 28 November 1944. GO 119. An Artillery Section is established as a Special Staff section. No functions assigned.

6. 8 December 1944. GO 123. Military Labor Service is established as a Special Staff section. Functions are outlined.

7. 15 December 1944. GO 127. Functions of Thirteenth Artillery Officer outlined.

8. 28 December 1944. GO 131. Replacements will be designated in future as reinforcements.

9. 29 December 1944. GO 132. Recinds GO 62, 1944 and GO 97 in Replacement System.

10. 23 January 1945. GO 5, ETOUSA. Lt Gen Ben Lear announced as Deputy Theater Commander.

11. 27 January 1945. GO 7, ETOUSA. The American School Center established by CO 21, SOS, 25 August 1942 is disbanded.

I. ETOUSA progressive changes between 12 Feb 1945 and 8 May 1945.

1. 13 March 1945. GO 34 ETOUSA.

a. The Military Labor Service is discontinued.

2. 5 April 1945. CG 53, ETOUSA.

a. I&E Division is established as a Special Staff Section.

a. Special Services is established as a Special Staff Section.

3. 18 April 1945. GO 68, ETOUSA.

a. The Office of Deputy Military Governor, Germany is established, reporting to the CG, ETO.

4. 26 May 1945. Letter ETOUSA to ETO et al, GCT/32201 (Theater), subject US Theater Organization Plan.

Headquarters
THEATER SERVICE FORCES
U.S. FORCES, SUPPORT THEATER
Office of the Commanding General

17 December 1945

SUBJ/TOT: Theater Organization Study.

TO : Commanding General, The General Board, U. S. Forces, European Theater, HQ 468, U. S. Army.

1. Having reread the General Board's revised draft, "Organization of the European Theater of Operations", Part Two, Chapters 1 to 7, inclusive, and having previously read and commented upon the original draft, I feel that the only satisfactory way to present the Theater Service Force view is by letter, as in Appendix to the Report.

2. The Theater Service Force view, which I am presenting, is based upon my experience as Commanding General of the Services of Supply, LTC, then of the continuing Communications Zone, MAC, which has become Theater Service Forces, European Theater. The principles underlying these views are believed to be similar to those of General Somervell, until recently the Army Service Forces commander, although there are doubtless modifications that he might not endorse.

3. The conclusions reached in the draft of the Board's Chapter 7 seem to be significantly summarized in paragraph 76: "The Headquarters ATGUSA should have been complete with the G-4 Section in the General Staff."

4. The historical and, indeed, the military professional value of the General Board's report is so great that to confine its conclusions to details and peculiarities of this particular Theater would be unfortunate. When the United States or, indeed, the United Nations is next engaged in active operations, it would seem inevitable that fighting forces must be supported in air operations and at sea, as well as on the ground. Although the Pacific campaigns involved naval operations to a much wider extent, the European campaigns also depended initially on naval operations to a very marked degree, and could not have been sustained without naval support. The planning and support of joint air, naval, and ground operations present the most critical problems, not only of the campaigns won in this war, but for future consideration.

5. It is futile to expect campaigns of the future to resemble closely those of the past, therefore details of experience in this Theater seem relatively unimportant. However, it may be noted that the very conclusions apparently reached by the General Board for this Theater: "The command of HQUSA should have been exercised through a separate headquarters. Headquarters SOS should not have been charged with the

exercise of Theater functions", had, in fact, been earlier adopted in North Africa with results understood to have been far from satisfactory.

6. The General Gouraud's report, insofar as I have read it, omits mentioning two important facts: first, the European Theater Campaign, in spite of its inherent logistical difficulties, was successfully supported; and, second, there was an acute shortage of experienced administrative personnel available to the European Theater.

7. The logistical problems of the European campaign may be quickly visualized by comparison with figures of the 1917-18 campaign. The tonnages were more than six times as great, both in total dead weight and in tonnage per man overseas. The distances involved and the time factor were markedly more difficult. The time demand on presenting requirements for production and preparation for shipment, transcription, reception, and delivery, was staggering. Every effort had been made to save time, first by understanding far in advance what the requirements would be, then, without interruption, to organize and carry through a service of effective supply. Thanks to the initial advise of General Somervell, approved by General Marshall, our basic organization was sound and effective. Our most vexatious difficulties developed to be staff contacts with the several headquarters in the Theater. In spite of these, and of shortages in administrative personnel, there was no serious failure in supply or administration.

8. In planning for the future, it is felt that our military organization should be kept simple in order to cope adequately with the increasing complexities of weapons and the widespread range of operations. In all military organizations there should be recognized two fundamental functions: fighting, and supporting the fighting operations. In warfare today and in the future there must be operations initially in the air, closely followed by those at sea and, eventually, and indeed finally, on the ground. The demands of materiel may continue to be heavy, and require prompt, reliable coordination in order to be met, along with other national or international needs. Moreover, the time factor becomes of increasing, rather than diminishing, importance. We cannot count on time to train staffs in special functioning procedure. Rather we should so simplify our staff and command procedure that America's superb industrial executives can be readily absorbed into a rapid mobilization. We must adopt in textbook theory what all successful executives practice; combine authority for planning with responsibility for execution. We should discard the discredited French General Staff doctrine of anonymous planning with no responsibility for results, of functional coordination in the name of the commander. These factors justify every possible simplification in our military structure.

9. Recognizing the two basic functions, fighting and support, it is felt that in every echelon of military command there should be the fighting elements and the supporting, or administrative, elements. For efficiency and simplicity, the supporting or administrative elements in any commander's organization should be guided and, indeed, normally commanded by a dependable deputy who plans the administrative support of operations in close contact with the operations deputy. Only by such sound planning and the faithful execution of such plans can the commander be reasonably certain of achieving his mission.

10. Whereas the basic attitude of the fighting commanders must be aggressive and grasping -- tenacious and even selfish -- fundamentally the basic attitude of the service commander and his forces must be instinctively generous and unselfish in their giving the very best of service. The service commander's mission is not one of competition with the fighting commanders, but to support them in every possible way toward the attainment of the high commander's objective. This service attitude is fundamental on the part of all service personnel, and especially the service commanders. If they lack such a service attitude; if they are unfaithful in their stewardship; they should be promptly replaced.

11. The Army Service Force policy of providing overall service coordination throughout the world for our fighting forces was, I feel sure, based upon General Somervell's desire to render the best possible service, both in regard to time and to tonnages of equipment and supplies, as and where needed. Therefore the fighting services recognize the soundness of individual service integration, such as Quartermaster, Medical, Signal, Ordnance, Engineer, from divisions, through corps, armies, groups, and thence, we had not realized the essential need of an overall integrated coordination which was offered by ASF. Coordination of all such services with transportation is of vital importance, yet one apparently forgotten between wks. So important is transportation that it becomes almost the regulating factor in the supply of both materiel and personnel replacements. For this reason, as well as for other reasons of economy, it is felt that the service commander should be responsible for personnel replacements. However, a transportation service should not only be continued with the hope of becoming more and more efficient, but should cover all types of transportation, including air transportation.

12. The importance of having a continuing overall service force organization in our military structure can hardly be overemphasized. Its importance is all the greater for the combined services, air, naval, and ground. It should not only be wisely organized from an economic peacetime standpoint, both for production and for administration, but it should be indoctrinated with the service ideal. It should have its academy as the fountainhead of its idealism in the basic training of its officer corps. Its personnel should be initially selected for their service viewpoint,

and should be indoctrinated through their formative years and held up to such performance for their entire service. They should be men and women who derive the greatest satisfaction from giving their best service and their best resources in support of their nation's and the United Nations' mission. There should be no justification of suspicion on the part of the fighting forces that the service personnel is doing other than giving its best.

13. Running through the General Board's report on organization one reads an inference that the Com-Ar Com Z ETO was bidding for critical items of personnel against the fighting commands, Army groups, air forces, and possibly naval forces. It is natural that aggressive, grasping, fighting natures may be led into such false suspicions. Actually, insofar as practicable, all shortages were foreseen and priorities arranged for equitable distribution. Where agreement could be reached among the representatives of commanders of the several fighting commands, such priorities were followed without having to obtain the approval of the Theater Commander. In my recollection, very few such decisions had to be taken to him. Similarly, in personnel administration the allotment of replacements was determined after consultation with the interested commanders or their responsible representatives. The Service Forces, without exception, got what was left, and actually produced thousands of service troop volunteers and transferees for retaining as combat reinforcements. In matter of promotion and award, the detailed recommendations submitted by the force commanders was presented exactly as received, and without further recommendation, to the Theater Commander in person. His own administrative firms and arrangements in such presentation were faithfully followed, and his decisions were implemented by his immediate official staff. Being the service forces commander, I scrupulously avoided any hint of preferential recommendation. This was clearly my duty, as it must be the object of service personnel to adhere faithfully to a disinterested attitude.

14. In conclusion, it is submitted that:

(a) The administrative support of the fighting forces in the European Theater was, on the whole, successful;

(b) The administrative conflicts previously experienced in France during 1917-19 were largely avoided, as were most of the administrative difficulties experienced in North Africa during 1943;

(c) Our future military organization, particularly the staff structure, should be simplified and made to follow direct lines of responsibility;

(d) Far more effort must be made toward the selection and training of professional administrative personnel;

(e) We must plan against future emergencies

of increasing complexity by adhering all the more
faithfully to sound disinterested thinking and simpli-
fied organization.

15. It is recommended that this letter be made
an Appendix to the General Board's Report on Organi-
zation of the European Theater of Operations, Part
Two.

/S/ John C. H. Lee
JOHN C. H. LEE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army

1. General Lee's letter on Theater Organization Study, resulting from his review of a draft of the Study, presents some thoughts not included therein and discussion of points not appearing in the final draft. It is believed that brief comments on his letter should accompany it.

2. A draft of the Study was submitted to General Lee for his review before preparing the final draft. In addition to the letter submitted by him, he made a number of pertinent suggestions which have been thoroughly considered and a number of them included in the final report. Reference is hereinafter made to certain paragraphs of his letter.

3. Reference paragraph 3. The wording of the former paragraph 7b referred to will be changed somewhat as indicated in the final paragraph 104.

4. Reference paragraph 4. The General Board's report is confined by direction to the European Theater. Very probably it will be considered along with reports from other theaters. It is believed that this particular report must include in its conclusions such details and peculiarities of the European Theater as seem desirable.

5. Reference paragraph 5. It is agreed that future campaigns are not likely to resemble closely those of the past, but we assist in our preparation for future campaigns by the study of the past and we gain particularly by thorough consideration of the difficulties and the steps taken to overcome them; often the seemingly minor details are the most troublesome. The conclusion referred to in General Lee's paragraph 5 has been reviewed and now appears as paragraph 106 of the Study. However, with reference to his comment on the situation in North Africa, it is believed that there was considerable difference between the administrative organizational problems in the two Theaters, resulting particularly from the fact that the European Theater lent itself to free command in the field much as contemplated in our Field Manuals and pre-war teachings.

6. Reference paragraph 6. The report does include mention of the shortage of experienced administrative personnel. The report does not indicate whether the campaign was successfully supported or not, although we do know that the operations were successful. The General Board is making a number of studies based upon our experience in the European Theater and it is endeavouring to present some of the lessons resulting from our operations, with recommendations which may result in improvement in the future. The studies are made regardless of the fact that our operations were successful.

7. Reference paragraphs 8, 9, and 10. It is agreed that we should combine authority for planning

with responsibility for execution. It is also agreed that our military structure should be as simple as possible. The Study indicates, partially at least, that with respect to this particular point there was divided opinion and that basically the differences in opinion were due to the re-organization of the War Department in March 1942 and the AFSC theory of Service operation. The Study presents some of the differences in thought with respect to where authority and responsibility should be placed. It appears that the AFSC theory and General Lee's thoughts on Service control follows to some extent the British system. The British normally have a Chief Administrative Officer, who, although not a deputy of the commander, does rank along with the Chief of Staff in their field organization. However, there is no organization under the British system corresponding to our Communications Zone and there is not delegated to the major subordinate commanders the full responsibilities that we give to ours, including the Army commanders. General Lee's thought that the Service commander's mission does not result in competition with the fighting commander, is not in accord with the art presented in the Study. The Communications Zone Commander requires the means to accomplish his mission and those means are just as important to him as are those relating to the Army and the Air Forces commanders. A spirit of self-sacrifice, although laudable, may be in error, in that the sacrifice at one particular time may be to the detriment of later operations as a whole; the need for that sacrifice should be considered thoroughly with the requirements both at that time and for the future.

8. Reference paragraph 11. General Lee's statement that the fighting forces recognize the soundness of individual Service integration, etc., through corps, armies, groups, and theater, may be questioned, if it means that they recognize that these services should be integrated under the Service commander. Our teachings recognize the responsibility of a Service chief if they recognize also that in each command the responsibility for the Services in that command remains with the commander and not with a theater commander, even though the latter be designated as Deputy Theater Commander.

9. Reference paragraph 12. The Study indicates a need for greater consideration being given in the time to administrative training, including both staffs and organizations. With reference to General Lee's last sentence, the Study is not intended to dictate that the fighting forces were suspicious of a Service personnel not giving its best; it did indicate that if such a condition could be avoided it preferable to have one command giving its full attention to the accomplishment of the mission assigned, and to avoid the same command having overall responsibilities for itself and other subordinate commands.

10. Reference paragraph 13. It was intended there would be more than an inference in the Study with respect to the SOS or Com Z ETO bidding against other commands for critical items or personnel. To accomplish

its mission the Communication Zone requires personnel, including Service organizations, equipment, and supplies. Since it is admitted by all that such things are never available in sufficient quantities it is obvious that we must assign to the various commands including the Communications Zone, such means as are available. It seems very possible that unless the commander's headquarters exercises the commander's responsibility for the direction of the entire effort, the sacrifice of the Communications Zone operations in order to assist the other commands may be in error. Again, the Study is not intended to indicate that the Service forces commander gave his own command preferential treatment, but rather that such a commander should not be placed in the position of deciding for or against himself in the accomplishment of his mission, for which he is responsible to his commander just as much as the Army or the Air forces commander.

/s/ Raymond G. Moses

RAYMOND G. MOSES

Brig Gen, U. S. Army